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With the growing use of online communications in our modern society, information
security is becoming a big concern. Along with that, the progress in quantum computers
is posing severe threats to such communications. Once powerful quantum computers are
available, most of today’s encryption schemes, which are based on computationally hard
problems, will be broken within a short period. Researchers are therefore making a great
effort to establish quantum-safe encryption schemes. One such scheme is quantum key
distribution (QKD), which utilizes the laws of quantum mechanics. These cryptography
protocols offer unconditional security to the communication between two distant parties
by providing a secure way of sharing encryption keys between them.
While over last few decades QKD has continuously progressed, it is limited to a distance
of up to several hundred kilometers using terrestrial quantum links. Satellites are therefore
being considered to extend the QKD range for global coverage, although implementations
of the satellite-based QKD infrastructure are still in their early stage. There are many
aspects of QKD that need further assessment and advancement for establishing long-term
satellite-based quantum communication (QC). My thesis works were focused on developing
advanced systems for single-photon detectors and quantum sources.
Single photon avalanche diodes (SPADs) are the most viable option for satellite-based
quantum communications. They must travel to outer space either for receiving quantum-
states in the ground-to-satellite QC, or for characterizing the quantum-sources in the
satellite-to-ground QC. However, while in space, SPADs exhibit damage caused by the
space radiation that gradually increases their dark counts. Performing QKD is not pos-
sible when the dark counts exceed a specific threshold. Hence, methods of reducing the
detectors’ dark counts by mitigating the damages would help to extend the SPADs’ in-space
useful lifetime. Laser annealing is one such effective method, found in lab experiments,
to heal the radiation-induced detector damages. We now aim to carry out this method in
low Earth orbit (LEO) to verify its in-orbit effectiveness. On that goal, we are building an
annealing payload (APL) for a cube satellite (CubeSat) in collaboration with the Univer-
sity of Illinois at Urbana Champaign (UIUC). We, the University of Waterloo team, built
one of the two segments of the APL– a space-qualified detector module containing two
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Excelitas C30902SH and Excelitas SLiK detectors. Our miniaturized and compact module
integrates the facilities required for the detector operation and laser annealing, as well as
an active detector temperature control system. The operation of the detector module is
highly flexible and software controllable. Our detector module will work together with the
control board containing the laser annealing system (built by the UIUC team). Once the
satellite has been launched in 2020, the in-orbit experiment will enable us to study the
in-space SPAD radiation damage and their healing using the integrated annealing system.
During a second project, we designed and built a new simple readout circuit for the
negative feedback avalanche diodes (NFADs), which are free-running single-photon detec-
tors at telecom wavelengths. These detectors suffer from strong afterpulsing effects, which
limits their overall performances. Therefore, our readout system incorporates features to
suppress NFAD afterpulses. We also used this custom readout to characterize two NFADs
(from Princeton Lightwave) and assessed the performance of the new electronics. Our
analysis showed that even at higher detection efficiencies, a 20 µs hold-off time after each
avalanche event is enough to extensively reduce the number of afterpulses and to keep the
dark count rate below 100 Hz at 192 K temperature. Both the detectors showed timing
jitter of less than 75 ps FWHM at their maximum efficiencies. The best figure of merit is
found to be 1.6×107, which is comparable to that of the high-performing superconducting
nanowire single photon detectors. This result demonstrates the suitability of our readout
and the NFADs in various quantum optics applications, such as in long-distance quantum
key distribution, where the detection rate is usually low.
We then performed a blinding attack, which enables an Eavesdropper in QKD to gain
information on the key, on these NFADs using bright illumination. These detectors are
usually threshold detectors that generate a click when the optical power is above a certain
threshold, otherwise they do not click. Blinding attack utilizes their inability of resolving
the photon numbers. During the experiment, we sent controlled optical pulses with a high
time resolution to deterministically force detection at the detectors. The result demon-
strated the NFADs’ susceptibility to this attacks, which tells us to include countermeasures
into the system to protect the communications.
Finally, we built a quantum source to produce 785 nm polarized photons to implement
decoy-state BB84 QKD. Our source utilized the sum-frequency generation scheme to gen-
erate 785 nm laser pulses. Its modulator system includes an intensity modulator and two
phase modulators in the Mach-Zehnder configuration to prepare polarized quantum states
with different intensities. Our source provides a repetition rate of 500 MHz, which was
successfully used in an airborne QKD demonstration with a moving receiver up to 10 km
distance.
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To summarize, my research projects are a contribution to the development of advanced
devices, particularly single-photon detectors for quantum communications.
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In today’s modern life, our society is deeply connected through a variety of electronic de-
vices, such as desktops, laptops, smartphones, wearables, or smart cards. Because of the
technology advancements of these gadgets, people nowadays rely heavily on online com-
munications in their daily activities. Many of such activities include online data transfer,
banking, shopping, email, and data storage in the clouds, which are rendered using pub-
lic communication channels. Therefore, it is crucial to protect these transmissions using
encryption so that an unauthorized entity does not gain access to the information.
Modern cryptography uses two types of encryption schemes: symmetric cryptography
(i.e., advanced encryption standard, AES [1], triple data encryption standard, TDES [2]),
and asymmetric cryptography (i.e., RSA [3], Diffie-Hellman, DH [4], and elliptical curve,
ECC [5, 6]). Most of these schemes do not provide any provable security. They are based on
mathematically hard problems, which are assumed to be unsolvable within a certain time
frame using conventional computers. The construct of the mathematical problems is such
that the computation is easy in one direction while the reverse is difficult. For instance,
the popular public-key scheme, RSA utilizes the difficulty of factorizing an integer that
is a product of two secret prime numbers. Typically, long integers are chosen so that an
adversary needs several decades to break the scheme. The security thus depends on limited
computational power of an adversary.
However, the security of these schemes is currently under threat posed by the ex-
ponential processing power of quantum computers. These new computers use quantum
mechanical effects for information processing. Their fundamental information units are
quantum bits, also known as qubits, that can be at both ’0’ and ’1’ states concurrently.
This property of qubits is called superposition that provides a probabilistic outcome upon
measurement. In addition, using another property of qubits – quantum entanglement –
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one qubit can influence another at a distance. A combination of superposition and en-
tanglement properties give parallel processing power to quantum computers. Therefore, a
quantum computer using n qubits can execute 2n operations simultaneously. An adversary,
having access to such quantum computers can exploit quantum algorithms to optimize cer-
tain hard problems. For example, Shor’s algorithm [7] would make it possible to factorize a
large number in a relatively shorter time. An adversary could also run Grover’s algorithm
[8] in a quantum machine to break the symmetric cryptography systems. This algorithm
would be able to find a particular entry from an unsorted database of size N in
√
N itera-
tions, while a conventional computer would need N/2 iterations. For instance, in AES-128
symmetric cryptography, an attacker would need a maximum 264 operations in a quantum
machine as opposed to that of 2128 in classical computer to break the scheme.
The concerning fact – from cryptography’s point of view – is that quantum computers
are coming into existence very fast. For example, the quantum machine from Rigetti has
the capability of up to 128 qubits [9]. However, a study by the National Academies says
that quantum computers still need way more processing power to attempt a real attack
on the existing classical encryptions. It is stated that a quantum computer would need 20
million qubits to break an RSA-2048 bit system [10]. Now the question is, how long it will
take to build a quantum computer with super processing power. Although the advances of
these machines are unpredictable, quantum scientists anticipate that quantum computers
might come earlier than expected. This is certainly alarming news to any government,
defense, or business agencies who want to secure their data for decades. Therefore, it is
important to develop a ’quantum-safe’ cryptography soon so that defensive measures are
ready against the foreseen attacks by the quantum computers.
At this moment there are two possible solutions to this threats: post-quantum cryp-
tography (PQC) [11] and quantum key distribution (QKD) [12, 13]. PQC is also based
upon complex mathematical problems that are assumed to be unsolvable, or at least not
solvable within a certain time, even by a quantum computer. This scheme is also known as
quantum-resistant cryptography. They can be implemented within our existing infrastruc-
tures as most of the implementations are software-based. However, PQC schemes do not
guarantee security due to the lack of security proofs. On the other hand, QKD guarantees
unconditional security (not dependent on any assumptions), as this protocol is based on
quantum mechanics. It is a method of generating encryption keys between two end-users
(generally referred to as Alice and Bob). In QKD, there is a fundamental limit that an
Eavesdropper (Eve) can gain from a quantum system. According to the Heisenberg Un-
certainty Principle [14], Eve can only know one parameter with certainty from a conjugate
property by measuring a quantum system. In addition, ’No-cloning theorem’ [15] says that
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if Eve tries to copy a quantum state, it will disturb the system. Therefore, Eve’s attempt
to measure or copy a quantum state will introduce errors in the measurement outcomes.
This will reveal her presence to Alice and Bob. The only downside of QKD systems is that
it needs a completely different sophisticated infrastructure.
However, QKD being the only provably secure quantum-safe scheme, a great effort
has been given to the development of its protocols and the technology required for its
infrastructure. QKD was originally proposed in 1984 by Bennet and Brassard (BB84
protocol) [12]. It uses photons as information carriers that are transmitted from Alice
to Bob. This protocol can be implemented using various degrees of freedom. In QKD,
using polarization degree of freedom, Alice first generates a single-photon in one of the
four polarization states: |H〉, |V 〉, |D〉 and |A〉. To prepare the photon-states, she uses two
non-orthogonal bases: horizontal/Vertical (H/V) basis and diagonal/anti-diagonal (D/A).
The bases are used to encode bit 0 and 1, where |H〉 and |D〉 refer to 0, and |V 〉 and |A〉
refer to 1. After preparing the states, Alice sends them to Bob, who measures the received
photons randomly in a horizontal/Vertical (H/V) or a diagonal/anti-diagonal (D/A) basis.
If Bob’s measurement basis matches with that of Alice, they will have the same outcome
with high probability. In contrast, for the non-matching basis choice, their outcome can be
different. After completing the transmission of a certain number of qubits, they establish
a key, called raw key. Then Alice and Bob communicate over an authenticated public
channel. Bob announces his measurement basis that he used for each state, and Alice tells
the correct basis choices. At the end of this communication phase, they keep only those
states having the matching bases and discard the rest. This process is called sifting and
leads to a new shorter key: sifted key. During the sifting process, if Eve tries to listen to
the open communications between Alice and Bob, she will only know the basis choices, not
the actual bit values. Once a sifted is produced, Alice and Bob next exchange a portion of
their sifted key to check the quantum bit error rate (QBER). If the QBER exceeds a certain
threshold, the operation is aborted. Otherwise, the sifted key is error corrected and then
shortened through a privacy amplification process to reduce the probability of information
leakage to Eve. The last two tasks are performed through a classical communication
channel and known as classical post-processing. At the end of all processing, Alice and Bob
establish a shared secret key between them. This key then can be used with any symmetric
encryption algorithm, such as AES or TDES, although to achieve unconditional security,
one-time pad (OTP) encryption scheme is required [16].
There is another main stream QKD scheme that utilizes quantum entanglement prop-
erties of photons. The scheme was proposed by Artur Ekert in 1991 (E91 protocol) [13],
where an intermediate source generates an entangled-photon pair. One photon is then sent
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towards Alice and another one towards Bob. E91 scheme utilizes singlet states: either
1√
2
(|H〉a|V 〉b±|V 〉a|H〉b), or 1√2(|D〉a|A〉b±|A〉a|D〉b). When received, Alice and Bob both
measure the states at random bases. Both of them next communicate over a public chan-
nel to announce their chosen measurement bases for each state. They keep the states for
similar bases that give a bit string and forms a raw key. One of them needs to flip their bit
value since singlet states are anti-correlated. They also share a small portion of the key to
test the Bell’s inequality [17, 18] by calculating their correlation value S. When the corre-
lation statistics violate some form of Bell’s inequality, it confirms the entanglement, which
in turn guarantees the security since there is no classical replication of such correlation. If
Eve tries to eavesdrop, her action will simply disturb the correlation of the quantum states,
revealing her presence to Alice and Bob. The post-processing of this scheme is similar to
that of BB84 scheme.
QKD technology has progressed very fast in the last decade. Commercial QKD systems
[19–21] have already been tested in government tasks (e.g., elections in Geneva), banks, as
well as Soccer World cup in 2010 [19]. But the QKD links, which are generally established
via optical fibers [22–24] or free-space [25–27], have limited range in the Earth. The in-
trinsic optical loss in fiber imposes the limit [28], while free-space links are restricted due
to the possible direct point-to-point links [29]. One of the other reasons for this distance
limitation is the nonexistence of quantum repeaters [30], which are still in their early stages
of development, and the time of their readiness is quite unknown. Therefore, an intensive
effort is being given to alternative solutions in extending the limits of QKD distance and
the key rates. At present, satellites are being considered in the QKD infrastructure to
extend its range. Towards that goal, China has launched its first quantum communication
satellite in 2016 and has been successful in demonstrating the ground-to-satellite entan-
glement distribution[31], decoy-state QKD [32] and quantum teleportation [33] over 1200
km. Almost a year later, in 2017, Japan was also successful in sending single-photons from
a low-cost microsatellite to a ground station [34].
However, there are various other aspects of QKD systems that need further investigation
to push the existing technology to make them suitable for long-distance communication.
In particular, the two main components of a quantum communication system – quantum
sources and receivers – require more improvements. That leads to the direction of my
research. In this thesis, I present my works that have been done on single-photon detectors
(SPDs), which are the mandatory devices for quantum receivers. I also explain my work
that is done on a weak coherent pulsed (WCP) source.
My recent research is developing a single-photon detector (SPD) module that fits in a
small satellite – a CubeSat (described in chapter 3). Nonetheless, The detector module
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is designed incorporating silicon single-photon avalanche photodiodes (SPADs), which are
a popular device for free-space quantum links because of their high detection efficiency.
However, these SPADs are affected by the space radiation consisting of high energy elec-
tron and proton particles. In satellite-quantum communication, when the detectors in a
spacecraft orbit the Earth, they come to the exposure of in-orbit radiation. It was found
in a satellite mission [35] that proton radiation significantly increases the detectors’ back-
ground noise by damaging the device material. The noise keeps growing each time they
cross through the radiation. If the noise exceeds a certain limit, then it is impossible to
perform quantum communication [36]. Therefore, it is important to keep the noise be-
low the threshold to lengthen the mission lifetime. Fortunately, there are several effective
solutions: thermal annealing [37, 38] and laser annealing [39, 40]. These methods are in-
vestigated in several ground-based experiments [41–46] to mitigate the detector radiation
damages. Among these methods, laser annealing was found highly effective in resolving
the damages [40, 47]. Therefore, we aim to perform an in-orbit laser annealing on the
Si-SPADs within a CubeSat in the CAPSat mission [48]. We designed and implemented a
SPAD module incorporating the facilities of doing laser annealing and an active thermal
control system. We also developed the firmware to control its operation. Then the devel-
oped module will be tested in a thermal vacuum chamber (TVAC) to verify its performance
in the space-vacuum environment. The details are discussed in chapter 5.
We have also studied negative feedback avalanche diodes (NFADs) [49], which are a type
of InGaAs/InP detector. The NFADs work in a free-running mode at 1550 nm wavelength
and are suitable for long-distance fiber-based quantum communication. One of the major
issues with these NFADs is their significant afterpulsing probability. The afterpulses are
non-photon detection events that are produced subsequently after the photon detections.
These false counts adversely affect the real photon counts, and the timing of the detection
events. Therefore, it is necessary to incorporate the afterpulse suppression feature in
NFADs’ readout electronics. From this motivation, we developed a new design of a readout
incorporating a circuit for active afterpulse suppression. We then implemented the design
and tested it, as well as characterized two NFAD detectors using our readout module.
chapter 6 gives the details of this experiment.
Next, we performed a blinding attack [50–53] on the NFADs using bright illumination,
explained in chapter 7. Usually, practical single-photon detectors suffer imperfections,
exploiting which an eavesdropper can attack SPADs to gain information. Particularly
in the blinding attacks, Eve can control detectors’ outcomes by sending bright pulses,
which enables her to get information on the transmitted quantum bits. Consequently, it is
necessary to know if the SPAD devices are susceptible to blinding attacks. If they are, we
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will need to incorporate countermeasures into the detector systems to prevent information
leakage. We therefore performed a similar attack on two NFAD samples, and our result
suggests that the detectors are unsafe against the blinding attack.
In one project, I worked on single-photon source. We developed a weak coherent pulsed
(WCP) source that are used in many practical realization of quantum communications. A
WCP source is required to have high repetition rate for photon transmissions over a lossy
links in the long-distance communications, particularly in the ground-to satellite links.
High rate source increases the probability of received photons at the receiver. The WCP
source that we developed provides maximum repetition rate of 500 MHz. It has phase and
intensity modulators that implements BB84 decoy-state protocol [54] by preparing four
polarization states at three different intensities, which was used in a successful airborne
QKD demonstration up to a 10km distance. The design and operation of our WCP source,
and the airborne QKD are described in chapter 8. Our source provides a repetition rate of
500 MHz which was also successfully used in an airborne QKD demonstration up to 10km
distance.
Moreover, in chapter 2, I explained the background and schemes of the satellite quantum
communications. Then different types of SPDs and their working principals are discussed





With the rapid technological development in recent years, QKD is now a mature protocol
and ready for commercial implementations [20, 55]. QKD systems use either optical fiber
or free-space as a medium of photon transmission [56, 57]. Fibers are more commonly
used both in proof-of-principle QKD experiments [58] and in implementations of larger-
scale quantum networks [59, 60]. However, fiber loss increases exponentially as the QKD
distance extends. This loss reduces the signal strength down to the dark count rate of
the receiver’s single-photon detectors, which increases the quantum bit error rate (QBER).
QBER is the percentage of incorrect bits over the total number of received bits that needs
to be below a certain threshold (depends on the QKD protocol in use) to generate secure
keys. The bounds of QBER ( i.e., 11% for BB84 protocol [61]) thus imposes a limit in the
maximum possible QKD range. Until now, fiber-based QKD succeed to generate secure
keys for the longest distance of up to 421 km [28].
In contrast, QKD links over the terrestrial free-space are limited by the possible line-
of-sight locations [56]. These links are also affected by the external atmosphere, especially
due to the objects in optical paths, atmospheric turbulence, and weather conditions, which
cause beam distortion and beam wandering. The atmospheric absorption increases expo-
nentially and the beam divergence scales quadratically with distance. As of now, the direct
free-space QKD has been successful to reach up to 144 km [56, 62].
Consequently, to facilitate long-distance quantum communications, quantum signals
would be required to be amplified in the intermediate nodes. But according to no-cloning
theorem [63], it is not possible to create an amplified copy of quantum signals. In this
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context, quantum-repeaters [30] and -satellites [64] are the two potential alternatives for
the globalization of quantum communications. Quantum repeaters are very promising for
future long-distance QKD, but they are still in the development process [65]. In contrast,
satellite QKD is already feasible utilizing current satellite and quantum technologies [54,
66, 67]. As of now, China has already demonstrated satellite QKD in their first quantum
satellite Micius [31–33], and few other countries are preparing to launch their own quantum
satellites in the upcoming years [68–71].
In the satellite-based quantum links, only a small fraction of the propagation path
remains in the atmosphere, less than 10 km [64], while the rest of the long path is empty
space. In the empty space, optical signals experiences almost no atmosphere induced losses,
due to which the satellite links can potentially connect any two points in the globe. This
chapter explains the satellite-based QKD schemes, related challenges, and the efforts that
are made until now towards the satellite QKD.
2.2 Satellite QKD schemes
There are several possible satellite-based quantum communication schemes (as seen in Fig.
2.1) for extending distances between two ground stations. For example:
1. Ground-to-satellite, also known as uplink, where a photon source stays on the ground
station, and the satellite carries the receiver.
2. Satellite-to-ground, known as downlink, where the satellite carries the quantum
source and the receiver locates at the ground station.
3. Satellite carries a entangled-photon source which sends the photon pairs to two
ground stations simultaneously.
4. Inter-satellite QKD link.
In an uplink (scheme 1), the ground station streams quantum signals to a receiver
located in space, whereas in a downlink (scheme 2), a satellite carrying quantum-source
sends signals downwards towards a ground station. Generally, the downlinks exhibit less
optical loss since the optical signals experience atmospheric turbulence only at the end of
a transmission link. In comparison, optical signals in their uplink propagation experience
more loss due to the occurrence of turbulence at the beginning of the path [36]. Therefore,
the downlink is capable of generating more key bits than an uplink [36], but operating
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At the National University of Singapore's Centre 
for Quantum Technologies, we have pursued an 
iterative approach to this problem, developing 
lightweight and rugged entangled photon pair sources 
with sufficiently low SWaP requirements to allow 
hosting on board “CubeSat” class nanosatellites. As 
their popularity increases, nanosatellites and the 
CubeSat platform continue to represent an attractive 
pathway towards establishing flight heritage and 
raising the technology readiness level (TRL) of 
components in our QKD system. The SpooQySat 
programme consists of a number of field tests and 
satellite missions tied to the parallel development of a 
miniature, robust and highly capable entangled photon 
source known as SPEQS [10]. 
In this paper, we briefly review proposed satellite 
QKD architectures and the progress being made at 
CQT developing and testing our quantum light sources. 
3. Satellite QKD Schemes
To share quantum encryption keys between space
and ground the quantum light source can be located on 
the ground or in space (see Figure 1 and [12]), though 
for maximum utility the source should be located in 
orbit (three out of four options in Figure 1 require this). 
Beaming photons from space-to-ground also has the 
advantage that the optical transmission path is much 
less affected by atmospheric turbulence (because the 
effects of turbulence act primarily at the end of the 
transmission, where the atmosphere is thickest) so 
optical link losses are lower [13]. Despite this, the 
perceived difficulty in operating a quantum source on-
board a satellite has led several groups to propose 
ground-to-space missions [14 - 17]. 
If scenarios 1 or 2 are used to share keys between 
two ground stations then it is required that the satellites 
be trusted parties in the key exchange (we call these 
“trusted nodes”). In contrast, scenario 3 (recently 
demonstrated in the Micius mission [8]) potentially 
enables entanglement-based QKD, removing this trust 
requirement. This is because if one photon in each pair 
of photons is beamed to Alice (at one ground station) 
and the other of the pair beamed to Bob (who is at the 
other ground station) then only Alice and Bob will 
have knowledge of the measurement outcomes and the 
key generated is private to them. They will be able to 
test this quantum exclusivity by performing a Bell 
violation test [5], and consequently need not trust the 
source. This scheme is restricted to ground stations 
simultaneously within the field-of-view of the satellite, 
and since both photons in a pair are traveling along 
high-loss paths the probability of both photons in a 
pair reaching their ground stations is very small 
(~60dB of total loss). Consequently key generation 
rates would be very slow, and indeed the recent 
demonstration of entanglement distribution by the 
Micius mission was able to achieve only slightly more 
than a single pair per second [8]. 
Figure 1- Possible satellite-based QKD implementations. 1. Ground-to-space, where the photon source is on the 
ground and the satellite only carries detectors. 2. Space-to-ground, where the satellite carries a source and detectors. 
3. A platform that can beam down to two ground stations simultaneously. 4. Inter-satellite QKD which could be the
building block for a long baseline test of quantum correlations. To enable configurations 2-4 with Bell violation-type
measurements, a source of entangled photons in space must be demonstrated. Figure reproduced from [11]. 
Figure 2.1: Possible configurations for satellite-based QKD. Reprinted from [72]
an in-orbit quantum source is complicated. Because of that, several groups are actively
working with the uplink scheme [66, 73–75]. An uplink offers a few advantages over a
downlink. For instance, the complex and energy-consuming photon sources stay on the
ground that allows flexibility to choose quantum sources among various options, such
as entangled photon source or weak coherent photon source. Also, satellite carries the
relatively simple single-photon detectors as components of a receiver, whose requirements
are comparatively relaxed. Usually, the receiver does not require a high-rate random
number generator and high-capacity for data processing and storage since the photon
reception rate is considerably low.
In scheme 3, a satellite carries an entangled photon pair source and establish two
downlinks with two stations on the ground allowing entanglement-based QKD between
the stations [31, 76]. This scenario demands the stations to have simultaneous line-of-sight
with the satellite. Chinese satellite was able to distribute entangled-photons over 1200
km [31]. In the last configuration, scheme 4, the inter-satellite QKD [77, 78] can be a
fundamental element for a long-distance quantum correlation test. A satellite carrying
an entangled-photon source can perform as trusted relay nodes, which are a temporary
solution to the quantum repeaters [79]. This scheme will potentially enable to distribute
entanglement at much longer distances on the ground [80].
2.2.1 Trusted node QKD scheme
In the near future, the trusted node configuration (Fig. 2.2) is foreseen as the most practical
form of satellite-based secret key generation. The satellites in schemes 1 and 2 in Fig. 2.2
function as a trusted node which is demonstrated by the Chinese Micius satellite [82]. In
this scheme, an orbiting satellite first performs QKD operation with the ground station A
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tems (including the moving observers scenario above). 
Moreover, long-distance “quantum teleportation” 
experiments could be conducted – the first baby steps 
towards realizing the famous Star Trek “Beam me up, 
Scotty” command may be only a few years away.
Meanwhile, back on Earth...
For these experiments to be conducted any time soon, 
an actual design for a satellite must be nailed down 
and, of course, built. As for anything of a space-faring 
pedigree, this encompasses a number of technical 
challenges that need to be resolved. First and fore-
most is figuring out how to successfully transmit the 
quantum optical signal between the satellite and the 
ground station, which has been studied in increas-
ing detail by various groups worldwide. The problem 
that needs to be overcome is atmospheric loss – not 
in space, but in the region near the ground station. 
Other effects to contend with include atmospheric 
turbulence, diffraction and background noise. Our 
own group at the Institute for Quantum Computing 
(IQC) in Waterloo, Canada, has recently concluded 
a comprehensive theoretical study, simultaneously 
incorporating all of the significant effects on the signal 
throughput, which has helped us to determine what 
overall design features of the satellite and ground sta-
tion systems would be suitable. We also calculated the 
expected performance of the quantum optical signal 
for QKD and fundamental science endeavours.
Another important technical challenge is to ensure 
that the quantum channel between the satellite and 
the ground station is precisely aligned as we need 
Towards global quantum communication
Global communication, such as fibre-optic broadband, could 
be made more robust by establishing a secure encryption 
key between two communicators that no-one else could 
possibly know. This could be done by using a satellite 
enabled with quantum technologies to act as a kind of relay 
between two ground stations to establish a secure key. 
One way of doing this would be a “trusted node” approach 
(left), in which an orbiting satellite first establishes a key – 
key 1 – with station A via quantum key distribution (QKD), 
sending single photons one at a time either by uplink (from 
ground to satellite) or downlink (from satellite to ground). The 
satellite travels some distance and then establishes another, 
different, key – key 2 – with station B. (QKD itself cannot 
transmit existing keys, but only generate new ones.) The 
satellite then encodes key 1 with key 2 (encrypting it) and 
transmits the result over radio communications to ground 
station B, which uses the key it knows (key 2) to determine 
key 1. At this point both ground stations possess a shared 
secure key – key 1 – which enables them to communicate 
securely on the ground via the usual classical means.
This approach comes with a caveat, however: the satellite 
knows the secure key that the ground stations will use. If a 
nefarious entity were to somehow penetrate the security of 
the satellite, which would be no small feat given a properly 
designed autonomous orbiter, then the security of the 
communication on the ground would be vulnerable. One has 
to trust that the satellite is secure.
Fortunately, it is possible to utilize a different approach 
such that the satellite can act as an “untrusted node” (right). 
Here, an orbiting satellite generates entangled photon 
pairs and transmits one photon of the pair to each of the 
ground stations A and B simultaneously. The entanglement 
correlations between the photon pairs allow A and B to 
extract a common secret key that even the satellite does 
not know. The ground stations could then compare their 
detection statistics, independent of the source, in a manner 
similar to a Bell test (see box opposite), allowing them to 
verify that no other party gained information about the 
states they received – not even the satellite. (Another 
proposal reverses this idea, with each ground station 
generating and transmitting single photons that are received 
and entangled by the satellite, although this is considerably 
more technically challenging.)
Verification of the trustworthiness of the source means 
that no assumptions have to be made about the security of 
the satellite, but it does mean that the satellite needs much 
more complex kit, including an entangled photon source and 
two telescopes that can be pointed independently. These 
extra complications make the trusted node, by comparison, 
seem like a good stepping stone for testing quantum 
encryption with a satellite, moving towards an untrusted 
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Figure 2.2: Illustartion of satellite-based trusted node configuration. Reprinted from [81]
by sending single hotons either by an uplink or by a downlink and establishes a key K1.
Then after traveling a distance when the satellite comes on site of the second station, B
creates another key K2 by performing a second QKD operation. The satellite knows both
keys while the stations only know their key. Then the satellite encrypts key K1 by K2
and sends over the classical ch nnel to the station B. Afterward, B preforms K2 ⊕ (K1 ⊕
K2) = K1, (where ⊕ indicates the exclusive-or operation), to gain key K1. This operation
facilitates both stations to share a common secret key K1, which the stations will use on
the ground in classical channels for secure communication. In this scheme, the satellite
must be trusted because it knows the key. If an adv rsary g ts access to the satellite, the
security of information will be compromised.
2.2.2 Untrusted node QKD scheme
A different approach, like scheme 3 in Fig. 2.2, where an in-orbit entangled-photon source
distributes photon pairs to the ground s ations, oes not req ire to be trusted (Space-
QUEST mission concept [76] and also implemented by Micius satellite [31]). Since each
photon of an entangled pair is sent to the stations A and B separately, only A and B will
know their measurement outcome. Both stations will perform Bell tests [83] to verify the
quantum correlations of the photon pairs, and will form a common secret key. The Bell
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tems (including the moving observers scenario above). 
Moreover, long-distance “quantum teleportation” 
experiments could be conducted – the first baby steps 
towards realizing the famous Star Trek “Beam me up, 
Scotty” command may be only a few years away.
Meanwhile, back on Earth...
For these experiments to be conducted any time soon, 
an actual design for a satellite must be nailed down 
and, of course, built. As for anything of a space-faring 
pedigree, this encompasses a number of technical 
challenges that need to be resolved. First and fore-
most is figuring out how to successfully transmit the 
quantum optical signal between the satellite and the 
ground station, which has been studied in increas-
ing detail by various groups worldwide. The problem 
that needs to be overcome is atmospheric loss – not 
in space, but in the region near the ground station. 
Other effects to contend with include atmospheric 
turbulence, diffraction and background noise. Our 
own group at the Institute for Quantum Computing 
(IQC) in Waterloo, Canada, has recently concluded 
a comprehensive theoretical study, simultaneously 
incorporating all of the significant effects on the signal 
throughput, which has helped us to determine what 
overall design features of the satellite and ground sta-
tion systems would be suitable. We also calculated the 
expected performance of the quantum optical signal 
for QKD and fundamental science endeavours.
Another important technical challenge is to ensure 
that the quantum channel between the satellite and 
the ground station is precisely aligned as we need 
Towards global quantum communication
Global communication, such as fibre-optic broadband, could 
be made more robust by establishing a secure encryption 
key between two communicators that no-one else could 
possibly know. This could be done by using a satellite 
enabled with quantum technologies to act as a kind of relay 
between two ground stations to establish a secure key. 
One way of doing this would be a “trusted node” approach 
(left), in which an orbiting satellite first establishes a key – 
key 1 – with station A via quantum key distribution (QKD), 
sending single photons one at a time either by uplink (from 
ground to satellite) or downlink (from satellite to ground). The 
satellite travels some distance and then establishes another, 
different, key – key 2 – with station B. (QKD itself cannot 
transmit existing keys, but only generate new ones.) The 
satellite then encodes key 1 with key 2 (encrypting it) and 
transmits the result over radio communications to ground 
station B, which uses the key it knows (key 2) to determine 
key 1. At this point both ground stations possess a shared 
secure key – key 1 – which enables them to communicate 
securely on the ground via the usual classical means.
This approach comes with a caveat, however: the satellite 
knows the secure key that the ground stations will use. If a 
nefarious entity were to somehow penetrate the security of 
the satellite, which would be no small feat given a properly 
designed autonomous orbiter, then the security of the 
communication on the ground would be vulnerable. One has 
to trust that the satellite is secure.
Fortunately, it is possible to utilize a different approach 
such that the satellite can act as an “untrusted node” (right). 
Here, an orbiting satellite generates entangled photon 
pairs and transmits one photon of the pair to each of the 
ground stations A and B simultaneously. The entanglement 
correlations between the photon pairs allow A and B to 
extract a common secret key that even the satellite does 
not know. The ground stations could then compare their 
detection statistics, independent of the source, in a manner 
similar to a Bell test (see box opposite), allowing them to 
verify that no other party gained information about the 
states they received – not even the satellite. (Another 
proposal reverses this idea, with each ground station 
generating and transmitting single photons that are received 
and entangled by the satellite, although this is considerably 
more technically challenging.)
Verification of the trustworthiness of the source means 
that no assumptions have to be made about the security of 
the satellite, but it does mean that the satellite needs much 
more complex kit, including an entangled photon source and 
two telescopes that can be pointed independently. These 
extra complications make the trusted node, by comparison, 
seem like a good stepping stone for testing quantum 
encryption with a satellite, moving towards an untrusted 
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Figure 2.3: Illustartion of satellite-based untrusted node configuration. reprinted from [81]
test ensures that the informa on of th r sultant measuremen outcome is not leaked to
any third party, including the satellite. Since the satellite has no knowledge of the key, the
quantum source can be untrusted. However, in this approach, the two stations must be
concurrently within the field-of-view of the satellite, and the probability of arrival of the
pho pairs to their gr und statio s are very low as the pair travels a long high-loss path
(∼60dB of loss). Hence, the key generation rate is very low, where the Micius mission was
able to acquire only a little more than a single pair per second.
2.2.3 QKD satellite orbits
The features of communication links are highly dependent on the orbital altitude of a
satellite [84]. The orbits are classified into three categories depending on their distance
from the Earth surface: i) Low Earth Orbit (LEO) – 160 to 2000 km in altitude, ii) Medium
Earth Orbit (MEO) – 2000 to <35786 km in altitude, and iii) Geostationary orbit (GEO)
– exactly 35786 km of altitude for circular orbits. Although LEO and GEO orbits are
most appropriate for satellite QKD applications, current missions are primarily targeting
the LEO orbits because of their proximity to the earth. These orbits have a lower link loss
(discussed in section 2.3) and also significantly low cost compared to the GEO satellites
due to the smaller size of the LEO satellites. However, due to relatively high orbiting
speed of the LEO satellites with respect to the earth (i.e., around 7.8 km at 800 km of
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altitude), it is difficult to maintain an accurate and stable link during signal transmission.
On contrary, maintaining a link would be easier with the GEO satellites as they appear
to be ’fixed’ over an Earth location but at the cost of much higher losses [85]. Telescope
optics are used as the transmitter and the receiver to establish the optical links and to
transmit quantum signals between the satellite and ground stations.
The number and the time of flyovers, and the duration of being on line-of-sight of
an LEO satellite with a ground station depends on orbital inclination and location of
the ground station. For example, satellites in a sun-synchronous polar orbit, which are
synchronous with the sun, pass over a specific location of the Earth at the same local time.
A study showed that a circular sun-synchronous noon/midnight LEO orbit at an altitude
of 600 km gives around 713 night time passes over a year at 90◦ of elevation [36]. The
Micius satellite at 500 km sun-synchronous orbit crosses over the Xinglong ground station
each night at around 12:50 am local time with total link duration of 5 minutes [32]. On
the other hand, the International space station orbit would pass over an Earth location at
40◦ of inclination giving 150 usable night time passes over a year [71].
2.3 Challenges of quantum communication
Satellite-based quantum communications are extremely challenging in respect of payload
(in this context, the quantum source or receiver) design within the limited available re-
sources. The launching cost scales up with the spacecraft dimension, weight, and power
[64]. In addition, the quantum payloads need to be robust enough to withstand the launch-
ing process and to survive in the space vacuum, radiation, microgravity, and thermal envi-
ronment [86]. Therefore, before moving on building the infrastructure for the space-QKD,
extensive theoretical and experimental feasibility studies have been performed [36, 64, 87–
89]. The studies have been done on different aspects of quantum space communication,
such as system automation [87], possibility of lightweight payload design, [64], and link loss
analysis [36, 88–90]. This section briefly discusses the transmission challenges of quantum
signals between the ground and satellite.
Quantum signals degrade as they propagate in the free-space. Several effects are respon-
sible for this degradation, such as beam scattering, absorption, atmospheric turbulence,
and pointing error. Of theses effects, scattering and absorption are caused by the molecules
in atmosphere, like water, carbon dioxide, and ozone. Depending on the molecular type and
concentration, the loss of signals vary through the atmosphere. The signal transmissions
are also dependent on their wavelengths. J. P Bourgoin et al. performed a comprehen-
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sive simulation to find out the low absorption transmission wavelengths [36]. The study
reported several low-loss transmission wavelengths– 665 to 685 nm, 775 to 785 nm, 1000
to 1070 nm and 1540 to 1680 nm are the most notable.
Another effect, the atmospheric turbulence leads to beam broadening and wandering,
and scintillation [36]. This effect originates from the variation of refractive index due to
temperature fluctuations that dominate in the lower 20 km of the atmosphere and depends
on the elevation angle and direction of propagation. An uplink is more affected by the
turbulence as it appears at the beginning of the signal propagation. However, turbulence
does not affect the polarization of quantum signals [91]. A simulation of atmospheric
turbulence has shown that location of a ground station plays an important role to have
optimal link efficiency [90]. The link loss varies around 10 dB between a location at sea-
level to an excellent location. Use of adaptive optics can increase the link efficiency up to
8 dB.
Beam diffraction also causes beam broadening [36]. Consequently, the total beam
broadening is a contribution from both the diffraction and turbulence. Diffraction induced
losses, which depends on signal wavelength, size of the transmitter telescope, and the link
distance, dominates in the downlinks. Beam divergence due to diffraction can be reduced
either by using telescopes having larger diameters or by using shorter signal wavelengths.
Therefore, a trade-off is required between these two parameters to mitigate diffraction




here, θ is the Beam divergence, DT is the transmitter aperture size or diameter, and λ
is photon wavelength. However, for ground-based transmitters, having telescope diameter
larger than a few tens of centimetres has less effect in reducing the overall loss due to the
atmospheric turbulence.
In addition, misalignment due to the telescope jitter and error in the tracking system
also contributes to the link loss. In-orbit jitter control of the telescopes is challenging, which
affects more to the downlinks. Pointing accuracy is an important factor in minimizing the
total link loss. The simulation performed by J. P. Bourgoin et al. demonstrated that
2 µrad or less error in the pointing would not contribute more than 1–4 dB in the total
loss [36].
Overall summary is optimization of the diameter of the transmitter and the receiver
telescopes, photon’s wavelengths, and the pointing system can minimize total link loss.
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2.4 Ground Based Free-space QKD
Since the first complete protocol for quantum cryptography in 1984, the first free-space
QKD protocol was demonstrated in lab using photon polarization in 1991 [58], although
the link length in the air was only 32 cm. The distance was extended to 205 m in another
laboratory demonstration by a research group at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
[26]. In 1996, researchers at the Johns Hopkins University were first able to transmit qubits
over a 75 m link under bright daylight condition [92]. This distance was subsequently
extended to 950 m over an outdoor free-space link during nighttime in 1998 by the LANL
researchers using B92 protocol [25]. With their consistent effort in the outdoor, they
successfully demonstrated 500 m point-to-point link at daytime in 1999 [93] and in 2000
they could further extend the link length first ever into kilometer range – 1.6 km using
a better QKD system [94]. They also showed the feasibility of achieving secret bit rates
of 3 kHz that is protected against the simple beam splitting attack and intercept-resend
attack. They further demonstrated the BB84 protocol in free-space over 10 km during
daylight condition with the secret key rate of 264 Hz in 2002 [95]. Later in the same
year, researchers at the Ludwig-Maximilian University were able to exchange secure keys
between two mountains over 23.4 kilometers free-space link [96]. Their raw key rate was
1.5 - 2 kbit/s with a bit error rate of less than 5%. They also exchanged keys up to 27 dB
of transmission in the poorer visibility . Most of these successful outdoor tests [25, 92–96]
envisioned ground to satellite quantum links as a possible means for future long-distance
quantum cryptography.
In the continuous efforts made for extending the range of free-space links, a European
research group in 2006 performed QKD over 144 km between two Canary Islands– La Palma
and Tenerife. They used both weak coherent laser pulses [62] and entangled photons [56],
and this was the first demonstration of entangled-photon distribution across such a long
distance. The atmospheric loss within such range is comparable with that between a low-
Earth orbit and a ground station, which confirmed the possibility of a quantum satellite.
In their BB84 QKD demonstration, the distributed secure key rate was 12.8 bps with
a 6.48% quantum bit error rate (QBER) and about 35 dB of transmission loss. Their
polarization-entangled photon distribution achieved the violation of Bell inequality by 13
standard deviations, confirming the entanglement. The produced secret key rate was 2.37
bps with 4.8% of QBER. They also performed quantum teleportation between the islands
to demonstrate the feasibility of the ground-to-satellite quantum teleportation. [97].
In 2012, a Chinese research group developed an advanced acquiring, pointing, and track-
ing (APT) system to follow an arbitrary object with high-frequency and high-accuracy.
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They demonstrated quantum teleportation and quantum entanglement distribution over a
97 km link across a lake [98]. They were able to send polarization-entangled photon-pairs
over the link with 35 to 53 dB of channel loss depending on the weather conditions, and
achieved 80.4% of average fidelity for the quantum states. They also performed entangle-
ment distribution over a two-link quantum channel to the receivers separated by 101.8 km
with 66 to 85 dB of total channel loss. Their result showed the feasibility of a high-loss
uplink or two-downlink channel, quantum teleportation, and entanglement distribution.
On the other hand, a research group at the University of Waterloo (UW) in Canada
led by Dr. T. Jennewein is actively developing an uplink scheme for the quantum satellite
[54, 66, 99]. Since an uplink experiences very high transmission losses, around 40—60 dB,
the scheme requires innovative photon source and advanced timing analysis. The group
implemented a 76 MHz photon source at 532 nm wavelength [100], and used that source
and commercially available silicon single-photon detectors to analyze satellite uplink losses
for a decoy-state QKD protocol [66]. They demonstrated the viability of a satellite uplink
up to 57 dB of channel losses in the infinite key limit with a secure key rate of 2 bps.
They also implemented a complete post-processing procedure–error correction, privacy
amplification on the shifted key– for key extraction at various channel losses up to 56.5
dB [54]. Their achieved secret key rate was 0.5 bps at a total loss of 56.5 dB, showing the
feasibility of the uplink scheme. This UW group designed a less complex quantum receiver
to achieve a robust system. Their receiver uses a passive polarization analyzer instead of
an active analyzer because active components require time synchronization that increases
the probability of failure in orbit.
Dr. Jennewein’s team later verified the feasibility of QKD between a ground station and
a moving object. They performed QKD between a stationary transmitter and a moving
receiver carried by a truck [99]. The receiver had an angular speed of 0.75◦/s equivalent
to the speed of a 600 km low-Earth orbit satellite, and the secret key rate was 40 bps.
2.5 Airborne and Ground-to-satellite QKD Experiments
QKD demonstrations using airborne platforms were the crucial steps for verifications of the
readiness of quantum technologies and their compatibility with the classical technologies.
A German research team first ever performed a proof-of-principle experiment for quantum
key distribution from a moving aircraft to an optical ground station [101]. The aircraft
carried a transmitter along with an advanced pointing and tracking system to ensure the
steady transmission of single-photons. It traveled on a circular path of radius 20 km around
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the ground station at a speed of 290 km/h equivalent to 4 mrad/s of angular velocity.
On the other hand, the ground station was equipped with a 40 cm Cassegrain telescope
together with the receiver system. The very first step of communication is to establish
a quantum link between the transmitter and the receiver. To do that, when the aircraft
enters the arc path, the transmitter and the receiver adjust their telescopes by knowing
their position via a global positioning system. Then the telescopes start tracking each
other via a fine pointing assembly which constantly follows the beacon laser illuminated
between the transmitter and the receiver. During the experiment, the pointing error of
QKD beam was narrowed down to ≈ 180 µrad. BB84 polarized photons were used for
key generation and a one-way classical channel was used for post-processing. The resultant
total link loss was 38 dB, and the average shifted key rate was 145 bps with a 4.8% of
QBER. An accurate compensation system was used to deal with the rotation of photon
bases to reduce QBER. Although the technology required more up-gradation for full QKD
demonstration, the experiment was successful in proving at least the feasibility of QKD
between a ground station and a flying object.
Later, Dr. Jennewein’s team at UW performed a full QKD in an airborne uplink
configuration in 2016 [102]. They equipped the airplane with a path-to-space prototype of
QKD receiver. A 400 MHz QKD source and a transmitter telescope were located on the
ground station. The plane travelled at 198–259 km/h which emulates the angular velocity
of 600 km LEO satellite with respect to the ground station. The aircraft followed two types
of paths: circular path at a constant radius around the ground station and straight-line
paths. In the straight-line paths, aircraft’s motion is closer to the apparent motion of the
satellite over a ground station that gives a better test of the pointing system. The test
was performed at an altitude of ≈ 1.6 km above sea level consisting of 14 passes at the
distances of 3 km, 5 km, 7 km, and 10 km, both circular and straight paths. Establishing
a quantum link was successful for seven out of the 14 passes where 10 km arc and 7 km
straight paths allowed a key exchange for a longer duration. The 10 km arc path gave
70947 secret bit at QBER of 3.39% with mean total loss of 42.6 dB whereas the 7 km
straight path exchanged 9566 secret bits at QBER of 3.58% with a mean link loss of 51.1
dB. This successful demonstration proved the technological readiness of an uplink quantum
satellite.
A research group in China analyzed several critical issues related to the quantum com-
munication via satellite: i) The rapid angular motion with a ground station, ii) The random
motion of a satellite, and iii) atmospheric turbulence at high-loss conditions [103]. Trans-
mitter on a turntable is used to simulate the angular velocity and acceleration for a satellite
allowing a key rate of 48 bps with a QBER of ∼4% at a total loss of ∼40 dB over a dis-
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tance of 96 km. A different platform, a hot-air balloon at a distance of 20 km, was used
to mimic the random motion of a satellite to verify the pointing, acquisition and tracking
system’s ability to maintain a link under adverse weather conditions. They demonstrated
the technologies to address the critical issues of a quantum communication satellite.
Besides the above experiments, the feasibility test for satellite-quantum communication
has been performed with in-orbit corner-cube retroreflectors (CCRs) by the research groups
in Italy [104] and china [105]. The CCRs was placed on an orbiting satellite at 400 km of
altitude as a transmitter while the receiver located on the ground. The photon states were
streamed upwards from the ground and were reflected back by the in-orbit CCRs. This
experiment, performed by Yin et al., [105] verified the single-photon transmission over a
downlink with a total link loss of ≈41 dB. On the other hand, Vallone et al. [104] used
polarization preserving coatings on the CCRs to verify the preservation of polarization
quantum states over a downlink.
2.6 Quantum Communication Space Missions
Several nations are working towards building a quantum satellite. China has made a huge
progress by launching their first quantum communication satellite at an altitude of ∼ 500
km in August 2016. Jian-Wei Pan’s group at the University of Science and Technology
of China (USTC) developed the quantum satellite ’Micius’. The mission achieved three
basic milestones for a global quantum network: decoy state QKD over ∼1200 km [32],
Entanglement distribution to two ground stations separated by ∼1200 km and Bell test
[31], and quantum teleportation [33]. Moving towards the long-standing goal of building
fully operational constellation of satellites, China has definitely led the start. Now other
countries are also rapidly catching up with the quantum communication space technologies.
A summary of satellite QKD initiatives is presented in Fig. 2.4.
The research group of Dr. Anton Zeilinger at the University of Vienna in Austria col-
laborated with USTC team to implement the quantum communication protocols between
the LEO satellite and ground station. The group performed an intercontinental secure
key exchange between the optical ground stations in Graz (Austria), and in Xinglong and
Nanshan(China) using the decoy state protocol where “Micius” acted as a trusted node
[82]. Also, the key was used for a first ever quantum cryptographically secured video
call between two continents, Vienna and Beijing showing that quantum internet is not a
dream any more [106]. The Vienna group also planned and designed the Space QUEST
(Space—Quantum Entanglement Space Test) mission with the European Space Agency
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Table 2. A summary of satellite QKD enabling initiatives
Initiative Goal Vehicle Status/Results
QUESS20 LEO-to-ground trusted-node




Micius 631 kg satellite. Entanglement distribution of
1203 km47, teleportation up to
1400 km43 and BB84 QKD up to
1200 km with QBER ~1% and
sifted key 14 kbps.42
Toyoshima et al.121 LEO-to-ground polarization
measurement.
OICETS 570 kg satellite. Polarization preserved within
system rms error of 28mrad.
Takenaka et al.90, 122 LEO-to ground polarization
measurements from a small
optical transponder (SOTA).
SOCRATES 48 kg satellite. Effectively no depolarization
was observed (100% Degree-
of-polarization) and QBER of <
5%.
Günthner et al.103 GEO-to-ground test of
quantum state used in
coherent communication.
Alphasat I-XL 6649 kg
satellite.
Quantum-limited states arrive
on the ground after
transmission from satellite.
Vallone et al.46 Test of polarization state for
weak coherent pulses using
retro-reflectors on LEO
satellites.
Jason-2 510 kg, Larets 21 kg
and Starlette/Stella 48 kg
satellites.
Average QBER of 6.5%
achieved.
Yin et al.122 Test of polarization state for
weak coherent pulses using
retro-reflectors in a LEO
satellite.
CHAMP 500 kg satellite. Signal to noise ratio of 16:1
observed for polarization
measurements.
Dequal et al.124 Test of weak coherent pulse
transmission from retro-
reflectors on a MEO satellite.
LAGEOS-2 411 kg satellite. Peak signal-to-noise ratio of 1.5
with 3 counts per second.
Tang et al.19 In-orbit observation of
polarization correlations from a
photon-pair source on a nano-
satellite.




Nauerth et al.125 QKD between the ground and
a aircraft moving at similar
angular velocities to a LEO
satellite.
Dornier 228 utility aircraft. Sifted key rate of 145 bps, QBER
of 4.8% from range of 20 km at
angular speed of 4mrad
per second.
Bourgoin et al.18 QKD with a moving receiver
similar to the angular speed of
satellite at 600 km altitude.
Pick-up truck. Key rate of 40 bps with QBER of
6.5 to 8% with receiver at a
range of 650m moving at
angular speed of 13mrad
per second.
Wang et al.126 Verification of pointing,
acquisition and tracking.
Hot-air balloon. Key rate of 48 bps and QBER of




3U CubeSats. Funded mission. Launches
planned from 2018.
QEYSSat43 Trusted-node receiver for
uplink QKD.
Microsatellite. Funded mission.
CAPSat94 Laser annealing of radiation-
damaged APDs.
3U CubeSat. Funded mission.
NanoBob128 Trusted-node receiver for
uplink QKD.
CubeSat. Proposal.








Scheidl et al.86 Entanglement-based QKD and
Bell tests, ground-to-LEO.
International Space Station. Proposal.
NanoQEY109 QKD and Bell tests ground-to-






Zeitler et al.85 Superdense teleportation, LEO-
to-ground.
International Space Station. Proposal.
QuCHAP-IDQuantique Establish QKD networks based
on high altitude platforms.
High-altitude platform. Proposal.
CQuCom53 LEO-to-ground QKD downlinks. 6U CubeSat. Proposal.
Progress in satellite quantum key distribution
R Bedington et al.
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Figure 2.4: An overview of ongoing and planned satellite QKD missions. Reprinted from
[85]
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(ESA) to transmit entangled quantum states from the International Space Station [107].
Very recently, ESA made an agreement with the European commission to build a pan-
European quantum communication infrastructure [108].
A team at the National Institute of Information and Communication Technology (NICT)
in Japan is researching on optical satellite communications for many years [109–111]. Re-
cently, an NICT team led by Dr. Masahide Sasaki and Dr. Morio Toyoshima performed a
quantum communication experiment between a SOCRATES (Space Optical Communica-
tions Research Advanced Technology Satellite) microsatellite in LEO and a ground station
[34]. Through the demonstration, the NICT team validated their QKD technology for a
complete satellite-to-ground QKD.
Prof. Gerd Leuchs’s team at the Max Planck Institute for the Science of Light in Erlan-
gen, Germany, demonstrated detection of coherent quantum states from a geosynchronous
satellite to a ground station [112]. At Los Alamos National Laboratory in the US, Richard
Hughes’ team has been working on space-QKD for many years [26, 87, 93, 95].
Prof. Alexander Ling’s research team at the National University of Singapore (NUS)
is developing SpooQySats [70] to demonstrate QKD using CubeSat platform. They are
building a technology for a robust, space qualified entanglement-source and aiming to test
the space worthiness of the source using CubeSat Platform [71, 113–117]. The team is
targeting an entanglement distribution via CQuCoM mission in 2020 [71] and an inter-
satellite entanglement distribution using CubeSats [118].
At the Institute for quantum computing (IQC), Thomas Jennewein’s group is working
closely with the Canadian Space Agency to carry out the QEYSSat (Canadian Quantum
Encryption and Science Satellite) mission. They have been working for years in the ’uplink’
configuration to send the quantum receiver on satellite. The team is gradually building
and shaping the required technologies for the uplink by a thorough performance analysis
[36, 66, 90], and outdoor experiments [99, 102].
In short, a number of nations are accelerating their space technologies to demonstrate
the on-orbit QKD. The world can envision the desired global scale quantum-secured com-




CubeSat and its space environment
3.1 Introduction
Quantum experiments in the space environment on traditional spacecraft is technically
challenging due to their long development process, and the high costs of launch, operation,
and maintenance. These satellites have mass around 1000 Kg or more and are suitable
for long-term applications. Therefore quantum communication experiments are taking ad-
vantage of the cost-effective satellites, such as CubeSats (cube satellites), to evolve the
quantum technologies. CubeSats, which are usually launched to low-Earth orbits (LEO),
are nanosatellite standard spacecraft. Their mass is around 1 Kg to 10 kg and can be built
using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components [120, 121], which reduces their devel-
oping cost and time. Previous chapter (section 2.6) mentioned several upcoming quantum
communication missions in the CubeSat platform, for example SpooQySats [70], Cube-
Sat Quantum Communications Mission (CQuCoM) [71], NanoBob [69], and the Cooling,
Pointing and Annealing Satellite (CAPSat) [48]. This chapter introduces CubeSats and
briefly explains the orbital environment that the CubeSats will experience in the LEO.
3.2 CubeSats
A CubeSat is a cube-shaped miniature satellite having a standard dimensions of 10 cm ×
10 cm × 10 cm for a one unit (1U), as illustrated in Fig 3.1. A unit spacecraft has a
mass approximately 1.3 kg and limited power capacity (usually less than 1.5 W) [123].
CubeSats can be just one unit or a group of units maximum of 24 depending on the
needs of a particular mission [122]. They were originally developed by professor Jordi
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Figure 3.1: CubeSat dimension. Depending on the mission, CubeSats can be just one unit
or a stack of multiple units. Picture is taken from [122]
Puig-Suari from California Polytechnic State University and professor Bob Twiggs from
Stanford University in 1999 to facilitate inexpensive access to space [124]. Now, these
small satellites are very popular amongst academia [125], hobbyist [126], and commercial
services [127].
CubeSats are launched as an auxiliary payload carried by the launching vehicles (or
rocket) having extra capacity or from the International Space Station. Usually, CubeSats
are packed in a dispenser which is a interface between the spacecraft and the launching
vehicle (LV). The dispenser provides protection against launching vibration and dispenses
the CubeSats into space. At an appropriate time, the LV sends an electrical signal to
open the door of the dispenser and deploys the CubeSats into the expected orbits. While
launched, they operate autonomously in the orbit.
CubeSats have several common basic elements or subsystems. These are the Cube-
Sat frame structure, solar panels, antenna, communication system (COMM), on-board
computer (OBC), attitude determination and control systems (ADCS), electrical power
system (EPS), and the mission-specific payload. Due to the standardized dimensions and
aspects, many companies are capable of massively producing most of the basic subsystems
and offering off-the-shelf components (COTS). Thus it is possible to build a CubeSat by
developing the payload only substantially reducing the development time. For the past
six years, the number of CubeSat launches has increased significantly for university and
commercial applications, as seen in Fig. 3.2.
The major challenges of the CubeSats are their limited budget for power, space, and
shielding. Moreover, the COTS components used for the CubeSat development have less
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Figure .2: The number of CubeSat launches per year.
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3.3 Space environment in Low-Earth-Orbit
CubeSats in the LEO orbits, ranging from 200 to 1600 km of altitude, are exposed to
extreme space environments that can degrade the spacecraft electronics and materials.
These environment includes extreme heat and cold cycle, micrometeoroids, orbital debris,
ultra-high vacuum, atomic oxygen, solar ultraviolet radiation, and high-energy charged
particle radiation. Consequently, while building payloads for the CubeSats, it is important
to choose the components and materials considering the orbital environment and mission
lifetime. This section gives a brief explanation of several harsh environmental effects of the
LEO orbits.
3.3.1 Thermal stress in LEO
As the spacecraft systems periodically come in and out of sunlight while orbiting around
the Earth, they face extreme thermal fluctuations. These periodic thermal variations can
oscillate between -150◦C and +150◦C while orbiting [128]. The degradation of materi-
als due to the thermal extremes caused by several factors, such as thermal properties of
materials, areas exposed to sun, duration in shadow and in sunlight, thermal mass, and
heat-producing components [129]. To minimize thermal effects on the spacecraft hard-
ware, an active thermal system consisting of a heater or cooler can be used. However,
active systems are not practical for CubeSats because of their limited power budget. In
this situation, a thin polymeric coating (also called conformal coating) can be used to pro-
tect the underlying components. It is also important to select materials and components
having higher thermal tolerance for CubeSat payloads to prevent damages.
3.3.2 Vacuum pressure in LEO
LEO orbits experiences ultra-high vacuum with pressure around 5 × 10−10 torr [130]. At
the ultra-low pressure at around 10−6 to 10−9 torr , some materials starts outgassing [131]
which is a discharge of gas that was trapped or dissolved into the material. The gas then
deposits on nearby surfaces which can affect or degrade the performance of spacecraft,
more specifically sensitive optics of the satellites. It is thus crucial to choose materials
or components with low outgas properties while preparing the payloads for high-vacuum
environment. If the materials chosen have outgas probability, they should be thermal oven
backed for about one day at 100◦C or more than the expected in-orbit temperature [131].
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Figure 3.3: Earth’s radiation belts. Reprinted from [135]
3.3.3 Space radiation in LEO
Space radiation contains several high energy particles, such as protons, heavy ions, and
electrons, which originates from galactic cosmic rays or solar flares, and it cause a huge
deterioration to the spacecraft electronics [132]. In the case of LEO, a major source of the
radiation particles is the trapped ions from the two donut-shaped radiation belts [41], as
illustrated in Fig. 3.3. The belts are also known as Van Allen radiation belts, which trap
and store charged particles. Due to the slight difference in the Earth’s rotational axis and
the magnetic pole, one side of the inner radiation belt is dragged towards Earth’s surface
to an altitude of 200 – 800 km which is known as South Atlantic Anomaly [133]. Any
spacecraft passing through this radiation belt will strongly interact with protons having
energies above 10 × 106 eV moving at a density of 3000 cm−2s−1 [134]. Fig. 3.4 illustrates
the radiation flux distribution at an altitude of 800 km, which shows higher radiation
occurs at the southern part of Earth. It is important to equip the satellites with proper
measures to protect the systems and electronics against radiation.
The radiation severely affects mainly the spacecraft electronics. Usually, two types
of damages happen due to the radiation: total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement
damage (DD) [136]. In the case of TID, when highly energetic protons and electrons travel
through a device substrate, transfer the energy to the atoms of the semiconductor substrate
that generates new electron-hole pairs. The excess charges either recombine or are moved
away by an electric field leaving behind the holes. This causes a charge accumulation
creating permanent damage to the devices. On the other hand, relatively low-energy non-
ionizing radiation causes displacement damage. The non-ionizing particles cannot create
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Geiger mode APDs up to a maximum altitude of 37 km [12].
3. Space radiation environment
Space radiation consisting mainly of electrons, protons and heavy ions is the greatest degrada-
tion factor for spacecraft electronics [13,14]. The vast majority of radiation flux in LEO comes
from trapped particles in two radiation belts above the Earth [15]. Radiation flux has two major
effects on Si APDs: total ionizing dose damage and accumulated displacement damage within
the Si lattice caused primarily by protons. In both cases, the effect on Si APDs is an increased

































































































Fig. 3. Radiation flux at 800 km altitude and 98 degree inclination. The South Atlantic
Anomaly (SAA) is the region of increased radiation in the southern hemisphere. (a) Proton
flux via the AP-8 Max model. (b) Electron flux via the AE-8 Max model. (Color online).
The Space Environment Information System (SPENVIS) [16] is used to analyse in-orbit
radiation flux for LEO satellites. Data from SPENVIS reveals an important feature in LEO
radiation known as the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA), a region where an inner radiation belt
extends down to an altitude of 200 km due to the mismatch between the Earth’s magnetic and
rotational axes (see Fig. 3). Accumulated radiation effects and the resultant electronics lifetime
is a function of both altitude and orbit trajectory.
3.1. Ionizing damage test and results
Energetic particles traversing a solid can ionize the material in its surrounding path, generating
electron-hole pairs. Under an applied electric field, the more mobile electrons are swept out
immediately, and the holes are left behind. This causes charge accumulation which changes the
electrical properties of the devices [13,14]. From SPENVIS data, a satellite payload at 800 km
with a 98 degree inclination behind 1.85 mm of Al shielding experiences a total ionizing dose
of approximately 5 krad per year. We conducted ionizing damage testing with γ-radiation in
a 60Co chamber (dose rate of 8.8 krad/hr) at the Centre for Ion Beam Application (CIBA),
National University of Singapore. Three Si APDs were irradiated with γ-radiation in steps of
1 krad up to 5 krad.
In this test series, we investigated the effects of ionizing radiation on breakdown voltage and
the dark count rate. We applied the step-stress approach whereby measurements were made af-
ter each predetermined dosage was reached using the window comparator mechanism described
in the previous section. All the APDs were stored and operated at a temperature of 22±2◦C.
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Figure 3.4: Proton and electron radiation flux at 800 km altitude. Southern hemisphere
has increased radiation due to the South Atlantic Anomaly. Reprinted from [135]
new carriers, instead dislocates atoms from lattice forming structural damage [132]. DD
m y cha ge the device’s working principle or destroy completely [137].
The satellites in LEO are partially protected against radiation by the Earth’s magnetic
field despite the South Atlantic Anomaly. However, spacecraft still will be exposed to a
radiation dose of about 100 rad/year [139]. To achieve further protection, we can use ad-
ditional aluminium shielding [138]. Fig. 3.5 demonstrates the protection against radiation
doses with respect to the thickness of aluminium shielding. Around 5 mm (197 mils1)
of aluminium is sufficient for shielding most of the high-energy electrons, while proton
radiation still dominates. Although the amount of aluminium thickness depends on the
spacecraft mass budget, particularly for CubeSats, the amount is highly limited.
The protection measures thus far explained are considered in the design and develop-
ment of the detector module for the CAPSat [48] anne ling payload. Further details are
discussed in Chapter 5.
1mil is one thousandth of an inch and 1 mil = 0.0254 mm.
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Figure 3.5: Effect of aluminium shielding for protection against radiation doses. Reprinted
from [138]. Total dose for a 5-year mission at 705 km polar orbit. Note: 5 mm corresponds




Single-photon detectors for quantum
communications
4.1 Introduction
Single-photon detectors (SPDs) have a large internal gain so they can respond to a single
photon. SPDs have diverse applications, for example in quantum cryptography [12, 63],
basic quantum mechanics [140, 141], quantum computing [142], biomedical imaging [143],
eye-safe laser ranging [144], fluorescent decays and luminescence [145, 146], and astron-
omy [147]. Of these applications, the field of optical quantum communications is rapidly
expanding and playing a major role in the advancement of SPDs since the detectors are
essential elements for quantum communications (QC). Moreover, SPDs are required to
operate within the harsh space environment in the satellite QC implementations. This
chapter explains the effects of their exposure to the harsh radiation conditions of space. In
addition, the important parameters of SPDs, suitable detectors for the QC applications,
SPD readout circuits, and their operation principles are also discussed.
4.2 SPD Characteristic parameters
Various types of SPDs have been used in quantum communication, for instance, photo-
multiplier tubes (PMTs), single-photon avalanche diodes (SPADs), and superconducting
nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs). Selection of SPDs for their applications relies
upon several parameters, including their wavelength of operation, quantum efficiency, dark
29
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Figure 2.7: Simulated atmospheric transmittance at a typical rural location, for propaga-
tion at zenith (top) and for different elevation angles (bottom). Coloured lines represent
wavelengths of commercially available laser systems. Several transmission windows are
evident, within which optical transmission would experience low loss. Generally, the trans-
mission tends to be better at higher wavelengths, but other factors (e.g. diffraction, sources,
detectors) must be taken into account to properly determine the best wavelength choice.
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Figure 2.7: Simulated atmospheric transmittance at a typical rural location, for propaga-
tion at zenith (top) and for different elevation angles (bottom). Coloured lines represent
wavelengths of commercially available laser systems. Several transmission windows are
evident, within which optical transmission would experience low loss. Generally, the trans-
mission tends to be better at higher wavelengths, but other factors (e.g. diffraction, sources,
detectors) must be taken into account to properly determine the best wavelength choice.
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Figure 4.1: Simulation result of optical propagation (a) at zeni h nd (b) at different
elevation angles . Vertical lines corresponds to the wavelengths of commercially available
laser sources. Several high-transmittance wind ws are evident where hig r wavelengths
tends to have higher transmission. Reprinted from [36]
count rate, maximum count rate, timing jitter, afterpulsing probability, and device active
area. This section discusses the details of several parameters.
Wavelength
SPD responds to a single-photon only for a specific range of wavelengths defined by the
device materials. For exampl , silicon ingl -photon avalanche diodes (Si-SPADs) are sen-
sitive to wavelengths between 400-1000 nm, while InGaAs/InP SPADs are responsive to
wavelengths between 950 nm to 1650 nm [61]. Usually, their selection depends on the
medium of optical propagation and its transmission windows. For instance, applications
that use optical fiber as the propagation medium must adhere to the low loss transmission
windows of 1260–1625 nm [148]. On the other hand, the low-loss transmission windows
in free-space vary due to the losses induced by atmospheric turbulence, scattering, diffrac-
tion, and absorption by the atmospheric molecules. J. P. Bourgoin et. al. [36] performed a
detailed simulation to find the transmittance of an optical link over a wide range of wave-
lengths and at various elevation angles. Figure 4.1 presents the simulation results showing
possible low-loss transmission windows in free-space. For quantum communications, the
possible windows are at 665–685 nm, 775–785 nm, 1000–1070 nm, and 1540–1680 nm.
Commercial laser diodes are available at all these wavelengths.
30
Dark count rate
Dark counts are false counts that occur in the absence of photons, which are considered
as noise. The source of these counts can be either the detectors’ material, their structure,
bias voltages, or the SPDs’ sensitivity to outside noise. For instance, dark counts in SPADs
arise primarily from the thermal excitation, tunneling effect, and trapped electrons [149].
However, low-temperature operation reduces thermally excited noise, and a lower bias can
decrease the tunneling effect. In quantum communication, it is important to choose SPDs
with low noise since it affects the overall signal to noise ratio. To date, SNSPDs are
reported with the lowest noise, less than 1 cps [150]. Although, low-noise Si [151, 152] and
InGaAs [153] detectors are also available.
Detection efficiency
Detection efficiency is the measure of the overall probability of registering a count on the
absorption of a single photon by SPD. Generally, SNSPDs have the highest efficiencies;
70–80% at 250–370 nm [154], >90% at 1550 nm [150]. At visible wavelengths, Si-SPADs
have been reported with 80% detection efficiency [155]. InGaAs SPADs have maximum
efficiency of 25% at 1500 nm [153]. Generally, higher detection efficiency is desirable in
most applications, specially in QKD, because better detection efficiency increases the secret
bit rate.
Timing jitter
Timing jitter is the fluctuation in the time difference between the photon absorption by a
detector and the output electric pulse. The jitter of a photon counting system includes the
contribution of the detector itself, and it’s quenching circuit. The inherent timing jitter
of the device depends on the bias voltages. A Larger bias ensures a quick build-up of an
avalanche that reduces the jitter. SNSPDs report the lowest jitter of 14.80 ps full width
half maximum (FWHM) [156] while it can vary within 35–400 ps FWHM for SPADs and
PMTs [157].
Afterpulsing probability
Afterpulses [158, 159] are also non-photon events like dark counts that contribute to the
overall noise. The source of afterpulses are the trapped carriers in energy states in the
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bandgap. When these carriers are released, they trigger avalanche current. Sometimes, one
such avalanche event generates several secondary avalanches. The lifetime of the trapped
ions can be a few tens or hundreds of microseconds [160], while their number scales up
with the avalanche duration. Afterpulsing probability (PAP ) is generally high in SPADs.
Although higher temperatures and good quality crystal can reduce the afterpulsing effect
[161], it is still a challenging issue for the germanium or InGaAs/InP SPADs. The PAP can
be suppressed either by running them in gated mode or by imposing a long dead time after
each avalanche in free-running detectors. For example, InGaAs/InP SPADs experience
2.2% PAP for 20 µs of dead time in the free-running mode [162] and 6.5% of PAP at 500
MHz sine-wave gating [163]. In contrast, Si-SPADs suffer comparatively less PAP at around
1% [152].
Maximum count rate
The maximum count rate of an SPD defines how many counts per second the device can
register. Generally, an SPD needs a recovery time after an avalanche, within which the
detector is not ready for any single-photon detection. The recovery time depends on the
types of detectors and their material. For instance, SNSPDs have higher counting rates
that range over gigahertz [164, 165]. In contrast, semiconductor detectors suffer relatively
long recovery time which is in the range of microseconds for Si-SPADs that limits their
maximum count rate to the megahertz range [155, 157, 166]. In InGaAs/InP detectors,
the maximum count rate is limited by their gating frequency [161] (upto the gigahertz
range [167]) or by the additional dead time [168, 169] that are applied to suppress the
afterpulsing.
However, before selecting detectors for a particular application, it is important to under-
stand the above-mentioned detector parameters and their relations. For example, detec-
tors’ dark count rate contributes to the QBER in QKD applications as the ratio of dark
count (D) to the sifted key rate1. Therefore, smaller D is expected, which can be further
reduced by gating the detectors for a short period. But, the minimum gating interval is
limited by the detectors’ timing jitter. Along with that, the jitter of detectors (in most
cases detector jitter dominates over source jitter) also limits the maximum clock rate of a
photon detection experiment. Hadfield formulated a dimensionless figure of merit to define
1the detected quantum states that have the matching bases between the transmitter and the receiver.
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here, η is the detection efficiency, D is the dark count rate, and ∆tj is the timing jitter. So,
H takes into account detectors’ three major parameters including their timing performance.
This figure is useful for quantum information applications (e.g., QKD) as well as for Time-
Correlated Single-Photon Counting (TCSPC) applications [170]. Usually, higher value of
H at a certain wavelength refers to a better detector, such as SNSPD detectors have the
best figure of merit at 1550 nm wavelength, in the range of 107 [157].
4.3 SPDs for quantum communications
Essentially any single-photon detector, such as PMTs, SPADs, or SNSPDs can be used
for quantum communications. For successful quantum applications, ideally, the detectors
must have a high quantum detection efficiency over a wider spectrum, low noise or dark
counts, good time resolution, and shorter recovery time or dead time [63]. It is difficult to
find all these qualities in one detector at the same time. Detectors are generally selected
based on their practicality for the specific application.
Generally, available single-photon detectors are broadly divided into two major spectral
ranges. Si-SPADs are widely used for visible wavelengths (400– 1000 nm), and InGaAs/InP
or germanium (Ge) SPADs are well suitable for the near-infrared wavelengths (950–1650
nm). In contrast, PMTs and SNSPDs can have a much wider spectrum extending from
ultra-violet to mid-infrared wavelengths, although, SNSPDs are designed and optimized
for particular wavelengths.
Up until now, SNSPDs are highly suitable for a broader range of applications because
of their exceptional characteristics such as high system detection efficiencies (SDE), ultra-
low dark counts, low time jitter, fast recovery, and GHz maximum count rates [150, 154,
156, 165, 171–173]. Their best performances (more than 90% of SDE) are reported at the
near-infrared wavelengths. Therefore, they have potential uses at the telecom wavelength
quantum applications, for instance in loophole-free tests of local realism [174], quantum
teleportation [175], QKD [176] and quantum memories [177]. On the contrary, they are
not suitable for satellite QC missions as they require cryogenic cooling to reach sub-kelvin
temperatures for their operation. In addition, they have very small active areas (a few tens
of micrometers).
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As an alternative, semiconductor SPADs such as InGaAs/InP or Ge SPADs are suit-
able for long-distance quantum communications at telecom wavelengths. Among them,
Ge was developed particularly for long-distance applications and has been implemented
successfully in several quantum applications, for instance in quantum cryptography, and
violation of Bell inequalities [63]. However, the development of Ge devices became limited
because of their low performance in the fiber-based applications and the need for liquid
nitrogen temperatures [178]. Currently, Ge devices are replaced by the InGaAs/InP diodes
for single-photon detection at the near-infrared wavelengths. These devices can operate
at much higher temperatures ranging between 150 K and 220 K, and they have good
quantum detection efficiencies (above 30%) [178]. They are good for fiber-based quantum
applications, due to their compact size, and low power requirements. However, they are
not ready for satellite applications, because of their high noise levels and limited repetition
rates [179].
Photomultiplier tubes (PMTs) are a possible alternative to SPADs for satellite receivers.
They are a matured technology and have been used in space for several years. PMTs
have a long spectral range (115–1700 nm) and a big sensitive area (above 10 mm) [157].
Conversely, their detection efficiencies are relatively low (highest 40% at 500 nm), they
require voltages in the kV range for operation, also, suffer high afterpulsing effect. Although
better technologies such as hybrid photodetectors [180] and micro-channel photomultiplier
tubes [181] are available, both of them suffer from a high level of noise.
On the contrary, Si-SPADs have been used for single-photon detection in the visible
wavelengths for years. The technology of these devices is matured now in respect to their
design, and fabrication methods. They are commercially available with good characteristic
parameters, for example, more than 60% quantum detection efficiency [155], low dark
counts (<200 cps), good time resolution (better than 350 ps) and a few MHz count rates
(typically 10 MHz) [157]. Since cooling improves their performance, some commercial
detectors are packaged with a built-in thermo-electric cooler (TEC) [182]. Due to their
compact size, high detection efficiency and responsivity, low noise, smaller time jitter, and
low power requirements, they are suitable for many quantum applications, especially for
satellite missions.
Hereafter, the discussion will focus on the avalanche photodiodes, such as the Si-SPADs
for visible wavelengths, and the InGaAs/InP SPADs for infrared wavelengths.
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4.3.1 Single-photon avalanche diodes
SPADs are semiconductor devices based on p-n junctions that operate at a reverse bias
above the breakdown voltage VB for single-photon detection. At this bias, the electric
field at the p-n junction is so high that a single electron-hole pair generated either by a
thermal excitation or by absorption of a photon can trigger an avalanche multiplication of
carriers at the depletion layer. SPADs are different from traditional avalanche photodiodes
(APDs) since each has distinct operation regime as seen in Fig. 4.2. APDs work below
VB that provides a proportional outcome for incoming optical power. In contrast, SPADs
exploits their intrinsic positive feedback to achieve a large gain, which produces macroscopic
current pulses due to single-photon absorption. This operation mode is known as Geiger
mode [149], in which a bias voltage VA greater than VB is applied across SPAD. The gain
is dependent on the excess bias voltage VE, which is VE = VA − VB. Larger VE increases
the probability of single-photon detection while the amount of VE can be between ∼1 and
50 V depending on the types of SPAD material and structure. Under Geiger mode, the
first generated carrier with a sufficient impact ionization coefficient collides with another
atom and creates new electron-hole pairs while traversing the depletion region. Each newly
generated carrier is then accelerated, and their further collisions with other atoms creates
more carriers. This phenomenon quickly (within less than nanosecond [183]) builds-up
carriers that leads to a macroscopic current pulse. This self-sustaining current persists
until it is quenched. Usually, an external electronic circuit, also referred as quenching
circuit, is employed to quench the avalanche current by bringing the bias voltage below VB
[183, 184]. Quenching circuits greatly affects the operation of SPADs and thus the overall
performance of a detector system.
Silicon SPAD
Si-SPADs are well developed and are now commercially available with excellent charac-
teristic parameters, such as high photon detection efficiencies (PDE) and low dark count
rates (DCR). The device is formed by p-n junctions on a silicon wafer with a very small
active area diameter that is sensitive to wavelengths 400-1000 nm. Efficient photon de-
tections can be achieved by using an epitaxial growth structure in Si-SPADs [185]. As
depicted in Fig. 4.3(a), the device can have two thin epitaxial layers of p-Si over an n-Si
substrate. A growth of lightly doped p-layer over a highly doped buried p+ layer intensifies
the electric field. Under Geiger mode, the n+ − p junction achieves a high enough electric








Figure 4.2: Operation regions of APD and SPAD in the reverse I-V curve of a p-n junction.
Redrawn from [166].
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Fig. 3. (a) Schematic cross section of the double-epitaxial SPAD device struc-
ture. (b) Photon arrival time distribution measured with this device [same ex-
perimental setup as in Fig. 2(a)]. The tail has a clean exponential shape with a
time constant of 240 ps.
[9], [10]. The structure was similar to the simple planar diode
shown in Fig. 1, but it was fabricated in a fairly thin p-silicon
epitaxial layer (about 12-µm thick) over an n-silicon substrate,
thus gaining at least two basic advantages. First, in silicon tech-
nology, it was known that a carefully grown epitaxial layer has
much higher quality than that of the original substrate; hence,
the SPAD device was fabricated in higher quality silicon even
starting from an ordinary good quality substrate. Second, the
depth of the neutral region from which minority carriers can be
collected by diffusion to the avalanching junction is delimited by
the epi-substrate p-n junction. This junction can also be reverse
biased for further reducing the thickness of the p-neutral region.
The analysis of the first epitaxial device motivated the design
of a new structure [see Fig. 3(a)] built in a wafer with double
epitaxy, that is, with a lightly doped p-layer grown over a heav-
ily doped buried p+ layer [11]. Instead of employing a lightly
doped n-diffused guard ring for reducing the field in the outer
region, higher p-doping was established in the central region
for enhancing the electric field. Implantation of boron followed
by a drive-in diffusion was employed to produce a p+-doped
central region, which was about 1-µm thick. Due to the lateral
p-diffusion, in principle, there is still a peripheral region where
the breakdown voltage progressively increases and the PDE de-
creases. In practice, however, the effect is negligible because
the width of this region is now less than 1 µm, instead of the
several micrometers caused by the diffused guard ring. With
respect to the previous epitaxial device, a thinner epitaxial layer
can be employed. In fact, it is no more necessary to accommo-
date a deep-diffused guard ring, and the conductive layer for the
avalanche current flowing to the lateral contact can be thinner,
thanks to the low resistivity of the buried p+-doped layer.
The double-epitaxial device structure brought important new
features. It made available various design and fabrication pa-
rameters for achieving good control of the electric field in the
active area. This is important because of the influence of the
electric field on dark count rate (DCR), afterpulsing probability,
and their temperature dependence [12]. Useful parameters that
can be controlled are the boron-implanted dose, the conditions
of the following drive-in diffusion, and the thickness and dop-
ing of the lightly doped epitaxial layer and the buried layer. The
geometry of the structure is remarkably different: it is now a
plane geometry both in the active region and in the neutral re-
gion beneath it, from which carriers are fairly rapidly collected
by diffusion. Almost half of these carriers are ineffective, since
they are collected at the substrate junction. It is deduced from
the carrier diffusion equation and experimentally verified [11]
that the diffusion tail is well described by a simple exponential
law [see Fig. 3(b)] with a lifetime τd that depends on the thick-
ness w of the neutral layer and the minority carrier diffusion





Since the lifetime τd does not depend on the photon wavelength
λ, the time resolution of the double-epitaxial SPAD is almost
wavelength independent, with a remarkable advantage in re-
convolution analysis of fast fluorescent decays. Experimental
data confirm that the tail maintains constant shape and only its
intensity relative to the peak changes as λ is varied.
For obtaining a time response completely free from diffusion
tail, a fairly complex modification of the double-epitaxial device
was devised, fabricated and tested [13], [14]. The basic idea was
to eliminate the neutral region beneath the active junction by
exploiting a patterned buried layer [13]. The diffusion tail was
completely eliminated in SPADs with about 10-µm diameter.
However, the fabrication process was clearly more difficult than
that of the previous double-epitaxial devices.
IV. FABRICATION TECHNOLOGY: CMOS VERSUS DEDICATED
In the past decade, several dedicated technologies have been
proposed for fabricating SPAD devices [15]–[18]. These tech-
nologies are compatible with the fabrication of CMOS circuits:
therefore, monolithic integration of SPAD devices and CMOS
circuits is possible. However, MOS transitors with suitable per-
formance must be expressly developed from scratch, also tak-
ing into account some specific constraints arising from features
introduced in the technology for optimizing the detector perfor-
mance, such as constraints to the thermal budget, etc. In general,
the extent to which separate optimization of SPAD detectors
and CMOS devices can be done depends on the complexity of
the dedicated fabrication process. In contrast to this, libraries
of standard components are readily available in the standard
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Geiger-mode avalanche photodiodes are interesting substitutes for conventional photomulttplier tubes in measurements of fast
optical waveforms. In this paper we discuss the physical mechanisms involved in the detector operation and we clarify how these
effects set a limit to the achievable timing performance . We show that a proper choice of the electric field profile is mandatory for
the design of devices combining high quantum efficiency and timing resolution given by the ultimate transit time limit.
1. Introduction
The extended quantum efficiency of solid-state de-
vices in the near infrared makes high sensitivity semi-
conductor detectors interesting substitutes for conven-
tional photomultiplier tubes (PMTs). In this perspec-
tive, the demonstration of silicon photodiodes with
timing performance comparable and even better than
that of microchannel-plate PMTs have opened the way
to new applications of such devices in fast optical
waveform measurements, laser ranging, optical time
domain reflectometry, and so forth [1-3].
Essentially, these devices are p-n junctions working
as Geiger-Miiller counters. In the following we will
focus our discussion on the two structures shown in fig .
1 [4,5] . The photodiode is operated biased above the
junction breakdown voltage, V., so that the electric
field at the n+ p junction is high enough to sustain, the




Fig 1 . Cross section of the samples used m the experiments : (a) thin junction device, (b) thick junction device (RCA C30902S)













is negligible until the first carrier, generated in the
junction depletion layer, impact ionizes, thus triggering
a diverging avalanche process. A suitable electronic
circuit senses the rise of the diode current and quenches
the multiplication process by lowering the bias voltage
down below Vt, . If the first carrier is photogenerated,
the leading edge of the avalanche pulse is synchronous
with the photon arrival time . Finally, after a suitable
dead time, the circuit restores the bias up to above V,,,
and the device is again able to detect another photon
[6] .
In principle, the measurement of the photon arrival
time is affected by jitter, due to both the detector and
the electronics . We have developed circuits with time
jitter less than 10 ps FWHM (full width at half maxi-
mum) . However, our experiments showed that the best
time resolution ranges from 20 to 350 ps FWHM,
depending on the device geometry [1,5] . It follows that
the detector itself is the limiting factor for the timing
Figure 4.3: Cross-section of Si-SPAD. a) Epitaxial structure of thin junction Si-SPAD,
reprinted from [185], and b)thick junction Si-SPAD, reprinted from [186].
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these structures have very thin p-n junction width, typically 1 µm, for which they are cat-
egorized as thin junction SPADs [183]. These SPADs have a smaller active area diameter
(5 − 150 µm), low break down voltage (20 - 50 V), and highest efficiencies at the visible
wavelengths (DE of 50% at 550 nm [187]). Their time resolution is smaller than 100 ps
FWHM which depends on the size of active area.
Si-SPADs are also available with thick junction geometry, as shown in Fig. 4.3(b).
Junction thickness can extend from 20 to 150 µm [188, 189]. The wider thickness of the
depletion region supports for a more efficient avalanche current distribution over the whole
junction area. These devices allow light illumination on a small area at the center, giving
good time resolution, lower than 350 ps. Their photon detection efficiency is greater than
50% over a wide spectral range around 540 – 850 nm, VB between 200 and 500 V, and a
wider active area diameter between 100 and 500 µm. However, they suffer from a non-zero
afterpulsing probability that ranges between 1–10% [190].
InGaAs/InP SPAD
InGaAs/InP heterostructure devices are now the mainstream solution for single-photon
detection in the near-infrared wavelengths [191, 192]. Various groups are working on de-
signing optimized devices to significantly increase their maximum count rate [193–198].
The design optimization is done considering two intrinsic parameters, detection efficiency
and dark count rate. Both of which are not controllable by external quenching electronics
[161].
InGaAs/InP SPADs generally have a separate absorption, grading, charge, and multi-
plication (SAGCM) structure [193] as illustrated in Fig. 4.4. The absorption layer is an
InGaAs (In0.53Ga0.47As) material having a bandgap energy of 0.75 eV at room temperature
that will give photo-sensitivity up to wavelengths of 1670 nm [161]. An InP material works
as a multiplication layer. Under a reverse bias, a sufficiently high electric field is ensured
in the multiplication region to escalate the avalanche probability. The reduced thickness
of this layer allows for a fast transition of the carriers and thus gives a reduced timing
jitter. On the other hand, the electric field of the absorption layer is optimized such that
this layer induces less avalanche breakdown while maintaining the drift of photogenerated
carriers. The grading layer in between the multiplication and absorption layers prevents
the build-up of trapped carriers, which helps to reduce the afterpulsing effect and the
charge layer adjusts the electric field profile. Both the design and the fabrication process
are optimized for improved SPAD performance.
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In the following sections, we will first introduce the basic semi-
conductor structure, device performance improvement, and Geiger
mode operations for InGaAs/InP SPADs. The characteristics and the
characterization methods relevant to InGaAs/InP SPADs are subse-
quently presented, and then we will focus on recent advances of
quenching techniques, particularly in the regimes of low-frequency
gating, high-frequency gating and free-running operation. The appli-
cations for diverse quantum communication protocols such as
quantum key distribution (QKD),19,20 quantum teleportation,21
quantum secret sharing (QSS),22–24 quantum secure direct communi-
cation25–28 and counterfactual quantum cryptography29 using
InGaAs/InP SPADs will also be described briefly and representatively,
and finally we conclude with a discussion of future perspectives on
both SPAD devices and quenching techniques.
Relevant reviews concerning quantum cryptography,30,31 quantum
communication,32,33 SPDs for quantum information applications,1
single-photon sources and detectors,2 solid-state SPDs34 and ava-
lanche photodiodes35,36 could also be of significance to the reader as
references.
INGAAS/INP SPAD
For the single-photon detection in the near-infrared, group III–V
heterostructure devices such as InGaAs/InP and InGaAs/InAlAs with
separate absorption, grading, charge and multiplication structures35,36
as shown in Figure 1 are the primary candidates. In these devices, an
InGaAs (In0.53Ga0.47As) layer with a room-temperature band gap Eg of
0.75 eV and a cutoff wavelength of around 1670 nm is used as the
absorption material, while the lattice-matched InP layer or InAlAs
layer is used as the multiplication material (Figure 1). The electric
field in the multiplication layer is sufficiently high to provide the
desired avalanche probability, while the electric field in the absorption
layer is adequately low to minimize field-induced leakage currents.13
The charge layer is designed to provide high electric field in the mul-
tiplication layer and low electric field in the absorption layer, while the
grading layer avoids carrier accumulation in the heterojunction inter-
face.13 To improve SPAD performance, both the device structure
design and device fabrication should be optimized specifically for
single-photon detection.37–39
In Geiger mode, the reverse bias voltage of the SPAD (Vb) is larger
than the breakdown voltage (Vbr). When a photon is absorbed, an
electron–hole pair of electrical carriers is created. One carrier is sub-
sequently injected into the depletion zone of multiplication layer and
may initiate a self-sustaining avalanche due to the impact ionization
mechanism at high electric field (on the order of 105 V cm21). The
avalanche current reaches a macroscopic steady state within a buildup
time on the order of a few hundred picoseconds.
The device structure of the InGaAs/InP SPAD illustrated in Figure 1
bears similarities to that of more mature ‘linear-mode’ APDs used at
modest gains below their breakdown voltage. However, despite these
structural similarities, the optimization of SPAD performance is sig-
nificantly different from that of linear-mode APDs because these two
device types are employed in dramatically different contexts.13 Linear-
mode APDs can provide sensitivity improvements in optical receivers
(relative to more conventional receivers based on p–i–n photodiodes,
which lack gain) as long as the noise of the APD is less than the noise of
the amplifier which follows the APD in the receiver circuit. In general,
linear-mode APDs only provide a sensitivity advantage for high-
bandwidth (e.g., .1 GHz) receivers in which the necessarily broad fre-
quency response leads to high amplifier noise. Therefore, linear-mode
APD design emphasizes low excess noise and high bandwidth.35,36
In contrast, the role of SPADs is to provide an avalanche response
that is sufficiently large to reliably detect the injection of a single
photo-excited carrier into the multiplication region (Figure 1). This
behavior is achieved by operating in Geiger mode (i.e., above Vbr), and
in this capacity, the SPAD is more appropriately described as a
photon-activated switch with an essentially digital response that is
noise-free, at least in the sense that the threshold for detecting ava-
lanches can be set far beyond the level of any background circuit noise.
The only noise in a SPAD originates in ‘dark counts’ induced by
thermal or field-mediated mechanisms in the absence of input signal
photons. While the average dark count level can be subtracted from
the overall device output, the shot noise of these dark counts is
unavoidable.
The different operating modes for linear-mode APDs and SPADs
require optimization of distinct performance attributes. For instance,
linear-mode operation benefits from a high gain-bandwidth product,
and since gain-bandwidth product is nominally inversely proportional
to the width of the multiplication region (Wm), linear-mode APD
design tends to emphasize narrow Wm of well under 1 mm.
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Figure 1 The SAGCM structure of InGaAs/InP SPAD.13 Figure reproduced: Ref. 13  2007, Taylor & Francis. SAGCM, separate absorption, grading, charge and
multiplication; SPAD, single-photon avalanche diode.
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Figure 4.4: Device structure of InGaAs/InP SPAD with separate absorption, grading,
charge and multiplication region. Reproduced from [193]
When the SPAD runs in Geiger mode, a photon absorption causes the generation of
the electron-hole carriers. Immediately, one carrier drifts to the depletion region of the
multiplication layer because of the high reverse bias and triggers a self-sustaining avalanche
current by impact ionization process due to the high electric field (around 105 V cm−1).
The detection efficiency (DE) of InGaAs/InP SPADs depend on various parameters
which can be defined by [161]
DE = PcPabsPinjPava (4.2)
here Pc is the coupling efficiency, Pabs is the efficiency of photon absorption at the
absorption layer, Pinj is the efficiency of the injection of photo-generated carriers from
the absorption layer to the multiplication layer, and Pava is the probability of creating
an avalanche at the multiplication region. Pc is defined by several factors such as SPAD
active area, insertion loss and reflectance. Pabs is given by Pabs = 1 − e−αd, where α is
the absorption coefficient and d is the thickness of the absorption layer. Usually, α is
∼ 7500cm−1 in the In0.53Ga0.47As layer for 1550 nm photon. The last variable, Pava highly
depends on the excess bias Vex above the breakdown voltage and temperature.
Another parameter, the dark count rate (DCR) is also affected by Vex and temperature.
Generally, three mechanisms will contribute to the DCR such as carriers generated in the
absorption layer due to thermal excitation, direct band-to-band tunneling, and trap assisted
tunneling in the multiplication layer. Thermal excitation dominates at high temperatures
while low temperatures or large Vex promotes the tunneling effect [193].
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The afterpulse probability PAP in InGaAs/InP SPAD devices significantly relies upon
the quality of the multiplication layer, such as the amount of defect density [161]. Another
approach to lower PAP can be the reduction of charge carrier flow (typically ≈ 107 − 108
[199]) during an avalanche or shortening the lifetime of the trapped carriers. PAP for a
detector system can be modelled as [161]




where Cd is the diode capacitance, Cp is the parasitic capacitance that includes both
the circuit and the device capacitance, δ is the avalanche duration, τd is the hold-off time,
and τ is the trapped carrier lifetime. It is seen from the equation that PAP can be reduced
either by a) scaling down Cp and δ, b) by lowering Vex, c) by increasing τd, or d) by
decreasing τ . Each of these approaches has a side effect as well. For instance, smaller Cp
and δ will deplete the strength of the avalanche signals causing difficulty in discriminating
them from the noise, low Vex will decrease the DE, long τd will limit the maximum count
rate, and shortened τ (achieved at high temperatures) will increase the DCR. Therefore,
the design of InGaAs/InP SPADs might consider their target applications to decide which
parameters are of most valuable.
Since InGaAs/InP SPADs experience high afterpulsing effect, their use is mostly limited
to gated-mode operation [200–205] with quantum efficiency of 10% – 30% at 1550- nm
[201, 206–209]. Although their other operation mode–the free-running mode– also reported
with more than 25% of detection efficiency [162], it has limited maximum count rate due
to the long hold-off time, typically ≤ 10MHz [210]. However, the free-running is essential
when photon arrival time is unknown, and low counting rate is not a concern, such as in
long distance quantum communication.
4.3.2 Quenching circuits for SPADs
As discussed earlier, when the self-sustaining avalanche current starts to flow in SPADs, it
needs to be quenched by bringing their bias voltage below the breakdown voltage VB. The
quenching circuits that are used to quench avalanche currents can be of two types: i) passive
quenching circuit (PQC) [183, 184], and ii) active quenching circuit (AQC) [211–213]. In
PQCs, the avalanche current goes down below their threshold current to stop avalanching
by itself, that requires a ballast resistor RL connected in series with the SPAD, as seen in
4.5. The value of RL can be in kilo-ohm to mega-ohm range, the junction capacitance Cd





















Figure 4.5: Passive quenching circuit for an SPAD. RL is the large quenching resistor and
RS is a small readout resistor. The right circuit is the equivalent representative of the left
circuit. Vd and Rd are the dynamic properties of the SPAD; Cd: junction capacitance; CS:
stray capacitance. Redrawn from [183]
RL to the ground) can be few pF [183]. RS is a small resistor (typically 50 Ω) used for
avalanche signal readout and Rd is SPAD dynamic resistor which is made up with junction
space-charge resistance and resistance of neutral semiconductor.
For photon detection, the SPAD is reverse biased via RL with a voltage VA which is
VE voltage above VB. When relaxed, no current flows through the device, thus there is no
voltage drops across RL, and Cd and CS charge up by VA. When an avalanche is triggered
(referred as closing switch in the equivalent circuit), a current id(t) will flow through the
device which is defined by id(t) = (Vd(t)−VB)/Rd and it will cause the discharge of Cd and
CS via Rd and RL. The current raises the voltage drop across RL which is id(t)RL that
lowers the diode voltage Vd(t) and current id(t) exponentially towards their steady-state






, since RL >> Rd (4.4)
Vf = VB +RdIf (4.5)
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When Vf is close to VB and Id is ≤ 100 µA, the quenching of avalanche current happens
with a time constant of τq ≈ (Cd + CS)(Rd || RL) which can be approximated to time
constant τq ≈ (Cd + CS)Rd as RL >> Rd. After quenching, the device takes a while to
come back to its rest condition which is known as reset time defined by the recharging of
Cd and CS that has a time constant of τr ≈ (Cd + CS)RL.
For an externally connected resistor, the stray capacitance CS is large, around 10 pF
[184]. This causes an increase of the total quenching and reset time, which limits the speed
of the device. If a SPAD comes with an integrated resistor, CS becomes much smaller,
∼ 1 pF. Also RL plays a vital role in defining the speed of the PQCs.
On the other hand, AQCs can resolve the long recovery problem of PQCs. These
circuits first sense the trigger time of the avalanche pulses and then force SPADs to quench
and reset by a controlled amount of time. As illustrated in Fig. 4.6(a), AQCs have well-
defined quenching and reset time, and this switching between the operation states is much
faster compared to the PQCs. In AQCs, a fast comparator first senses the rise time of
the avalanche pulse, which brings the bias voltage VA below the VB for quenching. After a
certain hold-off time, the bias comes back to its original bias of VA.
An AQC has two connections with the SPAD: one for detecting the avalanche pulse
and the other one for quenching pulse. These two connections can be at the two terminals
of a SPAD (Fig. 4.6(b)) or both connections at the same SPAD terminal (Fig. 4.6(c)).
In both configurations, the quiescent level of the sensing terminal is close to the ground
voltage, and the elements in the dotted box in Fig. 4.6(b)-(c) compensate the current
pulses generated by the quenching pulses due to the SPAD capacitance. The compensation
eliminates the possibility that capacitive oscillations are detected by the comparator. The
driver D generates the quenching pulses of amplitude higher than VE to ensure quenching.
A hold-off feature can be achieved by employing a monostable circuit that will create the
quenching pulses of a certain width synchronously with the leading edge of the avalanche
pulses [183]. The hold-off time can effectively control the number of trapped carriers during
the avalanche and thus the afterpulsing probability.
Gated-mode operation is another way to operate SPADs for synchronous single-photon
detection [214]. This approach is effective for suppressing afterpulses and dark counts. For
this operation, a gate pulse of amplitude VE switches the SPAD to ON state for a short
duration, which also limits the charge flow during the avalanches. Usually, the gate OFF
time (when VA < VB) is kept sufficiently long to ensure de-trapping of carriers which
helps to reduce the afterpulsing probability. In these circuits, the gate pulses coupled to
the SPAD creates derivative signals caused by the capacitive effect of the SPAD. These














ment of a high-performance general-purpose photon-
counting module to be produced industrially4; in
1994 a compact AQC for detectors in adaptive-optics
telescopes.11
Figure 91a2 illustrates the principle of the active-
quenching method. The rise of the avalanche pulse
is sensed by a fast comparator whose output switches
the bias voltage source to breakdown voltage VB or
below. After an accurately controlled hold-off time,
the bias voltage is switched back to operating level
VA. A standard pulse synchronous to the avalanche
rise is derived from the comparator output to be
employed for photon counting and timing. The
basic advantages offered by the AQC approach are
the fast transitions 1from quenched state to operat-
ing level and vice versa2 and the short and well-
defined durations of the avalanche current and of the
dead time. The approach is fairly simple and bears
some similarity to an approach employed in an
original study with true Geiger–Mueller gas detec-
tors for ionizing radiation, but completely new prob-
lems arise in its development and application with
SPAD’s, as discussed below.
B. Basic Active-Quenching Circuit Configurations and
Design Problems
AnAQC inherently has two connections to the SPAD
for sensing the avalanche current and for applying
the quenching pulse. Therefore, two basic AQC
configurations can be considered, one with a quench-
ing terminal opposite the sensing terminal 1Fig. 102,
the other with a coincident quenching and sensing
terminal 1Fig. 112. In any case, the sensing terminal
has a quiescent voltage level at ground potential or
not far from it, since it is directly connected to the
AQC input.
The quenching and reset driver, labeled D in Figs.
10 and 11, represents circuit means that, when
driven from a low-level logic pulse, generate a high-
voltage pulse. It can be implemented with either a
pulse-booster circuit stage10,17,27,29,32,50,51,56,57 or with
electronic switches4,11,48,59 connected to two different
dc voltage sources that correspond to the operating
and quenching voltage levels. For example, such
switches can be DMOS FET’s capable of withstand-
ing the required voltage and of switching in nanosec-
ond time from a low-series-resistance on state to a
high-series-resistance off state and conversely.
Both solutions have their relative merits and have
been employed in practice. With fast switches the
AQC can be simpler, more compact, and have lower
power dissipation, since the driver dissipates power
only during the transitions. With a pulse-booster
circuit the AQC output can better approximate a
constant impedance source, as required for remote
SPAD operation 1see below2, and better control and
fine adjustment of the pulse waveform is usually
obtained.
The amplitude of the quenching pulse should be
larger than excess bias VE. The amplitude margin
should be sufficient to overcome possible reignition
Fig. 9. 1a2 Principle of active quenching: current–voltage I–V
characteristic curve of the SPAD and switching load line 1dashed
lines2 of theAQC controlled voltage source. The Q arrow denotes
the quenching transition, theR arrow the reset transition. 1b2Out-
put pulses from an AQC designed for minimum dead time that
operates with a SPAD of the type in Fig. 1, biased 0.9 V above the
breakdown voltage, displayed on a fast oscilloscope at 5 ns@div.
Experimental data are from our laboratory.
Fig. 10. Simplified diagram of the basic AQC configuration with
opposite quenching and sensing terminals of the SPAD. The
network in the dotted box compensates the current pulses injected
by the quenching pulse through the SPAD capacitance, thus
avoiding circuit oscillation. The voltage waveforms drawn corre-
spond to the circuit nodes marked with the same letter.
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effects that are due to nonuniformities of the break-
down voltage over the detector area. For SPAD’s
with high VB, deviations from uniformity can attain
several volts4 and make more severe the require-
ment of producing large voltage swings with short
transition times. Determining suitable electronic
components and devising circuit schemes for work-
ing with excess bias voltage higher than 20 V are
nontrivial tasks for the circuit designer.
1. Opposite Terminal Configuration
In the opposite terminal configuration10,50,51,56 the
quenching pulse must be superimposed on the detec-
tor dc bias voltage. An ac coupling could be em-
ployed for the quenching pulse, but dc coupling is
preferred. With ac coupling, if it happens even once
that the avalanche is not quenched, for example,
because of an interfering electromagnetic distur-
bance from a spark, the SPAD is locked in a station-
ary avalanche-on condition, insensitive to subse-
quent photons and possibly subject to catastrophic
end, caused by excessive heating. Even in the
absence of such anomalous events, with ac coupling
the baseline of the voltage applied to the SPAD
suffers a count-rate-dependent mean shift toward a
lower value 1see Section 52; furthermore, it is affected
by random fluctuations because of the random-time
distribution of the pulses. On the other hand, the
problems met in the design of a dc coupled circuit
become increasingly difficult as the bias voltage is
increased. In practice, the configuration is not suit-
able for SPAD’s having breakdown voltage higher
than 30 V. A further problem has to be faced with
any SPAD, which arises from the current pulse that
is injected into the AQC input through the detector
junction capacitance by the fast quenching pulse
transition. The reset transition injects a pulse with
polarity that is equal to the avalanche pulse and
comparable amplitude and that retriggers the circuit
forcing it into steady oscillation. For example, in
the case of Cd 5 1 pF, VE 5 2 V, with a 2-ns transition
time, the current injected is 1 mA. Specific provi-
sions to avoid such spurious retriggering should be
taken. Fast integrated circuit comparators usually
have a latch input60: by applying to it a pulse
covering with sufficient margin the SPAD voltage
reset transition, spurious retriggering is inhibited.
While the comparator is still latched, however, the
voltage on the SPAD recovers and the device can be
triggered by incoming photons that are sensed as
events that occur at the end of the latch command.
In order to discard such incorrectly timed events, the
circuit must be further elaborated. An alternative
solution, adopted in the first AQC design,50,56 is to
compensate the capacitive pulse by deliberately in-
jecting another pulse through an auxiliary capacitor
that has been trimmed to match the detector capaci-
tance. If the compensating pulse is returned to the
same input terminal connected to the detector, an
inverted quenching pulse has to be applied to the
capacitor, as shown in Refs. 50, and 56. If the AQC
comparator has a differential input, the compensat-
ing capacitor can be connected to the other input
terminal and the quenching pulse itself can be
employed,10 as shown in Fig. 10.
2. Coincident Terminal Configuration
Coincident terminal configuration4,11,17,27,29,32,48,51,57,59
has the basic advantage of being suitable for all
SPAD’s with any breakdown voltage because one of
the device terminals is free, not connected to any
AQC point, and is available for applying any re-
quired dc bias voltage. The quenching pulse is
applied to the same terminal and with the same
polarity of the avalanche pulse; thus it locks the
comparator in the triggered state unless suitable
circuit means are provided to avoid it. A mono-
stable circuit that limits the duration of the quench-
ing pulse is a simple solution. If carefully designed,
such a circuit produces clean rectangular pulses
with fast transitions affected by minimal overshoots
and ringings, typically limited from 1 to 3% of the
pulse amplitude. However, the pulse amplitude
ranges from a few volts to tens of volts: in absolute
terms, this means overshoots from tens to hundreds
of millivolts applied to the AQC input. Since the
circuit must be sensitive to pulses smaller than 50
mV 1avalanche pulse of 1 mA or less on input
resistance of 50 V2, the overshoots on the reset
transition can retrigger the comparator and drive
the circuit into oscillation. The overshoots could be
Fig. 11. Simplified diagram of the basic AQC configuration with
coincident quenching and sensing terminals of the SPAD. The
network in the dotted box is employed to avoid 1i2 locking of the
circuit in the triggered state by the quenching pulse, and 1ii2 circuit
oscillation that is due to small overshoots and ringing of the
quenching pulse. The voltage waveforms drawn correspond to
the circuit nodes marked with the same letter.
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Figure 4.6: Active quenching circuits for SPADs (reproduced from [183]. (a) I-V char-
acteristic curve of the SPAD and switching voltages between quenching and reset. AQC
configuration with (b) the different quenching and avalanche sensing terminal of the SPAD
and (c) the similar quenching and avalanche sensing terminal of the SPAD.
42
quenching electronics to extract the avalanche signals from the derivative signals. Another
important factor with these circuits is the gating frequency, which is limited by their long
gate OFF time for low/no afterpulsing operation.
Generally, the circuits are divided into two categories depending on the gating fre-
quency: i) the low-frequency gating (less than 100 MHz) [214–216], and ii) high-frequency
gating (above 100 MHz) [203]. Typically, low frequency gating uses coincidence method
[206] or double-SPAD technique [209] for extracting avalanche signals. In contrast, sine
wave gating and self-differencing are the two principal schemes used for high-frequency gat-
ing [161]. Both techniques give increased frequency rates of up to 2 GHz. High-frequency
gating is more widely used in InGaAs/InP SPADs. However, these techniques are also
applicable for SPADs with other materials such as Si-SPADs [217].
4.4 SPDs for satellite QKD
In satellite quantum communication, a satellite must carry single-photon detectors either
as an integral part of the receiver to detect photons in an uplink or to verify quantum
sources in a downlink scheme. The choice of the SPDs depends on the optimal wavelength
for a particular scheme considering the secret key lengths and the wavelengths of available
quantum sources. J. P. Bourgoin et. al. [36] performed a simulation to find the optimal
wavelengths for an uplink and a downlink using two types of sources, a weak coherent
pulse source, and an entangled photon source [218]. The simulated result is summarized in
Fig. 4.7 suggesting that 670 nm and 785 nm wavelengths are suitable for the uplink and
downlink, respectively, and entangled photons at ∼ 800 nm are suitable for both schemes.
Available PMTs, Si-SPADs and SNSPDs support all these wavelengths. Of these options,
SNSPDs are generally not chosen in space applications because of their cryogenic tempera-
ture requirement. Conversely, PMTs had been used in space for many years, although they
have significantly low quantum efficiencies compared to Si-SPADs at wavelengths above
550 nm (<20% of PMT versus >60% of Si-SPAD). In addition, photocathode degradation
has always been a major issue for the use of PMTs in space. Since Si-SPADs are com-
mercially available with high quantum efficiencies over a wider range of wavelengths, they
are considered as the prime candidate for satellite implementations [151, 152, 155]. They
have already been used in several space missions [35, 219–221], although in those missions
the Si-SPADs suffered increased noise levels due to space-radiation. It is thus crucial to
analyze the effects of radiation damage of Si-SPADs and find an effective solution to reduce
the damages for extending the life time of a mission.
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Table 1. Calculated length of distributed cryptographic key for various
wavelengths with a WCP (left) and an entangled photon (right) source. Of the
laser-line wavelengths studied, 670 nm produces the longest key for a downlink,
while 785 nm produces the longest key for the uplink. Downlink is with a 10 cm
transmitter and a 50 cm receiver; uplink is with a 50 cm transmitter and a 30 cm
receiver. Simulations are of the upper quartile satellite pass (in terms of pass
duration) with a 600 km orbit, pointing error of 2 µrad and rural atmosphere
(5 km visibility) at sea level. Source rate: 300 MHz for WCP and 100 MHz
for entangled photon source; detector dark count rate: 20 cps; detection time
window: 0.5 ns.
Secure key length obtained for the upper quartile satellite pass (kbit)
Wavelength Downlink, WCP Uplink, WCP Downlink, entangled Uplink, entangled
(nm) source source photon source photon source
405 68.5 3.5 6.2 0
532 264.5 33.1 119.3 12.1
670 465.6 87.7 324.7 67.4
785 458.3 111.3 272.9 75.7
830 317.3 82.1 136.1 39.7
1060 175.4 67.6 21.8 8.1
1550 123.9 94.8 12.8 14.4
We further assume that only half of the nights have clear skies, automatically rendering half
the passes unusable due to cloud coverage. Actual cloud coverage will depend on the ground
station location ultimately chosen. The average global cloud coverage on land is between 50
and 90%, with over 25% of clouds having a thin density [63]. Many areas, particularly in drier
or more elevated regions, experience less than 20% cloud cover, some having near 0% cloud
cover [64]. A location with 50% cloud coverage would likely represent a worst case of any site
that would be reasonably considered.
The results show that a downlink can generate more secure key bits than an uplink for the
same ground and satellite telescopes. Furthermore, the WCP source outperforms the entangled
photon source, due in part to the higher source rate for WCP, and in part to the inefficiency of
detecting the transmitter’s heralding photon in the entangled source. A downlink with a satellite
transmitter telescope as small as 10 cm and a receiver of 50 cm could be used to successfully
exchange a key of 4.5 Mbit per month with an entangled photon source and 25 Mbit per month
with a WCP source. In an uplink, a 30 cm receiver telescope on the satellite and a ground
transmitter of at least 25 cm could produce 0.4 Mbit key per month with an entangled photon
source and 3 Mbit per month with a WCP source.
Interestingly, for an uplink, varying the size of the ground transmitter telescope has little
effect on the number of key bits generated. This is because, for a transmitter telescope of 25 cm
or more, turbulence dominates the beam divergence, limiting any gains that could otherwise be
found by reducing diffraction via increasing the transmitter telescope diameter.
We also determine the long-distance performance of two other important quantum
experiments: Bell tests and quantum teleportation. For both experiments, we analyse each
satellite pass independently to determine which pass can perform a successful Bell test or
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Figure 4.7: Simulated cryptographic key length at various wavelengths for a WCP and an
entangled photon source. The longest key that are produced at 670 nm for a downlink,
and at 785 nm for an uplink. The results are for a 600 km orbit. Source rate: 300 MHz
for WCP and 100 MHz for entangled photon source; Reprinted f om [36]
4.5 Effects of radiation on SPADs
Si-SPADs have been part of several space missions. For instance, Sun el. al. in 2004
reported the on-orbit performance of their Si photon-counting system deployed for mea-
suring Earth surface elevation and atmosph re backsca tering on their Ice, Cloud, and
land Elevation Satellite (ICESat) mission [35]. Their counting module contained the Ex-
celitas reach-through type Si-SPADs. After ∼ 380 days of on-orbit operation, almost all
the parame er of the detectors we e found unaffected by he radiation except the dark
count rate, which was increased by ∼30 Hz per day. At this incremental rate, the photon
detectors would be unusable withi a few weeks for QKD ap lications, since larger DCR
contributes more to the QBER and gives smaller key rate. The effect of dark count rates
on different quantum communication systems was studied2 by J.-P. Bourgoin et al. [36].
It was found that the key rate would be 1.2 bps and 0.9 bps for DCR on the order of
100 Hz and 1000 Hz, respectively, using efficient commercial silicon detectors at 785 nm
wavelength and 300 MHz weak coherent pulsed (WCP) source. But for the dark counts
above 10,000 Hz, it was not possible to perform any form of QKD. Therefore, a target DCR
value is defined for successful realization of ground-to-satellite quantum communications,
which is ≤ 200 Hz per detector [222].
Usually, detector dark counts increases due to the resultant trapped electrons and pro-
tons, created from the strong bombardment of the outer space high-energy particles with
the detector substrate. The trapped electrons cause ionizing damage, while the trapped
2The analysis considered 50 cm transmitter and a 30 cm receiver, 600 km orbit, and rural atmosphere
with 5 km visibility at sea level.
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protons cause displacement damage [41]. For Si-SPADs, trapped protons cause more dam-
age than the trapped electrons, creating extra energy levels in the bandgap displacing some
Si-atoms. It then allows the electrons to transit to the higher energy levels at much lower
thermal excitation that causes more dark counts.
However, being a potential candidate for space quantum missions, Si-SPADs have been
thoroughly investigated in several ground-based radiation tests [41–46]. A research group
in National University of Singapore (NUS) tested Si-SPADs– Perkin Elmer C30902 and
Laser Component SAP 500– after irradiating them with γ-rays and proton emission. [42].
They chose a total ionizing dose equivalent to 800 km of altitude, which is 5 krad/year.
Then the SPAD samples were irradiated with γ-rays with the doses of 1 – 5 krad to analyze
ionizing damage. The result showed that the DCR raised by only two times demonstrating
the detectors are less sensitivity to the ionizing radiation damage.
They also tested the displacement damage (DD) from proton radiation. DD is measured
as a product of the non-ionizing energy loss (NIEL) ( MeV.cm−2/g) at each proton energy
and the fluence (cm−2). Fig. 4.10 represents the SPENVIS data of a proton energy
spectrum at various orbits considering 1.85 mm of Al shielding. Fig. 4.10(a) shows that
polar orbits have higher proton fluence than the equatorial orbits, where the dominating
proton energies are less than 100 MeV. On the other hand, Fig. 4.10(b) depicts that
protons with energies below 100 MeV have much higher NIEL, which causes more damage.
Therefore, the DD impact is more substantial in the polar orbits and at longer distances
from the Earth. Total displace damage dose is usually calculated by integrating the product
of total fluences φp(E) and the NIEL(E) over the entire energy range (eq. (4.6)). During
their experiment, several detector samples were irradiated separately with a particular
monochromatic proton energy (ranging between 5 MeV−50 MeV) of various proton fluence
that ranged from 1.47×108 cm−2 to 7.48×108 cm−2. The total dose of DD damage increased
the DCR by one to two orders of magnitude.
Dispacement damage dose =
∫ ∞
0
φp(E) ∗NIEL(E) dE (4.6)
Other ground-based radiation damage experiments on SPADs [41, 43–46] also reported
the DCR increase by thousands of counts after irradiation, which is undesirable for suc-
cessful quantum communication in space.
However, while analyzing the radiation damage, an interesting feature is pointed out
by Anisimova et. al [37]. They found that irradiation of SPADs when biased develops
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Fig. 5. (a) Annual proton fluence spectra for various orbits with 1.85 mm of Al shielding
from SPENVIS (100 keV resolution). The maximum fluence for the 400 km equatorial orbit
is on the order of 104. (b) Proton Non-Ionizing Energy Loss (NIEL) for silicon averaged
from [21,22]. (Color online).
(four devices per group) and irradiated with proton beams of 5, 25 and 50 MeV respectively
(see Table 1). The devices were calibrated at room temperature using the window comparator
mechanism before being shipped to CNL for proton irradiation, after which the devices were
shipped back to the lab for measurements on the post-radiation dark count rate and breakdown
voltage. The devices were then annealed at 55◦C for 24 hours (following [15]), after which
the dark count rate and breakdown voltage were re-measured. Finally the dark count rate was
measured when all devices were cooled to -20◦C.
Table 1. Proton fluence experienced by test devices. A total of 12 devices were tested in
3 groups (a,b,c). Each group was exposed to protons of a particular energy. Within each
group, individual devices (1-4) were exposed to different fluences. Devices are then tracked




1 2 3 4
a (5 MeV) 1.86 3.74 5.61 7.48
b (25 MeV) 1.73 3.46 5.19 6.92
c (50 MeV) 1.47 2.94 4.41 5.88
The observed dark count before and after irradiation for all devices are presented in Fig. 6.
All 12 APDs continued to function after irradiation. There were no significant changes ob-
served in the breakdown voltage. The APD dark counts increased by one to two orders of
magnitude depending on the accumulated damage. Annealing caused partial recovery confirm-
ing that SAP500 devices followed the trend observed in [7, 15] but becomes ineffective after
a dose of 3× 106 MeV/g. After a dose greater than 4×106 MeV/g, devices operated between
22-25◦C have a dark count rate sufficient to saturate the window comparator mechanism. Cool-
ing the devices to -20◦C, however, is extremely effective and even after the maximum dose of
9×106 MeV/g the dark counts remain in the range of 100 kcps.
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Figure 4.8: a) SP IS data for Pr ton fluence spectra per year at different orbits with
1.85 mm of Al shielding. b) Average Proton Non-Ionizing Energy Loss (NIEL) for silicon.
Reprinted from [42]
should consider this during planning of the mission to avoid extra damages fro the biased
condition.
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4.6 Techniques for healing radiation damages in SPADs
The damage experienced by the SPADs due to the in-orbit high energy particles requires
to be mitigated to maintain their performance and to enhance their in-orbit lifetime. Since
radiation mostly affects the DCR, any potential methods for healing the damages will
extend the effective lifetime of the SPADs. To date, several damage healing methods such
as cooling [37, 42], thermal annealing [37, 42, 43, 46] and laser annealing [39, 40] are being
analysed as promising solutions to mitigate the radiation damage.
4.6.1 Cooling of SPADs
Deep cooling is generally used in non-irradiated SPADs to reduce the rate of thermally
generated dark counts [223]. Recently the Singapore group utilized the cooling of -20◦C
on the irradiated SPADs for improving their DCR [42]. At this temperature, the detectors
keep functioning even after the displacement dose of as high as 9 × 106 MeV/g giving a
dark counts in the range of 100 kHz. Another study showed that cooling at -20◦C on the
24 months equivalent irradiated SLiK detectors exhibits dark counts on the order of 105
Hz [37]. All these rates of DCR are too high to perform quantum communication.
Although, the second study demonstrated a reduced DCR of 200 Hz by the irradiated
SLiK samples at -86◦C. This result proves that the deep cooling is capable of keeping the
DCR to the required rate of quantum protocols even after the higher doses. However, deep
cooling on the other hand affects the detector’s afterpulsing probability, since the lifetime of
the trapped carriers increases with the cooling. The analysis by Anisimova et al. showed an
increased afterpulsing probability after the irradiation, as seen in fig. 4.9 [37], which might
influence the quantum communications [223, 224]. Nonetheless, the SLiK detectors will
serve better in the quantum communications even after a large radiation doses if enough
cooling is provided.
4.6.2 Thermal annealing of SPADs
Thermal annealing is helpful in reducing the DCR of the irradiated devices by resolving
defects in the semiconductor structures [42, 43, 46]. It is a process of heating the SPAD
substrate at higher temperatures for a certain period that resolves some defects. Recently,
this method has been thoroughly analyzed on several SPAD samples (Excelitas C30921SH,
Excelitas SLiK, and Laser components SAP500S2) by Elena et al [37]. The samples were
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Figure 4 Normalized timing response histogram for representative APDs from group 4 using a pulsed
laser, before and after irradiation, measured at –60◦C. The full width half maximum (FWHM) timing jitter
before irradiation was ≈ 600 ps for SLiK, ≈ 550 ps for C30921SH, and ≈ 700 ps for SAP500S2. Changes in the
baseline count probabilities are due to the changes in DCRs. At FWHM there is no noticeable change in the
timing response of SLiKs and SAP500S2 before and after irradiation, and a moderate increase of 100 ps was
observed for C30921SH. Measured timing jitter includes timing jitter of the laser and time tagger.
Figure 5 Afterpulsing probability, measured at –86◦C, which increased for SLiK and C30921SH
devices during the first 6 to 12 month equivalent radiation dose. SAP500S2 results are high and
inconsistent with respect to the applied radiation.
the discriminator, and thus time-tagged events with delays dependent on the stochastic
arrival of adjacent avalanches. We remark that lower jitter values than those observed in
our experiment can be obtained by optimising detector electronics [, ].
The probability of afterpulses increased for SLiK and CSH samples after irradia-
tion (Figure ), likely due to an increased number of defects in the semiconductor crystal
structure. For SAPS, the afterpulsing results did not show a consistent trend. Note
that the afterpulsing probabilities for all SAPS devices, including those in the control
group, were remarkably high at lower temperatures, reaching %. A longer dead-time
than that provided by our circuit is clearly needed for correct operation of SAPS
[].
Figure 4.9: Afterpulsing probability PAP at -86
◦C. The SLiK and C30921SH detectors
have increased PAP for the 6 – 12 months of equivalent radiation dose. SAP500S2 showed
inconsistent results. Results reprinted from [42]
irradiated with 106 MeV proton fluences of 108, 109, 2 × 109, and 4 × 109 p/cm2,
equivalent to the radiation dosage that a satellite will experience in an orbit at 600 km
of altitude for a duration of 0.6, 6, 12 and 24 months, respectively. T e amount of doses
was calculated considering 10 mm of Al shielding. After the irradiation, all the samples
developed a significantly large DCR, illustrated in Fig. 4.10. In addition, the SLiK and
C30902SH detectors experienced higher afterpulsing probabilities, probably due to the
newly created defects induced by the radiation. Then they performed thermal annealing
on the irradiated samples at room temperature (+20◦C) and in a hot-air-flow oven at
+50◦C, +80◦C and +100◦C for different amount of time. All the samples were benefited
from the high-temperature annealing in healing the damages. However, room temperature
annealing was too slow to be useful in any satellite applications.
In contrast, the oven annealing at +80◦C for four hours followed by an hour at +100◦C
resulted in a substantial reduction of the DCR. For instance, the SLiK (C30921SH, and
SAP500S2) devices demonstrated a factor of 0.15 (0.3, and 0.28) times the pre-annealed
DCR. The study observed a significant reduction of DCR during the first hour of annealing
at +80◦C, and it continued to improve with additional annealing. They also tested thermal
annealing of SLiK SPADs using the built-in thermoelectric cooler (TEC) up to +100◦C,
which exhibited a consistent improvement of DCR. Thus it suggests that TEC can be a
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and DCR upon arriving from the radiation facility, with no significant changes observed.
PMTs were recharacterized at –◦C.
All APD samples were then characterized (breakdown, DCR, efficiency, jitter, and after-
pulsing probability) at temperatures ranging from –◦C to –◦C, allowing us to assess
the effectiveness of cooling to mitigate damage due to irradiation. Finally, we performed
thermal annealing on some groups at varying hot temperatures and durations, with fur-
ther characterization at selected stages and cold temperatures.
3 Effects of radiation damage
All irradiated APDs exhibited a significant increase in their DCRs, illustrated in Figure 
for –◦C operating temperature, consistent with previous studies [–]. The DCR in-
crease in each device followed the radiation dose applied, conditional that operating tem-
peratures were kept sufficiently low - at high temperatures, the device count rates satu-
rated. At high doses and standard operating temperatures, the DCRs of all devices would
prevent successful quantum communications - for example, Excelitas SLiK devices (over-
all the best performing devices) operating at –◦C exhibit DCRs of the order of  cps.
No significant changes in breakdown voltages, pulse shapes or efficiency owing to irra-
diation were observed. The timing jitter of detection pulses when operating at low tem-
peratures did not change for SLiK and SAPS samples, and increased by  ps for
CSH (see Figure ). However, the timing jitter when operating at higher temper-
atures appeared to increase for all the irradiated APDs - for example, within group  at
–◦C operation, jitter increased for SLiKs by up to  ps, for SAPS by up to  ps,
and for CSH by up to  ps. This increased timing jitter is likely due to the opera-
tion of the passive quenching mechanism at a high count rate: in this condition, avalanches
often trigger before the APD voltage has fully recovered, leading to effectively lower bias
voltages, which are known to have higher jitter [], for these events. Furthermore, the
variation in effective bias voltages between events leads to variable current rise-times at
Figure 3 DCR of APDs after irradiation, measurement taken at –86◦C operation with APDs biased
20 V above their breakdown voltages. In every case, radiation damage caused a DCR increase. The APDs
biased during irradiation developed a noticeably higher dark count rate.
Figure 4.10: DCR of irradiated SPADs measured at -86◦C. Control groups detectors were
not irradiated. Reprinted from [37]
simplified heating mechanism to be used in the outer space.
The aforementioned thermal annealing technique was performed only once on the ir-
radiated SPAD samples. Ian DSouza in his thesis explained a repeated thermal annealing
precess to approximately simulate the annealing in the space environment. They experi-
mented on two detector modules (DM) containing five SPADs each [38]. The DMs were
radiated with the two years equivalent doses which is 4 × 109 p/cm2. DM1 was irradiated
with 6.6 × 108 p/cm2 (4 month equivalent fluence in LEO) incremental doses while DM2
was irradiated with 3.3 × 108 p/cm2 (2 month equivalent fluence in LEO) incremental
doses until the final two years equivalent doses. Seven out of the ten SPADs exceeded 500
Hz of DCR at -80◦C after the first proton dose of 6.72 × 108 p/cm2 and the other three
detectors exhibited more than 1 kHz DCR. Thermal annealing of the detectors at +80◦C
using the in-built TEC for one hour after each irradiation helped to reduce the dark counts.
In the experiment, they performed the annealing on the two detector module at two dif-
ferent phases. DM1 was annealed after each radiation phase, while DM2 detectors were
annealed only when their dark counts exceeded 2 kHz. Of these two approaches, detectors
annealed after the threshold exhibited less dark counts compared to the detectors annealed
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in regular interval. Moreover, most of the detectors rendered the greatest reduction factor
after the first round of annealing showing its effectiveness around first time application. In
between the annealing phases, dark count reduction factor varied between 2–5. The study
overall showed that annealing was able to keep the DCR below 500 Hz up to 3 years of
LEO equivalent fluence (6 × 109 p/cm2). Thermal annealing therefore can be utilized in
the near future satellite quantum communication missions to heal detector damages.
4.6.3 Laser annealing in SPADs
Laser annealing is a highly effective method to resolve the defects in SPAD devices. This
process uses a focused laser beam to the active area of detector for the annealing. It
was previously manifested that ≈1 W of laser illumination on non-irradiated Si-SPADs
improves their dark count rates up to 5.4 times [39] than the pre-annealed DCR. Later,
Lim et al carried out an experiment of laser annealing on the irradiated Si-SPADs. Their
experiment demonstrated an excellent efficiency of this method in healing the radiation
damages [40]. They used the same irradiated SPAD samples that were used in [37], and
laser-annealed the detectors for a duration of 60 s using a 808 nm continuous-wave (CW)
laser. Annealing at 0.8− 1.6 W of laser power helped to reduce the detector dark counts.
The DCR reduction factor for the SLiK detectors were ranging between 1.3− 10 times at
−30◦ C and between 5.3− 41.7 times at −80◦ C. The C30902SH detectors exhibited dark
count reduction of around 150 times at −80◦ C. Importantly, this method was able to
further reduce the dark counts of the previously thermally annealed detectors.
Their analysis illustrated that most of the detector characteristic parameters stay un-
affected by the annealing except the afterpulsing probability, which was increased in each
detector after the annealing. This result implies that laser annealing is able to decrease
thermally generated dark counts by resolving its primary contributor– the mid bandgap
impurities, at the same time it creates new impurities near to the conduction band that
contributes to the afterpulses.
To identify the laser annealing effects and its reactions to the detector devices, a differ-
ent approach is explained in Jin Gyu Lim’s thesis [47]. They laser annealed a few samples
separately using high-power CW laser for i) 60 s, ii) 180 s, and iii) 50% duty cycle mode at
1.5 kHz for 60 s. In the both 60 s and 180 s duration, detectors’ maximum DCR reduction
occurred at the same optical power of 800 mW. This result implies that laser annealing
seem to be a local heating process. But 180 s annealing showed more dark count reduction
at less optical power around 267 − 800 mW, which suggests that there could be other
reason than the local heating. However, in the 50% duty cycle mode, lowest DCR was
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achieved at 2000 mW which was equivalent to the 60 s method with average power of 1200
mW. This result indicates that electrons possibly play a role in the laser annealing effect as
well. To know the actual reasons behind the laser annealing effect need more investigation.
Meanwhile, this method will be further studied in space in the CAPSat mission [48]. The




CAPSat detector module for in-orbit laser
annealing
Silicon single-photon avalanche photodiodes (Si-SPADs) are a promising component for
detecting single-photons in satellite missions, as discussed in chapter 4. However, space
radiation, especially proton radiation, damages these detector devices and increases their
dark count rates (explained in section 4.5). When the dark count rates exceed a threshold
(around 200 Hz), conducting quantum communication is not possible [36]. So detector
damage could affect the goal of space quantum communications and mission lifetime. For
mitigating the damages, section 4.6 described several potential methods, such as thermal
annealing [37, 38] and laser annealing [39, 40]. Until now these methods have been analyzed
in various ground-based experiments on Si-SPADs irradiated with LEO equivalent radiation
dose. These analyses showed reduced dark count rates after the annealing that heals the
radiation damages. Particularly laser annealing is found more efficient in reducing the
detector dark counts. We therefore want to study further this method of laser annealing.
In the previous annealing experiments, the proton radiation dose on the detectors were
estimated using SPENVIS software that considers shielding around an object, expected
orbiting duration, and orbital altitude. However, this calculation has uncertainty with
a factor of 2–3 [225, 226]. Additionally, the high-energy beam radiation produced at
a radiation facility is different from the space radiation [227]. The main difference is
that a synthetic radiation is delivered only in one direction at monochromatic energy,
while naturally occurring proton fluxes are omnidirectional and have a certain energy
distribution. Consequently, detector damage induced on the ground will differ from the
damage occurring in space. Besides, the previous laser annealing experiments used that
detectors which were irradiated with the total calculated dose of proton flux all in a single
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run [40, 47]. It remains to be known how does the repeated laser annealing work on
continuously irradiated SPADs. It is therefore interesting to study the effectiveness of laser
annealing in the real space environment and the healing of radiation induced damages of
the detectors.
Hence, we are interested in performing an in-orbit laser annealing on the Si-SPADs
(similar SPADs used in the other radiation damage experiments). We plan to send a
CubeSat in the CAPSat mission [48] incorporating several Si-SPADs with an integrated
laser annealing system to an low-Earth orbit (LEO). Through this experiment, we will be
able to analyze the in-orbit detector damage and performance of the annealing methods.
Since detectors in LEO will be exposed to the radiation during each cycle as it orbits the
Earth, particularly the poles and South Atlantic Anomaly, the induced radiation damage
will be periodic too. During this mission the degradation of the detectors will be deduced
from frequent dark counts measurements. We will activate the in-orbit laser annealing
system once detectors’ dark counts exceeds a pre-defined threshold. This approach will
provide insights into how often the annealing needs to be performed to keep the detector
devices useful, and the efficiency of the annealing methods in curing the damages.
Towards this goal, we designed and built a miniaturized and compact detector module
(DM) with a CubeSat compatible size, mass and power. The DM is designed to facilitate
laser annealing as well as thermal annealing. Since the detector packages used in the module
have an integrated thermo-electric cooler that is primarily used to cool the devices, it can
also be used to perform thermal annealing by reversing the electrical current. In addition,
the module is designed to provide high flexible and software controllable operation. The
main challenge of this work has been to accommodate all the circuitry and mechanical
structure required for the operation of the detectors within the volume and limited power
budget in a CubeSat payload. Additionally, the design had to consider the outer space






Figure 5.1: 3D model of the CAPSat satellite– IlliniSat 2 bus. Inside view of the satellite
shows the loaded payloads. The image is taken from [228]
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5.1 CAPSat Mission
The CAPSat mission is being developed as a part of the NASA Science Mission Direc-
torate’s Undergraduate Student Instrument Program. The CAPSat will carry three sci-
ence payloads – Cooling, Annealing and Pointing payloads, which will be housed in a 3U
CubeSat bus– IlliniSat-2 [229]. The satellite bus is designed at the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign (UIUC). The annealing payload (APL) is designed and developed
in collaboration with a UIUC team by separating the APL into a detector module (DM)
and a controller module.
The APL consists of two printed circuit boards (PCBs) that are stacked together. Fig.
5.1(b) shows the IlliniSat-2 bus loaded with the payloads, including APL. The satellite
bus provides power from its power board, supported by a battery. Two power channels
are provided to each payload– an unregulated supply directly from the batteries with a
maximum voltage ranging around 6 V ∼ 8.4 V , and a regulated 3.3 V supply. The total
instantaneous power limit of the bus is 18 W, and the limit of power consumption by each
payload is a maximum of 3 Ah per activation.
The operations of the satellite will be controlled by a Control & Data Handling (C&DH)
board of the satellite bus which has a firmware interface to communicate with each payload.
The C&DH board is responsible for monitoring the health of the payloads, activation or
deactivation of an experiment, and receiving data from the payloads. An RS422 bus is
used to interface the payloads with the C&DH board.
The satellite will be transported to the International Space station by a SpaceX Antares
spacecraft tentatively in 2020. Afterward, it is anticipated that it will be deployed to a near-
sun-synchronous orbit at an altitude of 450 km perigee at 93◦ inclination. The expected
lifetime of the satellite is ten months. If satellite communication has ceased approximately
for one week, the spacecraft will be considered to have reached its ’end of life’.
5.2 Annealing payload
The APL is developed with a CubeSat dimension to fit within the CubeSat bus. This
payload accommodates all the necessary resources required to operate and characterized
several detectors, and for performing thermal as well as laser annealing. Before giving
details of the APL, I want to discuss briefly the concept of operation. Fig. 5.2 illustrates
the functional arrangement of the payload. An optical-beam from the high power laser
diode (LD) is used for annealing of the Si-SPADs, and is focused on the SPAD active area
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by a fiber optic cable. A photodiode (PD), located close to the fiber, measures the small
fraction of the laser beam that leaks from the fiber to monitor optical power towards the
SPAD. A light emitting diode (LED) on right of the fiber acts as a reference light source.
This LED will send a very faint signal (that inserts into the fiber) to the SPAD when
activated to verify the photon detection efficiency of the detectors. The activation and
operation of all optical devices will be regulated by a microcontroller.
The APL is implemented into two separate functional units, as shown in Fig. 5.3.
The Control PCB, developed by the UIUC team, holds two LDs, LED, PD, and a
microcontroller (MCU). The Detector PCB that we developed contains four Si-SPADs
of two types, detector bias and quenching circuits, and a thermo-electric cooler (TEC)
controller. The outputs of the two LDs are fiber connected to two SPADs, one from each
type. These two detectors will be used for laser annealing. The other two detectors (not
connected to LD) will not be annealed. They will act as control detectors to give a measure
of cumulative damage due to the high-energy space radiation. Then the LED in the control
board working as a reference light source will be used for measuring the SPAD detection
efficiency, and the PD will monitor the power sent to the LD and LED.
The detector PCB will be stacked on top of the control PCB to form the complete
APL, as shown in figure 5.4. It will draw its driving power from the control PCB. The two
boards will communicate via a PC/104 connector and the MCU on the control PCB will
regulate the functions of the entire APL devices.
The experiment of the APL will give us two types of data: the DCR and the photon
detection efficiency of each detector. This test will collect data at different conditions,
such as at various cooling temperatures of the SPADs, before and after annealing, or after
several radiation cycles. The C&DH board of the satellite will collect the data and will
downlink later to a ground station.
5.2.1 Selection of components
SPADs:
Si-SPADs of two different models are chosen from Excelitas technologies – SLiK and
C30902SH [182]. The C30902SH has photosensitive area of 500 µm in diameter,
while it is 180 µm for the SLiK devices. The SPADs are hermetically-sealed in a
metal housing. A two-stage TEC and a thermistor are also packaged within the
SPAD housing. TEC provides precise temperature control of the SPADs between
−30◦C and 100◦C, and the thermistor allows to monitor the SPAD temperature. All
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Figure 5.2: Concept of the in-orbit laser annealing. Laser diode (LD) is a high power
laser that is used to anneal the single-photon avalanche photodiode (SPAD). LD output is
guided to the active area of the SPAD through optical fibre. A light emitting diode (LED)
is a reference light-source to test the photon detection efficiency of the SPAD. Photodiode
(PD) monitors the power illuminated to the SPAD. TEC is an integrated thermoelectric





Figure 2.1: A high-level block diagram of the payload.
Figure 2.1 shows a block diagram of the payload’s major components. At
a high level, this payload must test the performance of at least two models
of SPAD over the course of several damage and annealing cycles, record the
SPAD count data, then send that data back to the satellite’s control board
for downlink to a ground station. There are two types of data being collected:
the DCR and the efficiency (recorded counts versus incident power) of each
SPAD. Two of each SPAD model will be used: one which will be annealed,
3




The chosen laser diodes are the two QSP-808-4 diodes from QPhotonics [231]. These
diodes that are coupled with multimode fiber can output maximum 4 W of optical
power at 808 nm. The diodes come in a hermetically sealed and electrically isolated
package and have temperature tolerance between −30◦C and 70◦C.
Photodiodes and LED:
The PD is chosen from Osram Opto Semiconductors and the model is SFH-203-P
[232]. The device has wide spectral sensitivity with a maximum sensitivity at 850
nm. The LED model is MTE2081-OH5 from the manufacturing company Marktech
Optoelectronics [233]. The device has maximum emission at the wavelength of 810
nm with a typical output of 20 mW.
Power sources:
The control PCB contains the power system that provides the necessary power and
voltages to the APL logic devices. The power system consists of two voltage reg-
ulators from Texas Instruments, TPS54427 [234], and TPS54295 [235], that have
regulated output of 1.8 V and 5 V, respectively. The inputs of both regulators are
connected to the unregulated power channels of the CubeSat batteries. Additionally,
a third supply of 3.3 V is also available, which directly comes from the regulated chan-
nel of the satellite batteries. Of the three sources, 1.8 V delivers power to the laser
diodes, while the other two supplies provide power to the rest of the APL electronics.
Control system:
The platform of the APL is planned around the ultra-low power embedded system
Cypress CY8C3666 flash programmable-system-on-chip (PSoC3) [236]. It is an 8-bit
8051 processor that has integrated configurable analog and digital devices, a micro-
controller, and a single-chip memory. The configurable peripherals include counters,
timers, digital-to-analog converters (DACs), analog-to-digital converters (ADCs),
pulse-width-modulators (PWMs), op-amps, and many others devices. The controller
also allows flexible routing to any pin. This device is available as a commercial-
off-the-shelf (COTS) component and has been used in space-based quantum-optics
experiments [237, 238]. In the APL, the PSoC3 is located in the control PCB, and
the detector PCB access it via PC/104 connector. The controller sends data to the
CubeSat C&DH board via a full-duplex transceiver ADM3488 manufactured by Ana-
log Circuits [239]. This transceiver converts the PSoC signal to the control board
protocol RS422.
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Figure 5.4: 3D model of the annealing payload. Reprinted from [228]
The rest of the discussion focuses on the design, implementation and test of the detector
PCB. It is addressed as ’Detector Module’ throughout this chapter.
5.3 Concept of the Detector module
As mentioned in section 5.2, the DM consists of single-photon detectors, their bias, quench-
ing, and readout circuitry, and a TEC driver. The DM is a two sided PCB. Top side holds
all the large-sized components, while the bottom side accommodates most of the analog
and digital electronics. Fig. 5.5 illustrates the 3D model of the two sides of the DM PCB.
The components or parts chosen for the module are not all the way to space-class because
the satellites in LEO are mostly exposed to the radiation when they pass the south atlantic
anomaly. Therefore, we choose the parts particularly the automotive and military class
components which are better than consumer-class.
As seen in Fig. 5.5(a), the PCB contains four detectors of models Excelitas SLiK and
Excelitas C30902SH. Two detectors of each model are mounted on an additional piece of
aluminium mounting plate, which is attached with the DM PCB. All the detectors are
coupled with a fiber connector that facilitates direct fiber connection to the laser diodes.
The DM PCB contains two high-voltage supplies (HVS) to provide the necessary bias































Figure 5.6: The quenching and readout circuits of the SPADs
400 V , depending on the detector samples. So, we choose ultra-compact TZ-0.5Z HVS from
Matsusada Precision [240] that can supply output voltages up to 500 V which is achievable
only by a maximum of 2.5 V input control voltage. Each HVS provides bias voltages to
two SPADs. The high voltages are fed to the SPAD cathodes’ via four solid-state relays
AQV216SX manufactured by Panasonic [241]. The relays can drive output voltages of
600 V with a peak load current of 40 mA. The DM provides ways to turn ON any SPADs
by activating their respective relays, although we will activate one detector at a time to
save power.
Figure 5.6 illustrates the quenching and readout circuits for the detectors. This passive
quenching circuit (similar to the circuit explained in section 4.3.2) uses a quenching resis-
tance of 402 kΩ. This simple circuit is best suitable for satellite-based quantum-receiver
because of its robustness. Moreover, it provides protection against sudden current surge
caused by the charged particles, unexpected high voltage spike, or bright light illumination.
This circuit can give maximum detection rate of 0.2–0.4 MHz which is sufficient for the
QKD missions [36]. In addition, its longer dead-time, around 0.5 µs to more than 1 µs,
gives enough time for afterpulse suppression.
For the readout circuit, we choose discriminator RHR801 (from STMicroelectronics
[242]) that distinguishes avalanche pulses with typical amplitudes of 400 to less than 1 V
from a pre-set threshold. RHR801 is a very high-speed comparator having a sharp rise/fall
time of 1.1 ns. Therefore it can reliably discriminate avalanche pulses with typical width
of around 5–10 ns. Another reason for choosing RHR801 is its tolerance to radiation.
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Its radiation and characterization certification has full compliance with the test standard
used for microelectronic devices within Military and Aerospace systems (MIL-STD883
specification).
This discriminator needs dual supplies, +VCC and −VCC, for its operation with a restric-
tion on its input signals, which must be within (−VCC) + 0.5 V and (+VCC)− 1.2 V . That
means, to read signals with the ground base voltage, we need to provide at least −0.5 V
as −VCC. However, the DM PCB has no negative supply available, so we connected the
−VCC pin of RHR801 with the ground to avoid complexity in the design. But it enforced
the discriminator input signals to be larger than 500 mV , which was solved by connecting
the SPAD anode to a 600 mV voltage reference (ISL21070 IC manufactured by Renesas
[243]) instead of the ground. With this approach, the generated avalanche pulses oscillate
over 600 mV DC offset and thus solves the issues with the input voltage requirements.
After discrimination, RHR801 produces 3 V output pulses that are subsequently fed to
a dual-channel D flip-flop (Texas instruments 74AC11074pwr) to extend the pulse widths
so the comparatively slow PSoC device can reliably read them. In DM, each SPAD has a
separate quenching circuit, and two SPADs share a single readout circuit. Thus the DM
PCB has only two readout circuitry to process avalanche signals from four SPADs.
The module also includes a TEC driver circuit to control the temperature of the SPADs
via their in-built TECs. This circuit uses a highly compact MAX1968 driver IC from maxim
integrated [244]. The driver adjusts the current flow through the TECs to reach a specific
temperature. The driver circuit also includes four MOS-FET switches (G3VM-21HR) to
select individual TECs and allow current flow only through that particular one. These
switches can drive maximum current of 2.5 A in both directions.
5.4 Implementation of the detector module
During the process of design and implementation of the detector module (DM) for the
CAPSat mission, we developed three separate DMs. Most of the major components and
devices in the DMs are similar except a few changes made in the mechanical structures.
Each DM is built to serve individual purposes. The complete implementation and test
processes are divided into three different phases. These are:
1. Phase I: Test prototype DM1
Significant amount of work related to the design and the development process has
been done in this phase. We built the prototype detector module (DM1) to test and
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verify the operation of the detector module, maintaining the CubeSat form factor.
The tasks that are performed in this phase are
i. Deciding number of detector channels for the APL of the CAPSat.
ii. Choosing suitable components tolerant to the space environment.
iii. Designing the SPAD bias and quenching circuits, and temperature controller.
iv. Testing the sub-circuits of the DM PCB, and
v. Finally, implementing DM1 integrating all the sub-circuits to verify the proof-of
principal operation of the board.
2. Phase II: CAPSat detector module DM2
DM2 is the flight version of the detector module that will be sent in the CAPSat
mission. It is developed considering the launching vibration and the space environ-
ment (explained in chapter 3). In DM2, a few changes are made in the circuit and
also in the PCB dimension from the DM1 to fit it into the satellite bus (Illinisat-2
bus) along with the other payloads. DM2 will provide data from the experiment
performed in the orbiting satellite. It is now assembled with the APL control board
that is developed by the UIUC team to form the complete annealing payload.
3. Phase III: Detector module DM3 for test in the high vacuum
The third detector module (DM3) is also a flight version module. It is prepared
and assembled at IQC in the similar manner that were maintained during the DM2
processing. We built DM3 to continue further ground tests of the module. We will
verify the performance of the module in ultra-low pressure using a thermal vacuum
chamber (TVAC), which will be performed at the IQC. Prior to launch, this test will
allow us to analyse and confirm the behaviour of the module materials and electronics
in the vacuum that it will experience in space.
5.4.1 The test prototype DM1
We first breadboarded the individual sub-circuits of the module and verified their operation.
It is mentioned earlier that the APL design and its control functions are devised around an
embedded system Cypress CY8C3666 PSoC3. However, in the APL the PSoC3 is located
on the control PCB, which is not available to us until the two boards are assembled together.
Therefore we used a PSoC3 development kit CY8CKIT-030A to test the control functions
of the DM1 prototype board. An Integrated Design Environment (IDE) software, PSOC
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Creator enables configuration of the PSoC3 hardware and firmware concurrently. The
control of the DM circuitry is discussed below.
SPAD circuits and their control
PSoC3 control signals to the detectors’ bias and readout circuit are illustrated in Fig. 5.7.
The DM1 PCB contains two such circuits for driving four SPADs. We see in the figure that
a single high-voltage supply (HVS) provides bias voltages to two SPADs via two switches
(SW1, SW2). Two signals from the PSoC3 drive HVS’s output. First, a digital active Low
input (I/O) activates the HVS, and then an analog signal ranging between 0−2.5 V drives
HVS’s output from 0 V to 500 V . A PSoC3 voltage-DAC (VDAC) provides the analog
signals to the HVS. Its output voltage is then simultaneously fed to the input of the two
SWs, which have good electrical isolation between its input and output. The bias voltages
are forwarded to the SPADs when the SWs are activated by the PSoC3. With a sufficient
bias voltage, the detectors get ready to generate avalanche pulses. These signals are then
compared with a pre-set threshold (THR) in the discriminator (DISC). The THR value is
provided by a PSoC3 VDAC which is little larger (around 50−200 mV ) than 600 mV . For
each avalanche event, DISC produces 3 V output pulse with a narrower width, ≈ 10 ns.
These are broadened using a D-FF so that the PSoC3 can properly read the signals. An
RC circuit at the D-FF defines the width of the pulses. The values of R and C are chosen
such that the pulse width reaches around 100 ns. Finally, the total number of pulses are
estimated by a counter configured in the PSoC3. Thus this circuit drives two SPADs and
provides their avalanche counts. Since, one SPAD will run at a time, sharing the readout
between the SPADs does not cause any problem. We just need to adjust the bias voltages
and the DISC thresholds during the operation of each SPAD.
Temperature control
Figure 5.8 illustrates the control of the four in-built detector TECs, and the TEC driver
(MAX1968) by the PSoC3. The MAX1968 can drive current in both directions: positive
current for the cooling and negative current for the heating of the detector. Four current
switches are used to select a particular TEC to which cooling/heating current will flow.
Thermistors attached with the SPAD (shown separately in the figure) measure the SPADs’
temperature as a voltage. A PSoC3 analog-to-digital converter (ADC) reads these ther-
mistor voltages. Then a piece of C code written in the PSoC creator uses these readings to









































Figure 5.7: Block diagram of the controlling SPAD bias and readout circuit operations
by PSoC3. HVS: high voltage supply; SW1, SW2: switches; DISC: discriminator; D-FF:








































Figure 5.8: Schematic of the signal flow for temperature control. The Opto-coupler switches
select the respective TECs when they receive an active high logic input from PSoC3. The
active mode of the TEC driver is also chosen by sending an active high signal from the
processor. The thermistors measure the temperature of the SPADs. Detail operation is in
the text.
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It sets a voltage on a VDAC to send appropriate Control voltages to the TEC driver based
on the thermistor readings and the given expected temperature. Then the Control voltage
adjusts the TEC current flow that is necessary to reach a particular temperature. The
TEC driver also provides a way to measure this current flow via ITEC which can be read
by a PSoC3 ADC.
DM1 PCB
We integrated all the aforementioned sub-circuits and built the prototype board DM1, as
shown in Fig. 5.9. The size of the DM1 PCB is 95 mm× 95 mm× 40 mm (L×W× H).
It is built to test the proof-of-principal operation of the module. The DM includes two
fiber coupled SLiK SPADs and two C30902SH detectors that are without fiber connectors.
Having fiber connectors with the SPADs were not mandatory for this prototype, since
the module is built mostly to test the control functions. The SPADs are mounted on an
aluminum (Al) plate so that it can dissipate the produced heat from the detectors. The rear
side of the TEC heated up quickly during the cooling of the SPADs via TECs. To radiate
this heat, usually, the detectors need to be attached with a material that has good thermal
conduction property. Aluminum is chosen because of its good thermal conductivity, which
is more than 220 W/mK over a wide range of temperatures [245]. This material has
been used previously in other SPAD modules built in our lab to radiate the excess heat
[37, 38, 47]. To radiate this heat energy away by the satellite radiator, our primary concept
was to attach the Al mounting plate with a wall of the satellite bus. Since DM1 will be
operated in lab without the satellite bus, we attached a small heat sink at one side of the
mounting plate for heat dissipation, illustrated in Fig. 5.9. The mechanical structure of
the mounting plate and the brackets are depicted in Fig. 5.10. Two L-shaped brackets are
used to attach the mounting plate with the PCB.
After mounting the detectors on the Al plate, their pins coming through the holes are
connected to the PCB using additional vertical wires, as shown in Fig. 5.11. We create an
isolation of the pins from the Al plate by inserting wire jackets around each pin that have
connections with the PCB. The quenching resistors are also vertically connected with the
cathode of the SPADs to keep them as close as possible to the cathode. It is because this
approach reduces the parasitic capacitance, which in turn reduces the recharge time of the
detectors.
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Figure 5.9: Test prototype of the detector module DM1.
a) b)
Figure 5.10: DM1 Detector mounting plate. a) mechanical structure of the Al plate, and
b) the brackets used to secure the mounting plate with the PCB.
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Figure 5.11: Detectors pin connections with the PCB.
Test setup
The operation of the DM1 is tested using a Cypress CY8CKIT-030 PSoC3 development
kit. The test arrangement is shown in Fig. A.1. A programming interface is provided with
the development board (DB) to program the PSoC3. It interfaces the PSoC3 processor
with the PC through a USB port. The same programming USB also supplies power to
the development board. PSoC3 component configuration and firmware development are
accomplished using an Integrated Design Environment (IDE), PSoC creator software. The
very first step is to create a schematic design in the creator workspace adding the required
analog or digital components on it. Then the peripheral configuration, routing and pin
assignments are also accomplished using the creator. The operation and schedules of the
peripherals are defined by a C code that is programmed in the PSoC3 via the programming
USB. Before starting any operation, it is important to ensure that the development board
and the DM1 PCB both share a common ground. During the test, we provide the power
to the DM1 PCB from an external supply.
The creator schematic for the detectors bias and readout circuit is illustrated in Fig.
5.13. It shows the required components for controlling the detector circuits. Two Control




Detector Module 1 
(DM1)
Figure 5.12: PSoC3 development board is connected with the DM1 to test control functions.
Figure 5.13: Schematic design in the PSoC workspace to control the SPAD bias and readout
circuit.
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(HVS) that provides bias voltages to the SLiKs, and the corresponding switches of the
SLiKs. Similarly, ’SW HV2’ turns ON the second HVS and the two corresponding switches
of the C30902SH detectors. Detector switches need Logic ’1’ for their activation, while
the HVS requires logic ’0’ to turn it ON. With this approach, we have a flexibility to
turn ON separately any of the detectors, but one detector will be activated at a time to
save power consumption. After activating a HVS, the component ’VDAC HVcon’ sends
the analog control voltages to the HVS input to get an expected bias voltage. Then the
’VDAC Threshold1’ provides the required threshold voltages to the discriminator. We need
following sets of code to get high bias voltages from the HVS, and the SPAD avalanche
signals.
1 SW HV1 Write(1001);%/*4 bit: SLIKX,SLIK3,SLIK2,SLIK1,HV 1; 1001 is ...
the rest condition,*/
2
3 SW HV2 Write(1001);%/*4 bit: C0902SH2,C0902SH1,HV 2; 1001 is the ...
rest condition,*/
4
5 VDAC HVcon Start();%/* Sets control voltage of HV1*/
6 VDAC HVcon SetRange(VDAC HVcon RANGE 4V);
7 VDAC HVcon SetValue(86);%/*actual value is (setvalue)*16 mV*/
8
9
10 VDAC Threshold1 Start();%/* Sets threshold value of Discriminator*/
11 VDAC Threshold1 SetRange(VDAC Threshold1 RANGE 4V);
12 VDAC Threshold1 SetValue(20);%/*actual value is (setvalue)*16 mV*/
In this code, for a VDAC the ’ SetValue’ corresponds to a value = ’ SetValue’×16 mV.
The HVS output increases by around 3 V for each increment of the ’ SetValue’. Ta-
ble 5.1 lists several HVS output voltages at different ’ SetValue’, illustrating a tentative
required ’ SetValue’ to reach a certain bias voltage. On the other hand, ’ SetValue’ for
the ′VDAC Threshold1′ is simply found by ′Expected Threshold value/16 mV′. Since the
SPAD avalanche signals have DC offset of 600 mV, the discriminator threshold was set
around 50 to 200 mV larger than the signals’ DC offset.
After setting a fixed value for the threshold, we increase gradually the HVS control
signal (’VDAC HVcon SetValue’) to raise the SPAD bias. The SPAD output is monitored
in a oscilloscope (OSC). Whenever, the bias reaches to SPAD’s breakdown voltage, small
avalanche signals (around 15 mV ) start to appear frequently on the OSC display. This
process is continued to measure the breakdown voltages for all the SPADs. Table 5.4















Time 10 ns/ div
Figure 5.14: The avalanche pulse generated by Excelitas C30902SH at 20 V of excess bias.
above the breakdown) of the DM1 detectors. The amplitude of the signals increases with
increased bias voltages. Fig. 5.14 shows an avalanche pulse produced by a Excelitas
C30902SH detector at a 20 V excess bias, where the signal is around 600 mV with a width
of ≈ 5 ns. Then to measure the total number of avalanche events, a 24-bit counter is
configured in the PSoC creator. The counter device works together with a Sync device
(shown in Fig. 5.13) to properly estimate the number of events. The Sync helps to transfer
signals from a different clock domain to the destination clock domain by lining up the signal
transition.
Table 5.1: HVS output voltage for different ′ SetValue’









Table 5.2: A summary of DM1 SPAD parameters
SPADs Breakdown Voltage (V) Pulse width at the discriminator∗ (ns)
C30902SH 1 259 9.8
C30902SH 2 256 5.9
SLiK 1 314 7.3
SLiK 2 302 7.5
















Figure 5.15: TEC temperature Control by PSoC3.
5.4.2 TEC temperature control
The schematic of TEC temperature control is illustrated in Fig. 5.15. The TEC driver
adjusts the amount of current through the TEC, depending on the input CTL voltage, to
reach a certain temperature. Driver’s ITEC pin enables us measuring the TEC current as
a voltage which is read by a PSoC3 ADC. An integrated thermistor constantly senses the
SPAD temperature, changing its resistance with the variations in temperature. Therefore,
the voltage drop across the thermistor (Vtherm) also varies. A PSoC3 ADC reads the
instantaneous Vtherm, which is converted into temperature in the following way. First, we
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where Itherm is the current flowing through the thermistor, and VRef is the reference voltage
to which a combination of 10 kΩ resistance and the thermistor is connected, as seen in








where β and r∞ = Roe
−β
To are the thermistor characteristic parameters, which are found
from the detector data sheet [151]. The parameters are β = 3200, and Ro = 5100 Ω at
To = 298.15 K, which gives r∞ ≈ 0.1113.
Once PSoC3 knows the temperature of the SPAD, a control algorithm written in C
uses that value to reach the expected temperature. This algorithm creates a feedback loop
to calibrate the value of the CTL voltage to adjust the amount of the current flow through
the TEC. This loop is known as PID control loop, which is discussed later in this section.
Configuring TEC Driver
The TEC driver (MAX1968) in the DM1 is configured first to limit some of its parameters,
such as the maximum differential voltage (VMAXV), the maximum TEC positive current
(VMAXIP) and the maximum negative TEC current (VMAXIN). This is done by choosing
appropriate values for the resistors R10 – R12, and R14 – R16 in the DM1 schematic (Fig.
A.1). The limiting parameters depend on the TEC’s absolute maximum voltage, maximum
cooling, and maximum heating current. TEC parameters are found in the datasheet, for
instance, the TECs with the C30902SH detector have the absolute values of maximum
current ITEC(MAX)= 1.4 A, and maximum voltage VTEC(MAX) = 2 V. The parameters of the
TEC and the TEC driver follow the relationships given in equations 5.3– 5.5












Here, RSENSE is 0.05 Ω. For safe operation, the parameters of the TEC driver are chosen
for the TEC voltage VTEC(MAX) = 2 V, TEC cooling current ITECP(MAX) = 1 A, and TEC
heating current ITECN(MAX) = 0.25 A. The values of VMAXV, VMAXIP and VMAXIN
are then used to calculate the values of the resistors R10 – R12, and R14 – R16 using the
equations 5.6 – 5.8. The resistor values are summarized in table 5.3
VMAXV(V ) = REF× R14
(R12 +R14)
(5.6)
VMAXIP(V ) = REF× R15
(R11 +R15)
(5.7)
VMAXIN(V ) = REF× R16
(R10 +R16)
(5.8)
here REF is a fixed voltage of 1.5 V. When no current flows through the TECs, the
CTL is similar to the REF voltage. A positive current flows when VCTL > 1.5 V and
cooling is required. Conversely, VCTL < 1.5 V during heating and a negative current flows
through the TECs. The amount of current is monitored by reading voltages at the ITEC
pins of the TEC driver. If no current flows into the TEC, then the ITEC = REF. The





Table 5.3: Values of the TEC driver parameter defining resistors
VMAXV = 0.5 V R12 = 100 kΩ R14 = 50 kΩ
VMAXIP = 0.5 V R11 = 100 kΩ R15 = 50 kΩ
VMAXIN = 0.125 V R10 = 100 kΩ R16 = 769 Ω
PID Control
We implemented a digital PID control loop that continuously adjusts its output within
the loop using a feedback mechanism to control a system. Here the term ’PID’ stands for
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Figure 5.16: PSoC schematic for the temperature control. The components and lines in
blue color are not active elements. They are just to show how the PSoC3 active elements
are connected to the physical components of the DM1.
Proportional, Integral, and Derivative. We used a parallel form of PID controller [246] to
control the temperature. The relation of the control variable u(t) with the PID parameters
are given by







where e(t) is the error or difference between the expected and the system output tem-
perature, and Kp, Ki, and Kd are the proportional, integral and differential coefficients,
respectively. Here, e(t) is the input to the PID loop, while u(t) is the loop output.






















Figure 5.17: Step response of the PID loop for temperature transition between ∼ 8◦C.
The coefficients were Kp = 1.5, Ki = 0.2, Kd = 0.3.
The coefficients can be defined as,
Kp +Ki +Kd = K1
−Kp − 2Kd = K2
Kd = K3
Now, equation 5.11 can be written as





Finally, the difference formula of equation 5.12 is
u[k] = u[k − 1] +K1e[k] +K2e[k − 1] +K3e[k − 2] (5.13)
Equation 5.13 is used to implement the control algorithm in the PSoC creator. The
necessary components to run the PID loop are illustrated in the PSoC schematic, shown
in Fig. 5.16. The loop reads the instantaneous thermistor voltage utilizing the ADC























Figure 5.18: Measured thermistor voltages at various temperatures.
in algorithm. Their differences provides the error e(t). The loop keeps record of the errors
from previous two iterations. Using those error values, the algorithm calibrates the CTL
voltage and changes the TEC current. The loop coefficients Kp, Ki, and Kd were manually
tuned to achieve the optimum result. For tuning the PID coefficients, we observed the
loops’ step function responses at different coefficient values and the overshooting at the
instances of reset of the program. First, we tuned only the Kp parameter, keeping the
other two parameters zero. With this setting, the PID loop never reaches to its expected
value. Then the PI parameters Kp and Ki were tuned, which helped to reach the desired
temperature, but the rising and falling time between the two voltages were slow. Tuning Kd
parameter along with the other two parameters provided a better loop performance. The
optimal performances was found for Kp = 1.5, Ki = 0.2, and Kd = 0.3 for a loop duration
of 1000 ms. Fig. 5.17 shows the step response of the loop for temperature changes between
17◦C and 25◦C. The voltage difference was 100 mV , where the low-to-high steady state
transition was around 2 s and the opposite transition took around 14 s. So the PID loop
needs longer duration for heating. However, this duration will not affect the performance
of the experiment since in the annealing payload the requirement of changing temperature
is only as settings before performing any particular operation.
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Once the optimum parameters are found, the PID loop together with the hardware
arrangements shown in Fig. 5.15 work as a temperature controller. We used this controller
to vary the SPAD temperatures utilizing their integrated TECs. The corresponding mea-
sured average thermistor voltages and currents are illustrated in Fig. 5.18 and Fig. 5.19,
respectively. Thermistor voltages are approximately similar to the given set voltages used
in the PID loop, which were incremented at a regular interval of 0.05 V . At the cooling
temperatures, the measured temperatures are almost similar to that of the set values. In
contrast, these values gradually go off from the set ones as the temperature increases. At
the linear region of the thermistor voltages, the temperature drops approximately 3.4 K
for each 0.05 V of voltage increment. Over the temperature variations ranging between
347.5 and 254.2 K, TEC current flow varied from (−0.20) to 0.62 A. We restricted the
TEC current (both in hardware and in PID loop) to −0.20 A for the heating to avoid
overshooting above TEC maximum heating current, which is −2.50 A. So, by using a
larger current limit, it is possible to achieve a higher temperature. The estimated ther-
mistor resistance values were extended from 1.1 to 32.6 kΩ over the temperature range of





















Figure 5.19: TEC current at various temperature
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Figure 5.20: Resistance values of the thermistor at various temperatures
Power consumption
Table 5.4 outlines the power consumption by the individual major components of the
detector module. It shows that when only a single SPAD device is active, maximum power
consumption by the detector PCB was around 2.5 W . This measurement was taken at
the high-voltage supply of 485 V and the TEC current flow for −19◦C. So the power
consumption is well below the allocated total power budget of 5 − 7 W for the annealing
payload.
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Table 5.4: Power consumption by major components of the DM1 PCB
Device Supply Voltage (V) Current flow (mA) Power (mW)
High-voltage supply at 5 36.7 to 85 183.5 to 225
at Vout 200 to 485 V
Discriminator 3.3 8.94 29.5
High-voltage switch 3.3 5 16.5
current switch 3.3 6 20
TEC driver 3.3 659∗ 2175
∗ measurement was taken at −19◦C. Usually, a higher current is required during cooling.
5.5 The CAPSat detector module DM2
DM2 circuits and most of the components are similar to DM1. The main difference of this
module is that it is prepared and developed considering the extreme weather conditions in
space, such as high-vacuum and high-energy particle radiation. During implementation,
we choose carefully each element of DM2, such as the connecting wires, the jackets of
the wires, soldering materials, and thermal pasts. The hardware and electronics have gone
through several cleaning processes to minimize the contamination. DM2 structures are then
assembled in a clean room with filtered airflow at positive pressure to avoid contamination
and dust. DM2 will go through several tests and certification procedures to qualify for the
actual launch.
The PCB chosen for the DM2 is FR4 PCBs with tight tolerance in trace widths and
spacing (4/4 mil) to ensure the quality of the boards. The electrical components are
soldered in the PCB using Sn60Pb40 leaded solder alloy which is listed in the Electronics
Assembly Standard, IPC-J-STD-001D [248] as an acceptable alloy for space applications.
Due to their lower melting point, leaded alloy prevents delamination, breaks in the internal
paths, and blistering in space. We used Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTEF Teflon) insulated
silver-coated 30 AWG copper wires for the connections of the SPAD pins with the PCB.
This type of wires has good tolerance to high temperatures, low outgassing properties, and
high resistance to moisture [249].
The dimension of the PCB is modified to fit it inside the satellite bus. The PCB
dimension is 90 mm× 90 mm× 52 mm (L×W×H) with a 8 mm groove at one side (shown
in chapter A). The groove is made to pass the fibers to the detector board from the control
board lasers. Once completed populating the PCB with the components, the PCB was
cleaned in an ultrasonic bath using isopropyl alcohol 99% (IPA) solution that cleans out oils
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Figure 5.21: Flexible thermal braids pasted with the mounting plate for thermal propaga-
tion to the satellite.
and flux from the PCB. Then the mounting plate loaded with the detectors is assembled
with DM2 PCB in a cleanroom (ISO 100 standard). Further handling and testing of the
module have been performed in the cleanroom. A conformal coating of around 0.5 mm is
hand-painted on the PCB to protect electronics from corrosive contamination, mechanical
vibration, or shock. We used Arathen 5750 LV as a conformal coating because of their
good resistance to heat and humid conditions, as well as their low outgassing properties
[250].
Preparation of detector mounting plate
We added a few changes on the Al detector mounting plate. The new dimension is 90 mm×
2 mm×50 mm (L×W×H), which is shown in fig. A.3. Our initial plan was the Al plate will
be attached with the satellite walls so the heat waste generated by the detector propagates
to the satellite bus. However, the CAPSat walls are not thermally conductive, only the
corner frames (made with Al) of the Illinisat-2 bus are thermally conductive. We therefore
devised a new design for transferring the heat away from the mounting plate. We screwed
a pair of flexible copper braids at the top of the mounting plate as shown in Fig. 5.21.
Also a pair of bare copper wire is inserted in each braid to increase the capacity of thermal
propagation. The braids and the screws are then pasted to the plate using thermal epoxy to
ensure firm contact of the braids with the plate. The two ends of the braids will be attached
with two corner frames of the bus using thermal epoxy, once the payload has loaded into the
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satellite bus. The flexible braids are chosen so that it can tolerate the launching vibrations
without damaging the thermal contact. After preparing the mounting plate, this structure
was baked in a vacuum oven at 125◦C for 5 hours. Then it was given an ultrasonic cleaning
in a solution of Acetone for 15 minutes and subsequently in a IPA solution for another 15
minutes. This process ensures removing any greasy deposits without leaving extra residue.
After cleaning, a anodizing coat is applied using a pen (BONDERITE M-CR 1132) on the
Al to prevent its oxidization due to space radiation.
Assembling DM2
We load four fiber coupled Excelitas detectors (two C30902SH and two SLiK) in the de-
tector module DM2. The completed detector assembly is now given to the UIUC team to
process further tests and verification before its actual launch. Fig. 5.22, shows the flight
version of the annealing payload with the two PCBs stacked together. As of this writing,
the CAPSat has successfully passed the Orbital Debris Assessment Report performed by
NASA and the APL has passed phase 2 of the international space station safety panel. Its
anticipated launch is in 2020.
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Figure 5.22: Flight version of the CAPSat annealing PCBs stacked together. Courtesy to
University of Illinois.
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Figure 5.23: The third detector module DM3.
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5.6 Detector module DM3
We built a third detector module DM3 to study the performance of the module in high-
vacuum that it will experience while in space. It is also a flight compatible module
and is built following the similar steps that were maintained during DM2. We mounted
four Excelitas SLiK detectors in this module. These detectors were used in the experi-
ment performed by Ian DSouza et al [38] and were radiated with a total proton dose of
2 × 1010 protons/cm2 (equivalent to 10 years fluence in LEO). Figure 5.23 illustrates the
assembled DM3. It is mounted on an Al base-frame that imitates a CubeSat bus. This
frame also provides a robust structure and protects from accidental breakage during the
module handling. It has a dimension of 12 cm3 and is built from a single-piece Al sheet.
The corner frames were cut from the sheet and then bended vertically to give the conner
rail structure. The entire structure is cleaned and anodised in the same way as the detector
mounting plate was prepared.
DM3 will be tested at low pressures in the range of 10−6 torr inside a thermal vacuum
chamber (TVAC). We will also conduct laser annealing on the detectors, as well as their
characterization in that pressure. Through this experiment, we will study the outgassing
properties of the module and performance of the laser annealing in vacuum environment
that the module will experience in space. As of this writing, the preparation for the vacuum
test in under process.
5.7 Summary
To summarize, this chapter discussed the development of detector modules for the CAPSat
annealing payload. This module is one of the two segments of the annealing payload. The
details of the module circuits, as well as its preparation and assembling procedures, are also
explained. In total, three modules are built, and each one has its own individual purpose.
The first module was implemented to verify the functions and control mechanisms. The
second and third ones are the flight version of the module. Among these, the second
module will be assembled in the satellite bus and will be launched to an LEO orbit to
perform the in-orbit laser annealing experiment in 2020. The last one is built to execute a
similar experiment in the lab on previously irradiated detectors inside a thermal vacuum





A new readout circuit for NFADs and their
characterization
The content of this chapter is based on the manuscript in preparation [251].
6.1 Introduction
Free-running [252–254] single-photon detectors (SPDs) [157, 255] at telecom wavelengths
are excellent for their diverse applications, such as in optical time-domain reflectome-
try [256], high resolution depth imaging [257], photon-counting optical communications
[258], LIDAR [259], quantum communications [260], and particularly in quantum key
distribution (QKD) [13, 261], where photon arrival time is unknown. Types of SPDs
for free-running operation include photomultiplier tubes [262], InGaAs/InP single-photon
avalanche diodes (SPADs) [263], and superconducting devices like transition edge sensors
(TESs) [264] and superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) [172]. Of
these types, SNSPDs have the best overall performance, including impressive detection
efficiencies (> 90%), low dark count rates (< 1 Hz), small timing jitter (< 100 ps), and
almost no afterpulses [150]. However, these detectors are polarization sensitive [150], and
require cryogenic cooling to reach sub-kelvin operating temperatures. Because of that, they
are unsuitable for some applications. Presently, the most practical alternative to SNSPDs
are the InGaAs/InP based SPADs because of their close to room temperature operation,
compact size, low power consumption, robustness, and low cost.
However, these InGaAs/InP SPADs under free-running mode suffer high afterpulsing
probability, which limits their performances. The afterpulses are spontaneous, non-photon
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avalanche events that occur due to the detrapping of carriers from bandgap energy levels.
These carriers were trapped while travelling through the device during avalanche events.
One such event also triggers several other secondary avalanches. The probability of these
occurrences scales up with the number of carriers involved per avalanche, the avalanche
duration, as well as the lifetime of the trapped carriers, which can be a few tens to hundreds
of microseconds [160].
One approach to reduce afterpulsing probability of the NFADs is the reduction of charge
flow per avalanche by fast quenching of the avalanche current [199]. Usually in conventional
SPADs under passive quenching circuits, a large external series resistor is used to quench
the avalanche current. But this external resistor adds a large parasitic capacitance to the
circuit, preventing fast quenching of the avalanches.
To achieve fast quenching, recently a new InGaAs/InP SPAD device has been devel-
oped that is known as negative feedback avalanche diode (NFAD) [49]. In these devices,
the detector device is monolithically integrated with a thin-film resistor that provides re-
duced parasitic capacitance. This approach in NFADs lowers the number of charge flow
per avalanche, resulting in a lower afterpulsing probability compared to that of the con-
ventional InGaAs/InP SPADs. Including additional dead time (also called hold-off time)
per avalanche further reduces their afterpulsing effect. Previously, several NFAD readout
circuits have been reported. In 2012, Yan et al [169] demonstrated a readout without any
active hold-off feature. In the same year, Lunghi et al [168] presented an FPGA based
system incorporating an active hold-off function to suppress the afterpulses.
Here, this chapter introduces a new simple design of an NFAD readout module that
we implemented adding an active hold-off feature. This module is an upgraded version of
the system reported by Yan et al [169]. Our readout contains a pulse processing module
(PPM) to produce hold-off pulses with tunable width and to process detection pulses. The
PPM is designed using traditional low voltage transistor-transistor logic (LVTTL) and
emitter-coupled logic (ECL) devices. We also studied the performance of the module and
characterized two NFADs from Princeton Lightwave Inc. [210]. This chapter discusses the
operation of NFAD devices and our new readout module, as well as NFAD characterization
using our new readout.
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a)
the pmetal contact as shown d ode (Cd) s d sc a ged e cu
b)
Figure 6.1: NFAD device (reprinted from [168]). a) SPAD growth structure with a thin
film resistor integrated on the surface of the device. (b) Top view of an NFAD. The Orange
shape is the thin-film resistor and has contact with the p-contact metal of the structure.
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6.2 Negative feedback avalanche diodes
NFADs [49] are designed to resolve the drawbacks of conventional SPADs. Figure 6.1
presents the growth structure of NFADs, where a thin film resistor is monolithically in-
tegrated with an InGaAs/InP SPAD. This approach minimizes the parasitic capacitance,
which in turn achieves fast quenching of avalanche current and also regulates the charge
flow per avalanche, around 105 − 106 carriers. Therefore, NFADs exhibits less number
of trapped charges and significantly low afterpulsing effect compared to the typical In-
GaAs/InP SPADs. NFADs have been demonstrated with extremely low dark counts (1
Hz at 10% detection efficiency), and afterpulsing probability of 2.2% at a hold-off time
of 20 µs [162]. This outcome is comparable with the performance of the SNSPDs, mak-
ing them suitable for various other applications that were assumed not possible. By now,
NFADs have been successfully used in long-distance QKD [57, 162, 169], and singlet-oxygen
dosimetry for photodynamic therapy [265].
6.2.1 NFAD device operation
Negative feedback avalanche photodiodes (NFADs) operate in Geiger mode for single-
photon detection. They require a fixed DC bias voltage equivalent to the sum of diode’s
breakdown voltage Vb, and excess bias voltage Ve above breakdown. Under proper bias
voltage when avalanche events are triggered, the quenching of avalanche current and gen-
eration of output signals both happen independently by the NFAD. Here, the negative
feedback approach that utilizes the integrated load resistor is theoretically equivalent to a
passive quenching circuit.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the fundamental operational of an NFAD. The detector is con-
sidered as the series combination of a SPAD and a negative feedback load resistor. The
SPAD itself is modeled as a parallel combination of its dynamic resistance Rd and junc-
tion capacitance Cd. The load is represented by a load resistance RL and a parallel load
capacitance CL. A reverse bias voltage of Va = Vb + Ve is applied across the NFAD for
photon detections.
With a monolithic integration, the parasitic capacitance CL is negligible [210]. Total
charge flow during an avalanche will be determined by the detector capacitance Cd and
the excess bias Ve as, q = Cd × Ve. So, smaller q can be achieved through a proper scaling
of Cd during manufacture. The operation of NFAD is explained below.
Initially, the NFAD stays in armed stage (the left most circuit in figure 6.2), represented
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involves this same amount of charge flow Q, and Q can be made quite small through appropriate scaling of Cd.  (The 
magnitude of the excess bias Vex will be dictated by operational targets for PDE since PDE increases with larger Vex.)  
Moreover, as we describe below, we have seen evidence from initial experiments [17] of the potential for limiting the 
current flow per avalanche to even less than Cd Vex, and we hypothesize that because of sufficiently large negative 
feedback, we are achieving avalanche quenching with only partial discharge of the diode depletion capacitance Cd.
In Figure 1, we illustrate the basic operational concept for the NFAD.  The device is modeled as the series combination 
of a SPAD and a generalized negative feedback load.  We have described the load as the parallel combination of a load 
resistance RL and load capacitance CL, but more general (e.g., non-linear) elements are possible.  The SPAD itself is 
conveniently modelled as having two parallel branches.  The first branch consists of the diode depletion capacitance 
Cd; the second branch includes the diode dynamic resistance Rd above breakdown, the breakdown voltage Vb, and a 
switch S that is closed to represent the occurrence of an avalanche.  An applied voltage Va = Vb + Vex is imposed 

































Figure 1.  Basic concept of NFAD operation.  The device is modeled as the combination of a canonical SPAD with a 
negative feedback load.  The closing of switch S corresponds to the onset of an avalanche event, providing for the 
discharge of diode capacitance Cd and the shifting of some portion of the excess bias voltage Vex = Va – Vb  from the 
SPAD structure to the negative feedback load (equivalent to potential drop i·RL).  Quenching of the avalanche is 
represented by the re-opening of switch S, at which point the external source re-charges Cd to re-arm the device.
The NFAD is initially in its armed state with the voltage across the SPAD exceeding Vb by the excess bias Vex.  With 
the switch S open, no current flows.  The onset of an avalanche is modeled by the closing of switch S, at which point 
capacitance Cd discharges through the diode dynamic resistance Rd with a time constant on the order of d ~ RdCd.  The 
removal of charge from Cd reduces the voltage across the SPAD structure, although the precise amount of voltage 
removed depends on the ratio of Rd and RL.  In fact, in steady state, the applied voltage Va is split between the SPAD 
structure and the load according to the voltage divider presented by these two resistances in series.  The amount of 
voltage removed from the SPAD structure is precisely the amount of voltage i·RL developed across the load by the 
introduction of a current i from the voltage source.  When the total current through the SPAD switch S drops to a value 
smaller than a characteristic quench value iq, the avalanche will spontaneously quench, represented by the re-opening 
of switch S.  With S open, Cd is re-charged through load resistance RL, with a recharging time constant r ~ RLCd
dictating how long it takes to re-arm the NFAD. 
From this description of NFAD behavior, a fundamental design trade-off becomes apparent with the respect to the 
magnitude of RL.  On the one hand, RL must be large enough to ensure a small current flow (<< iq) through the load 
after the initial capacitive discharge during an avalanche event so that quenching can occur rapidly.  On the other hand, 
because the effective dead time (during which the excess bias is low) is proportional to the recharging time constant 
Proc. of SPIE Vol. 7608  760829-4
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Figure 6.2: Basic operation of NFADs. The NFAD device is illustrated as a series combi-
nation of a SPAD with a n gative feedback load RL. The first circuit is a pre- valanche
condition, represented with the open switch S. An avalanche event is presented with the
S closed. After the quenching of avalanche current, NFAD requires a charging time to be-
come ready for next detection, represented by th third circuit. The diagram is repro uced
fro reference [210]
w th the switch S ’open’. At this tag , no avalanche current flows and Cd cha ges via the
voltage Va. During an avalanche (middle circuit in figure 6.2), with the S ’closed’ Cd starts
to discharge through Rd with a time constant of τdischarge ≈ RdCd. This causes a current
flow i through RL that gradually increases, and a voltage i.RL grows across the load RL.
At the same time, a similar amount of voltage is deducted from the SPAD, reducing its
current flow clos to the quenching curr nt iq. Once iq is eached, avalanche current stops
and S goes back to its open state. During this state (third circuit in the figure), the
capacitor charges again with a time constant τcharge ≈ RLCd. Since the charging time and
quenching time both depends on the magnitude of RL, it should be high enough for quick
quenching of avalanches, as well as low enough to reduce the charging time. Because a
large RL leads to a long dead time by increasing their charging time and thus reduces the
photon counting rates. Therefore, RL is selected carefully by the manufacturer for NFADs’
optimal operation.
6.3 The photon counting module
Figure 6.3 shows the functional diagram of the photon counting module, which consists of
two submodules. The detector with its bias circuitry (the left submodule in Fig. 6.3) is
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inside a Stirling Ultracold freezer (Shuttle ULT:25N-86C) at 192 K. The high voltage bias
is provided to the NFAD through the primary coil of a pulse transformer (PE-65968N).
The secondary coil transfers the avalanche signals to the right sub-module (Fig. 6.3) via
a 50 Ω transmission line. Note that the detection signals are inductively coupled to the
amplifiers (located in the right sub-module) via the pulse transformer that allows transfer
of avalanche current with improved sensitivity. After processing these avalanche signals
by the PPM, generated hold-off pulses are fed back to the NFAD anode by another 50 Ω
transmission line.
Ground






















Figure 6.3: Design diagram of our NFAD photon counting module. All components in
the gray box are at room temperature, and those in the blue box are in a deep freezer at
192 K temperature. The high voltage module supplies bias voltages to the NFAD. The
pulse processing module processes the detection signals and produces hold-off pulses. PE-
65968N: pulse transformer; ZFL-1000LN: radio frequency (RF) amplifier; FC/PC: single
mode fiber connector; SMA: Coaxial connector.
On the other hand, the right sub-module stays at room temperature that consists of
a high voltage module, two wide-band RF amplifiers, and the PPM. The high voltage
module (Matsusada, model TP-0.15P) provides the required bias voltages to the NFAD,

































Figure 6.4: a) Electrical schematic of the pulse processing module. The PPM circuit
produces a detection pulse and hold-off pulse for each NFAD detection event. Experimental
data of a typical detection pulse and hold-off pulse are shown at the two outputs. Bold
lines refers to the differential lines. Disc: discriminator (ADCMP553); D-FF: D flip-flop
(MC100EP51); PWM: pulse width modulator; E/T: ECL to TTL converter (ICS83021I);
INT: Integrator. Functional details are explained in text. b) The readout module that
consists of radio frequency amplifiers (RF amplifier), high-voltage supply (HV supply),
and the PPM.
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signals by +40 dB. The PPM processes the detection pulses as well as simultaneously
generates tunable hold-off gate pulses. These gate pulses are LVTTL voltages and reduce
NFADs bias below their breakdown voltages to prevent detection for the gate duration.
6.4 Pulse processing module
The pulse processing module (PPM) is designed using LVTTL and high-speed ECL logic
devices. The ECL devices have differential input/output, and the difference between the
logic levels is only around 0.8 V, allowing their use for fast switching. The block diagram
of our PPM is shown in Fig. 6.4.
The PPM has two branches– one path processes the detection pulses, while the other
generates hold-off gate pulses. The module operates in the following way: A discriminator
(Disc) distinguishes the amplified avalanche signals when their amplitude is larger than
a pre-set reference voltage (maximum of 200 mV). The Disc output is fed simultaneously
to the non-inverting inputs of two D-FFs in each branch. An avalanche event causes a
transition from LOW to HIGH at the output of both D-FFs. Then capacitor C1 at D-FF1
output starts to charge via resistor R1. Once a voltage develops across C1, it resets D-FF1
and generates a pulse with a width defined by the R1C1 time constant of the circuit. We
choose a pulse width of 100 ns by tuning R1. Lastly, an ECL to TTL converter (E/T)
transforms the differential pulses into LVTTL detection pulses with an amplitude of 3 V.
Similarly, the lower branch of the PPM circuit generates LVTTL hold-off gate pulses
after the E/T conversion. In this case, the pulse width is determined by a pulse width
modulator (PWM) that resets D-FF2 after a certain duration (between 1.2 and 60 µs). We
observed that gate pulses trigger extra detection events at their falling edges due to large
voltage change in a short duration at the pulse transformer. Therefore, an integrator (INT)
circuit is included following the E/T converter to control the fall time of the hold-off pulses.
The INT consists of an operational amplifier (op-amp), and a combination of resistors Rs,
Rp and capacitor Cp as shown in Fig. 6.4. We select a value of Cp to give sufficiently long
fall time. Then resistor Rp is tuned to increase the fall time until the detection events at
the fall edges disappear. Next, an amplifier (Amp) following the INT is used to vary the
amplitude of gate pulses by modifying Amp gain.
The resultant gate pulse (shown in Fig. 6.4) has an amplitude of 4 V and a fall
time (90% to 10% of full amplitude) of 2 µs. The NFADs are ready for detecting new
events within 400 ns from the gate pulse falling edges. The gate pulses (at 10% of full






















Figure 6.5: Test setup for the NFAD characterization using the time-correlated single-
photon counting method (TCSPC) [170]. a) Schematic overview of the setup. The optical
pulses from a pulsed laser (PL) are attenuated by a variable optical attenuator (VOA),
and then sent to an NFAD. The avalanche events from the NFAD are collected using a
time tagger (TT). b) The lab setup and the devices used during the experiment.
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duration compared to the microsecond hold-off pulses. Consequently, this delay has a
negligible contribution in limiting the count rate of the system. Overall, this simple design
of our PPM supports easy operation and troubleshooting of the signal processing, while
maintaining an excellent time resolution.
6.5 Characterization of NFAD
We characterized two NFADs using our custom readout electronics. The NFADs used in
the system are model E2G6 (NFAD1) and E3G3 (NFAD2) from Princeton Lightwave Inc.
[210], with an active area diameter of 22µm and 32µm, respectively. Both diodes are sin-
gle mode fiber coupled and have integrated quenching resistor of 1.1 MΩ. NFAD2 was also
characterized using Yan’s [169] circuit without the afterpulse suppression feature. There-
fore, characterizing NFAD2 using our new readout allows us to compare the performance
of the circuits.
A schematic of our characterization experimental setup is illustrated in Fig. 6.5. We
used time-correlated single-photon counting method (TCSPC) [170] for the NFAD charac-
terization. The setup used a 1310 nm distributed feedback short-pulse laser source (PL: id
Quantique, model # id 300), that is triggered by an arbitrary waveform generator (AWG:
Tektronix AFG3502) to generate optical pulses. We attenuate the pulses down to single
photon energy levels using a variable optical attenuator (VOA: OZ optics, DA-100-3U-
1550). The weak pulses are then transmitted to the NFAD under test. A time-tagger
(TT; 16-channel UQDevices) with a resolution of 78.125 ps is used to record the avalanche
events with reference to the trigger pulses of the laser. Using this setup we measured the
NFADs’ characteristic parameters, such as their photon detection efficiency, dark count
rate, afterpulsing probability, and timing jitter.
6.5.1 Dark count rate
First, we measured the breakdown voltages (VB) of the two NFADs at temperature 192 K
to be 69.4 V (±0.1 V) and 69.3 V (±0.2 V) for NFAD1 and NFAD2, respectively. Then we
measured the dark count rate (DCR), keeping the laser turned OFF and the hold-off time
(τd) fixed at 20µs. This DCR includes intrinsic dark counts due to thermal excitation and
trap-assisted tunneling, as well as afterpulses originating from intrinsic dark counts.
The DCR of the diodes at various excess bias voltages VE (the bias voltage above VB)
are shown in Fig. 6.6. We see both diodes respond similarly and have less than 100 counts
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Figure 6.6: Observed dark count rates versus excess bias voltages. The dark count rates
for each data point were accumulated in the time-tagger unit for 10 minutes. The hold-off
time was 20 µs for both NFADs. The dotted line joining the data points are guidelines.
This plot shows the complete operation regime for each NFAD before saturation. The size
of the error bars are smaller than the data marker size.
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Figure 6.7: Effect of various hold-off times on the dark count rate. Long hold-off time
reduces significant number of dark counts, and the afterpulses due to the dark counts. At
2 V excess bias with a 40 µs hold-off time, DCR of NFAD1 increases probably due to a
drift in the bias or thermal properties during measurement.
per second (cps) over a wide operation regime, up to around 4 V of VE. Above 6 V of VE,
the two NFADs suddenly saturate due to a significant increase of afterpulses caused by the
large bias voltages. In contrast, under the circuit of Yan et. al., NFAD2 saturated just
at 2 V of VE. This relatively low DCR of the NFADs even at the large bias demonstrates
how our new readout circuit can prevent the early saturation by significantly reducing the
number of afterpulses. Dark counts can be further suppressed by additional cooling [162].
We then studied the effect of hold-off times on DCR of the NFADs, which is shown in
Fig. 6.7. The measurement was performed at two different excess bias voltages, 2 V and
5 V. We see that DCR is almost constant at 2 V of VE for each diode, around 12 cps (20
cps) for NFAD1 (NFAD2). However, exponential drop of DCR is observed in both NFADs
for 5 V of excess bias from τd of 1.5 µs to 20 µs. This significant reduction of DCR for
a long τd refers to substantial suppression of the afterpulses. Note that, DCR is steady




We used two methods to measure the detection efficiencies (DE) of the NFADs. A weak
coherent pulse (WCP) source was used in the first method, then a spontaneous parametric
down-conversion (SPDC) source was used in the second method. The measurement of DE
using these methods are discussed below.
WCP method
In this method, we used a WCP source that utilized a 1310 nm pulsed laser (id 300). It
generated optical pulses at a rate of 10 kHz, which was much smaller than the system’s
maximum possible repetition rate of 50 kHz (defined by the τd of 20µs).
Considering the incoming photons have a Poisson distribution, the detection efficiency











where Rdet and rdc are the measured count rates with and without the laser illumination
respectively, ftrig is the trigger frequency of the laser, τ0 is the coincidence time window on
the TT, and µ is the mean photon number. The derivation of eq. (6.1) is given in appendix
B.
During experiment, we chose µ to be extremely low, around 0.14 (0.13) for NFAD1
(NFAD2). The process of calibrating µ is explained in appendix B. Detection events from
the NFADs were registered in a time tagger, which also recorded the coincident occurrences
of the photon detections with the trigger pulses for a time window τd of 1 ns. We then
estimated the detection efficiencies of the NFADs at various excess bias voltages, which are
depicted in Fig. 6.8. We found the maximum detection efficiency of 8.5% and 6% at 5 V
of VE for NFAD1 and NFAD2, respectively.
We also analyzed the evaluation of DE with the photon flux at two different bias
voltages, illustrated in the inset of Fig. 6.8. Since detection probability increases with
the increased number of photons per pulse, so larger µ gave an expected higher detection
efficiency. DE was later verified for various hold-off times and discriminator threshold
voltages (summarised in Fig. 6.9 that did not show any noticeable effect on DE.
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Figure 6.8: Evolution of detection efficiency (DE) of the NFADs with the bias voltages.
The lines joining the data points are guidelines. This plot shows the DE for the complete
operation regime of the two NFADs. The measurement for each data point is taken for a
20 µs of hold-off time. Inset plot illustrates the evolution of DE of NFAD1 with the photon
flux at 2 V and 5 V of VE.
SPDC method
This method used an SPDC source developed by Dr. Rolf Horn [266]. The source contains
a pair of type-0 phase matched PPLN crystal that uses a 776 nm pump laser and produces
photon pairs at 1552 nm. Using SPDC source has an advantage because it avoids the un-
certainties in the mean photon number calibration. Therefore this method of measurement
requires least assumptions in the detection efficiency measurement.
We used two detector arrangements for this test, as shown in Fig. 6.10. In the first
arrangement (dotted box (a) in Fig. 6.10), two idQ-201 detectors were used to detect the
correlated photon pairs from the SPDC source. Here the idQ-201 SPADs are commercial
gated mode InGaAs detectors available with detection probability up to 30% at 1550 nm
[267]. The second arrangement consists of one idQ-201 detector and an NFAD pair (dotted
box (b) in Fig. 6.10). Later, the output detection events from the two arrangements were
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Figure 6.9: Effects of hold-off times and threshold voltages on the detection efficiency. The
lines joining the data points are guidelines. The measurement for each data point is taken
for a 20 µs of hold-off time and 2 V of VE.
compared to estimate the efficiencies of the NFADs. For example, when the idQ-201 at
the lower arm in box (a) was replaced with an NFAD, we compared the detection events
of the NFAD with that idQ-201 detector. Since both of these detectors were connected
to the same arm of the SPDC source, the photon coupling loss experienced by that arm
would be similar in both measurements. Therefore, we ignored photon coupling loss of the
arms during efficiency estimation of the NFADs.
The test procedures are explained here. First, a 50/50 beam splitter (BS) splits the
photon pairs from the SPDC source and transmits them to the two idQ-201 detectors
(first arrangement). Both of these detectors were triggered by an arbitrary waveform
generator (AWG) at 1 MHz. The detector parameters were set to 10% detection efficiency,
10 µs dead time, and 50 ns gate pulse width. Then the individual detection events from
the SPADs, and their detection coincidences within a 2 ns window were registered using
a time tagger. Afterwards, the setup was changed to second arrangement by replacing
IDQ2 with NFAD1. The individual (singles) and coincident counts of the IDQ1-NFAD1



















Figure 6.10: Scheme for NFAD’s detection efficiency measurement using SPDC source.
The photon pairs separated by a 50/50 beam splitter (BS) are transmitted to (a) two IDQ
(idQ-201) detectors, and (b) a IDQ-NFAD pair. The avalanche events are registered using
a time-tagger (TT). The pulsed laser (PL) source and the variable attenuator (VOA) are
used with the arrangement in the dotted box (b).
IDQ2-NFAD2 pairs.
The detection efficiencies of the NFADs were calculated based on the singles and coinci-
dental counts. Let’s assume R is the total photon pair generation rate, then the individual
detection events of an IDQ-NFAD pair (of an arm of the source) are given by
NIDQ = R . ηIDQ . tdc (6.2)
NNFAD = R . ηNFAD (6.3)
Here, NIDQ and NNFAD are the singles at the IDQ and NFAD respectively, ηIDQ and
ηNFAD are the detection efficiencies of the IDQ and NFAD SPADs, tdc is the duty cycle of
IDQ detectors. The net counts are the total counts minus dark counts in each individual
case.









. ηIDQ . tdc (6.4)
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Table 6.1: Summary of the detection efficiencies for NFAD1 and NFAD2 using SPDC
source






















where NCoincNFAD and N
Coinc
IDQ are the coincident events in each pair of detectors. The cal-
culated DE of the NFADs for the different detector arrangements are outlined in table 6.1.
It is seen that larger DE is found for the NFADs, when singles are considered. Since the
singles also includes the afterpulses, the DE based on the singles is a over estimation of
detection efficiency. In contrast, coincidental events are considered for only 2 ns window,
where afterpulsing effect is negligible. Therefore, detection efficiencies based on the co-
incidences are more accurate. This process gives the best DE of 8.8% (4%) for NFAD1
(NFAD2) at the 5 V of VE. These results closely agree with the efficiencies found in the
WCP method.
6.5.3 Afterpulsing Probability
To measure the afterpulsing probability PAP, we used the setup mentioned in Fig. 6.5,
where the laser was triggered at a rate of 10 kHz. We accumulated the detection events
in the time-tagger for 180 s. It gave a histogram for the successive avalanche events on a







− rdcτ)× 100%, (6.6)
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Figure 6.11: Afterpulse probability at various hold-off time (τd) for the NFADs. The lines
joining the data points are guidelines. The inset plot shows a histogram of the detector
counts for NFAD1 with a 20 µs of τd. Counts at 0 µs correspond to the photon detection
events due to the laser pulses, while the rest of the events result from the afterpulses.
here Ci is the number of events in the remaining time bins that are hold-off time apart
from the photon detection bin, and Cd is the number of avalanches that occur due to the
laser pulses. rdc is the dark count rate, and τ is the time-bin size, which was 150 ns for
our measurement.
Figure 6.11 illustrates the effects of the hold-off times on PAP of the NFADs at 2 V
and 5 V of excess bias. We see that afterpulses are significant at the larger bias, and these
are substantially reduced for a long hold-off time. For instance, at a τd of 20 µs, NFAD1
has PAP of 0.4% and 62.0% at 2 V and 5 V of excess bias, respectively. In the case of
NFAD2, 20 µs hold-off time results in a negative afterpulsing probability for 2 V of VE,
inferring to an extremely low PAP, and it is 48% for a 5 V excess bias. In contrast, NFAD2
exhibited more than 200% afterpulsing probability at only 2 V of VE under Yan et al. circuit
without any hold-off time [169]. This noticeable PAP improvement of NFAD2 under the
new readout circuit demonstrates its remarkable afterpulse suppression capability. Notably,
this extensive afterpulse reduction is more evident for different hold-off times at 5 V of VE,
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at which a considerable amount of afterpulses occur in each NFAD. At this bias, PAP drops
from 1671% to 33% for a τd from 10 µs to 30 µs in NFAD1, and drops from 11248% to
48% for a τd from 5 µs to 20 µs in NFAD2.
We verified our PAP estimation by computing the intrinsic dark count rate (r
i
dc), which
should not be affected by the hold-off times. ridc was calculated by using the formula (6.7)
for various τd [168].
ridc =
rdc
(1 + PAP )(1− rdcτd)
(6.7)
here rdc is the measured dark counts that includes the intrinsic dark counts r
i
dc , caused
by the thermally generated carriers or tunnelling effects, and afterpulses caused by the dark
counts. This equation considers the hold off time correction and discards the extra counts
from afterpulses. Our estimated ridc is almost constant with a deviation of ±0.5 (±26) at
2 V (5 V) of VE that provides a confidence in the resultant PAP in our measurement.
6.5.4 Timing Jitter
Timing jitter (∆tjitter) of the NFADs were estimated from the registered counts by the
TT unit. ∆tjitter includes the jitter contribution from the detector itself and the readout
electronics. However, the devices involved in the measurement process, such as the time
tagger and the laser diode also contributes to the total measured timing jitter (σM). There-
fore, TT jitter (σTT ) of 78.125 ps, and the laser pulse width (σL) of ∼147 ps have been
de-convoluted from the σM (eq. (6.8)), to calculate the jitter of the readout system.
∆tjitter =
√
σ2M − σ2L − 2σ2TT (6.8)
Figure 6.12 illustrates the σM for the NFAD1 and NFAD2 at three bias voltages for a
τd of 20µs. It is observed that the detectors respond earlier to the incoming photons as
the bias voltage increases. So the late responding curves are shifted to the left, as the plots
in Fig. 6.12 are centered at their maximum counts.
We found the resultant ∆tjitter for NFAD1 is 74.5 ps full width half maximum (FWHM),
while the value is 61.8 ps FWHM for NFAD2 at their maximum efficiencies. These time
resolutions of the NFADs are excellent as compared to the findings of ∼100 ps jitter by
Yan et al in [169], and ∼ 400 ps jitter at 11% efficiency by Korzh et al in [162]. We then
verified the time jitter for various hold-off times at 2 V of VE. The insets of Fig. 6.12(a)-(b)
107
(a)


















 = 2 V
V
E
 = 3 V
V
E
 = 5 V
NFAD1
0 20 40





























 = 2 V
V
E
 = 3 V
V
E
 = 5 V
NFAD2
0 20 40












Figure 6.12: Timing jitter (∆tjitter) of the NFAD readout systems at three efficiencies. (a)
NFAD1 has ∆tjitter of 241.1 ps, 142 ps, and 74.5 ps FWHM, and (b) NFAD2 has ∆tjitter
of 221 ps, 118.7 ps, and 61.8 ps FWHM at 2 V, 3 V, and 5 V of excess bias, respectively.
Insets in (a)-(b) shows the jitter of the NFADs as a function of the hold-off time at 2 V of
VE. 108
illustrate that ∆tjitter deviates only by ±5 ps from the average jitter, showing negligible
effect of the hold-off times on timing jitter.
We also estimated the figure of merit of the NFADs using H = η/(DCR∆tjitter) [157]
at their optimum bias condition. NFAD1 gives H = 1.6 × 107 at η = 5.4% and ∆tjitter =
142 ps, and NFAD2 has H = 7.4×106 at η = 4.1% and ∆tjitter = 118.7 ps. These merits
are at least one to two order of magnitude higher than the gated InGaAs detectors [255].
Moreover, NFADs with such merits are comparable with many SNSPD detectors.
6.6 Summary and discussions
This chapter discussed a new simple readout circuit for free-running NFADs that incor-
porates an active afterpulse suppression feature. It explained the functional details of the
readout electronics, as well as characterization of two free-running NFADs using this new
readout circuit. Detection efficiencies of the NFADs were measured using two methods:
using a weak coherent pulsed source and a correlated-photon source. The first method gave
the maximum efficiencies of 8.5% and 6% for NFAD1 and NFAD2, respectively, which was
verified in the second method using commercial gated mode InGaAs detectors (idQ-201).
Detectors with such efficiencies are usable in long-distance quantum communications where
the channel loss is generally high. The observed dark count rates of the NFADs were below
100 Hz at 192 K for a 20 µs hold-off time. NFADs with DCR of 100 Hz and detection
efficiency of 10% was previously demonstrated in an entanglement-based QKD over 400 km
[100]. However, DCR being a dominant factor to the quantum bit error rate, keeping it
low is important for QKD applications. DCR can be reduced more by operating them
at lower temperatures [162]. Next, we studied the afterpulsing probability PAP at various
hold-off times. PAP was significant at 5 V of excess bias and this probability for a 5 µs
hold-off time was reduced by a factor of 51 and 236 under 20 µs of hold-off for NFAD1 and
NFAD2, respectively. This result demonstrates a noticeable afterpulse reduction capability
of our readout circuit. Here limitations in the maximum possible detection rate imposed
by the 20 µs hold-off will not affect the long-distance quantum communications because
of the lower receiving rate imposed by the high channel loss (e.g., 70 dB loss across 400
km quantum channel [169]). Our readout also showed a good time resolution. The timing
jitter of the readout system was 75 ps and 62 ps FWHM for NFAD1 and NFAD2, respec-
tively. So the overall resultant characteristic parameters of the NFADs under our custom
readout system ensure their suitability in quantum optics applications, such as quantum





Blinding Attack on NFADs
The content of this chapter is a partial contribution to the publication [268].
7.1 Introduction
Any implementation of quantum key distribution (QKD) trusts the detectors that are used
for detecting single-photons. However, in practice these detectors are not perfect. Their
imperfections introduce loopholes into the systems that leads security threats in QKD.
Because by exploiting the imperfections, an eavesdropper Eve can gain partial or complete
information on the key using various types of attacks, such as intercept-resend attack [269],
photon number splitting (PNS) attack [270, 271], detector efficiency mismatch attack [272],
Trojan-horse attack [273–275], time-shift attack [276], or faked state attack [50–53, 277–
281]. Of these attacks, utilizing faked state attack Eve can gain the full information on
the raw key. In this attack, which is also known as blinding attack, Eve blinds Bob’s
detectors using a bright illumination and then forces his detection to fully match with her
measurement outcome without being caught by Alice and Bob. This attack has already
been successfully implemented on the single-photon avalanche photodiodes [282–286], and
superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors [287, 288] using commercial off-the-shelf
components.
This chapter discusses the blinding attack on NFADs, which are different types of
detectors than the above mentioned single-photon detectors, as well as they require a
particular kind of readout circuits. It is crucial to verify their vulnerability to blinding
attacks so proper countermeasures can be incorporated into the systems to eliminate any
threat. To our knowledge, this test on NFADs has not been demonstrated before. We
111
performed this experiment in collaboration with ID Quantique researchers. We used the
two NFADs described in Chapter. 6 under our custom readout [251] and ID Quantique used
two commercial NFADs, model ID220 [289]. The combined results of these two experiments
are in preparation for publication [268]. However, this chapter particularly explains the
experiment of blinding attack performed on our two NFADs.
7.2 Working principle of blinding attack
The avalanche photodiodes diodes (APDs) used in most QKD systems work in Geiger mode
(biased above breakdown voltage Vbr) to detect single-photons. When APDs are biased
below Vbr, works in the linear mode where they respond linearly with the optical input,
as demonstrated in Fig. 7.1. In this mode, Eve can eavesdrop a QKD system using an
intercept-resend attack [51, 277]. First, Eve blinds the detectors with bright illumination
to bring them in the linear mode. Then regulated laser pulses are superimposed to the
blinding power to force Bob to detect the exactly same outcome as Eve prepared, when
measured at the matching bases. Conversely, Bob detects nothing when he measures in
the wrong bases.
The control of Bob’s detection works as follows: Eve keeps a copy of Bob’s state that
is sent from Alice and measures in a random basis. She resends the measured outcome to
Bob using bright trigger pulses instead of sending single-photon state. The optical power
of the trigger pulses are just above the Pth, which will produce a ’Click’ event at Bob’s
detector, only if Bob’s basis choice agrees with Eve’s measurement basis (as illustrated in
Fig. 7.2). Conversely, the optical power divides into halves for Bob’s wrong basis choice
and transmits to both Bob’s detectors. In this case, the optical power in the APDs are
below Pth, and none of the APD generates ’Click’.
This attack results with a loss of half bits, which is not an issue for a QKD system. It
is because the transmittance between Alice and Bob is below 1/2, and Bob’s APDs do not
posses quantum efficiencies always above 50%. However, in the blinding process, trigger
pulses always cause a click for the right bases. As Eve listens the open communication
between Alice and Bob in the classical channel during the shifting process, she applies the
same operation on the bits as Bob does. Finally, Eve ended up having the same key as
Bob.
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Hacking commercial quantum cryptography
systems by tailored bright illumination
Lars Lydersen1,2*, Carlos Wiechers3,4,5, Christoffer Wittmann3,4, Dominique Elser3,4, Johannes Skaar1,2
and Vadim Makarov1
The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics allow two
remote parties to communicate a private, secret key, which is
protected from eavesdropping by the laws of physics1–4. So-
called quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations
always rely on detectors to measure the relevant quantum prop-
erty of single photons5. Here we demonstrate experimentally
that the detectors in two commercially available QKD
systems can be fully remote-controlled using specially tailored
bright illumination. This makes it possible to tracelessly acquire
the full secret key; we propose an eavesdropping apparatus
built from off-the-shelf components. The loophole is likely to
be present in most QKD systems using avalanche photodiodes
to detect single photons. We believe that our findings are
crucial for strengthening the security of practical QKD, by iden-
tifying and patching technological deficiencies.
The field of quantum key distribution has evolved rapidly in recent
decades. Today, quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations in
laboratories can generate key over fibre channels with lengths up to
250 km (ref. 6), and a few QKD systems are even commercially avail-
able, promising enhanced security for data communication.
In all proofs for the security of QKD, assumptions are made for
the devices involved. However, the components used for experimen-
tal realizations of QKD deviate from the models in the security
proofs. This has led to iterations in which security threats caused
by deviations have been discovered, and the loopholes have been
closed either by modification of the implementation, or more
general security proofs7–9. In other cases, information leaking to
the eavesdropper has been quantified10,11.
Attacks exploiting the most severe loopholes are usually exper-
imentally unfeasible with current technology. A prominent
example is the photon number splitting attack12, which requires
the eavesdropper Eve to perform a quantum non-demolition
measurement of the photon number sent by Alice. The attack is
still unfeasible, and has been nullified by improved QKD proto-
cols13,14. In contrast, a more implementation-friendly attack is the
time-shift attack15 based on detector efficiency mismatch16.
Experimentally however, this attack only gave a small infor-
mation-theoretical advantage for Eve when applied to a modified
version of a commercial QKD system17. In the attack, Eve captured
partial information about the key in 4% of her attempts, such that
she could improve her random (brute-force) search over all
possible keys.
In this Letter, we demonstrate how two commercial QKD
systems id3110 Clavis2 and QPN 5505, from the commercial
vendors ID Quantique and MagiQ Technologies, can be fully
cracked. We show experimentally that Eve can blind the gated detec-
tors in the QKD systems using bright illumination, thereby convert-
ing them into classical, linear detectors. The detectors are then fully
controlled by classical laser pulses superimposed over the bright
continuous-wave (c.w.) illumination. Remarkably, the detectors
exactly measure what is dictated by Eve; with matching measure-
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Figure 1 | APD as a single-photon detector. a, In Geiger mode, where the
APD is reverse-biased above the breakdown voltage Vbr, an absorbed single
photon causes a large current IAPD through the APD. A detection signal
called a ‘click’ occurs when IAPD crosses the threshold Ith. Afterwards, VAPD
is lowered below Vbr to quench the avalanche, before returning to Geiger
mode. Below Vbr, in the linear mode, the current IAPD is proportional to the
incident optical power Popt. Then Ith becomes an optical power threshold Pth.
b, Commercial systems use gated detectors, with the APDs in Geiger mode
only when a photon is expected, to reduce false detections called ‘dark
counts’. In practice, the APD is biased just below Vbr, and periodical 3 V
voltage pulses create Geiger mode time regions, so-called ‘gates’. c, In both
systems, the bias high-voltage supply VHV has impedance Rbias (Rbias¼ 1 kV
in Clavis2 and 20 kV in QPN 5505) before Vbias is applied to the APD
at the point T1. Therefore, any current through Rbias reduces Vbias
(see Supplementary Section I for more details).
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Figure 7.1: Operation mode of APDs (Reprinted from [284]). In Geiger mode, a large
current IAPD flows through the APD in response to single-photon detection. When the
IAPD is higher than the threshold current Ith, APD can detect the signal. To quench an
avalanche, APD bias needs to be below Vbr. In the linear mode, IAPD proportionally scales
with the input optical power Popt, which must be above the threshold power Pth to be
detected.
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with incompatible bases the bit is undetected by Bob. Even the
detectors’ dark counts are completely eliminated (but can be simu-
lated at will by Eve). Based on these experimental results we propose
in detail how Eve can attack the systems with off-the-shelf com-
ponents, obtaining a perfect copy of the raw key without leaving
any trace of her presence.
Today most QKD systems use avalanche photodiodes (APDs) to
detect single photons18. To detect single photons, APDs are oper-
ated in Geiger mode (Fig. 1). However, all APDs spend part of
the time biased under the breakdown voltage, in the linear mode.
During this period, the detector remains sensitive to bright light,
with a classical optical power threshold Pth. If Eve has access to
the APDs in the linear mode, she may eavesdrop on the QKD
system with an intercept-resend (faked-state19,20) attack as follows.
Eve uses a copy of Bob to detect the states from Alice in a
random basis. Eve resends her detection results, but instead of
sending pulses at the single photon level she sends bright trigger
pulses, with a peak power just above Pth. Bob will only have a detec-
tion event if his active basis choice coincides with Eve’s basis choice
(Fig. 2), otherwise no detector clicks. This causes half of the bits to
be lost, but in practice this is not a problem because transmittance
from the output of Alice to Bob’s detectors is much lower than 1/2.
Also Bob’s APDs rarely have a quantum efficiency over 50%, but the
trigger pulses always cause clicks. For a Bob using passive basis
choice, Eve launches the peak power at just above 2Pth, because
half of the power hits the conjugate basis detectors20. Then Bob’s
detector always clicks.
After the raw key exchange, Bob and Eve have identical bit values
and basis choices. Because Alice and Bob communicate openly
during sifting, error correction and privacy amplification5, Eve
simply listens to this classical communication and applies the
same operations as Bob to obtain the identical final key.
The attack is surprisingly general. All commercial QKD systems
and the vast majority of research systems use APD-based detectors,
which all operate their APDs part time in linear mode. Detectors
with passively and actively quenched APDs can also be kept in




















Figure 2 | How Eve’s trigger pulses are detected by Bob. Schemes show
the last 50/50 coupler (C) and Bob’s detectors in a phase-encoded QKD
system. Line thickness represents optical power. I0/I1 is the current running
through APD 0/1. a, Eve and Bob have selected matching bases, and Eve
has detected the bit value 0. Therefore the trigger pulse from Eve interferes
constructively and its full power hits detector 0. The current caused by Eve’s
pulse crosses the threshold current Ith and causes a click. b, Eve and Bob
have selected opposite bases. The trigger pulse from Eve does not interfere
constructively and half of its power hits each detector. This causes no click
as the current is below the threshold Ith for each detector.



















Pblind,1 = 765 µWPblind,0 = 397 µW
Figure 3 | Bias voltage at T1 versus c.w. laser power for Clavis2. Detector 0
is blind (dark count rate exactly zero) at Plaser . 397 mW, and detector 1 is
blind at Plaser . 765 mW. QPN 5505 has similar characteristics; due to the
larger value of Rbias, its detector 0 goes blind at Plaser . 60 mW and detector 1
goes blind at Plaser . 85 mW (see Supplementary Section II for more details
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Figure 4 | Detector control. a, Electrical and optical signal oscillograms
when detector 0 in Clavis2 is blinded by 1.08 mW c.w. illumination, and
controlled by a superimposed 2.5-ns-long laser pulse timed slightly behind
the gate (see Supplementary Section III for detailed measurement setup).
The superimposed Pnever,0¼ 647 mW (detector 1: Pnever,1¼ 697 mW) trigger
pulse never causes a detection event, whereas the Palways,0¼ 808 mW
(Palways,1¼ 932 mW) trigger pulse always causes a detection event. b, Click
thresholds versus the applied c.w. blinding illumination for the QPN 5505.
When the blinding power increases, Palways,0 diverges, perhaps because the
bias voltage is approaching the punch-through voltage of the APD (see
Supplementary Section II).
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Figure 7.2: Scheme shows how Bob detects Eve’s trigger pulses (Reprinted from [284]).
APDs ’0’ and ’1’ are the two Bob’s detector . a) Eve and Bob measure in similar bases,

















Figure 7.3: Experimental setup used in the blinding control of the NFADs. a) Schematic
diagram of the experiment setup (Reprinted from [268]). The optical power of the contin-
uous wave laser (CW) and the pulsed laser are adjusted using variable optical attenuators
(VOA). The pulsed laser (PL) is triggered using a delay generator (DG). The two laser
outputs are combined into a 50:50 beam splitter (BS), whose divided outputs are then sent
to an NFAD (DUT) and to a power meter (PM). A time-tagging electronics is used for
logging the detector counts. b) Experiment setup used in the lab indicating each apparatus.
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7.3 Experimental setup for blinding attack
The experimental setup for the blinding attack is demonstrated in Fig. 7.3. Two lasers
at telecom wavelength are used for this attack. A continuous-wave (CW) laser (Santec
TSL-210V) sends optical power to the NFADs (DUT) for blinding and brings them in
the linear mode, in which the diodes are no longer sensitive to single-photons. During
the experiment, the CW power is kept fixed at 2 mW, and a variable optical attenuator
(VOA 1) next to the CW laser is used to adjust its continuous power. The second laser
(PL: DFB-1551.72) produces optical pulses of 161 ps full width half maximum (FWHM)
to manipulate Bob’s detection after the blinding. A delay generator (Highland Technology
P400) provides the trigger signals to the pulsed laser, and a second attenuator (VOA 2)
regulates its optical pulse energy. PL pulses are then split up by a 50/50 beam splitter
(10202A-50-FC-CWD07212909), which is not shown in the schematic. Half of the PL pulse
energy is combined with the CW power using another 50/50 beam splitter (BS: 10202A-50-
FC-CWD07215053), and the second half is fed to an oscilloscope (Lecroy Wavepro 760Zi)
via an optical-to-electrical converter (O/E: OE455) for pulse energy monitoring. On the
other hand, the BS transmits the combined optical energy to the NFAD, and a power
meter (PM) for monitoring total power sent to the detectors. Finally, a time-tagger unit
registers the detection events from the NFADs.
7.4 Detector Control
For controlling Bob’s detection, Eve first sends CW laser power to the detector at its
biased condition. In the beginning, detector’s counts were just the dark counts. With the
increased bright illumination, detector’s counts drop to zero, which ensures the blinding.
Then Eve adds the controlled optical pulses to the detector. Bob’s detection outcome
depends on these pulse energies because of a comparator in the readout circuit. If the
pulse energy is too small, none of Bob’s detector creates a click. For an adequate trigger
pulse energy Epulse, Eve has a probability p to make the detectors to click. The maximum
energy that never causes a click can be defined as Enever, and the energy above which there
is always a detection defined as Ealways. Now, to force a detection in QKD systems, Enever
and Ealways must fulfill certain conditions that depend on the protocol in use [285]. For
example, in the BB84 protocol, when Epulse > Ealways, as well as Eve and Bob measure in
a matching basis, all energy must hit one detector to generate a click. On the contrary, for
the non-matching bases, Epulse will be halved and hit both detectors, which should not give
any detections. To ensure this, the trigger pulse energy Epulse must meet the condition,
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Epulse/2 < Enever. After combining these two requirements, it becomes Enever > Ealways/2.
Since Bob’s detection rate is higher at the shorter distances, Eve must choose Epulse to have
higher click probability. Conversely, click probability can be less at the longer distances.
Fig. 7.4 shows the detection probability of NFAD1 (D1) and NFAD2 (D2) for various
trigger pulse energies at different blinding power. The dead-time is set to 20 µs that allows
maximum detection rate of 50 kHz for the detectors and the trigger pulses are sent at 40
kHz. As demonstrated in Fig. 7.4, above certain blinding power, there is a sharp transition
between Enever and Ealways. The width of the transition energy is shorter towards higher
blinding power, which is more apparent in Fig. 7.5. Since the transition energy is wider at
the lower blinding power, the blinding condition does not meet at this region. Therefore,
Eve will not be able to extract the entire key for short distance BB84 protocol using this
attack [52]. In such case, Eve either can increase the blinding power to achieve a narrower
transition, or get a partial attack on the key without introducing any disturbance in Bob’s
detection rate [290]. With the high blinding power, NFADs operate in the linear mode
where their gain is less due to a low voltage drop across the detector. This mode requires
increased trigger energy to get a click. In contrast, with the low blinding power, the
detectors operate at linear mode but more close to the breakdown voltage region, where
the devices have much higher gain. At this region, even very low trigger energy gives a non
zero probability to click, due to which Enever is smaller at lower blinding powers. Similarly,
when the detectors operate at higher efficiencies, they require more blinding power as the
detector’s bias voltage is high, as seen in Fig. 7.5. Detector D1 and D2 have similar
response except for a difference in their minimal blinding energy requirement, which can
be due to sample to sample variation.
We also study the change in trigger pulse energy with the discriminator threshold VTh,
where the transition energies are shown in Fig. 7.6. The difference in the transition energies
at various VTh are almost similar. We further see that, the changes of the hold-off times
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Figure 7.4: Probability of forced control at various trigger energy for a) D1, and b) D2.









































Figure 7.5: Transition energies depending on the blinding power. a) Comparison of trigger
energies for diode D1 at two efficiencies, 2 V and 5 V Vexcess. b) Comparison of energies
between D1 and D2 at the same efficiency, 2 V Vexcess.
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Figure 7.6: Evolution of trigger energy Ealways and Enever at different discriminator thresh-
old voltages for D1. The bias was 2V excess voltage and the hold off time was 20 µs.














































Figure 7.8: Time jitter of single mode D1 for bright pulse and single-photon. Solid line
represents the Gaussian approximation of the respective plots. The detection of bright
pulse has 100.6 ps FWHM and single photon detection has 271.8 ps FWHM. D1 was
biased at 2V Vexcess, and triggered at 40 kHz
For detector control, another important requirement is that timing jitter for the bright
pulses must be smaller than that of single-photons. We used a time-correlated single
photon counting (TCSPC) technique (discussed in section B.3) to measurement the jitter
for both single-photons and bright pulses. The width of the used bright pulses are 161 ps
FWHM and the single-photon pulses are 147 ps FWHM. The resultant timing jitter for
the D1 is shown in Fig. 7.8. We see that the control-pulse jitter is much shorter compared
to the single-photon jitter. This fact will also enable Eve to control the timing of clicks
at the Bob’s detector. In addition, Eve can increase artificially the jitter width to imitate
the single-photon detection. The results of the jitter measurements for the two diodes are
summarized in table 7.1. We observed a reduced jitter at the larger efficiencies and higher
mean photon numbers µ, due to the achieved larger click probability of the detectors. It is
also seen that D2 jitter is larger compared to D1, probably due to the variations between
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Table 7.1: Summary of time jitter for D1 and D2
Detector Vexcess (V)
Bright pulse Single Photon
Blinding power Jitter FWHM Mean photon Jitter FWHM
(nW) (ps) no. µ (ps)
D1 2 3.26 111.8
0.12 358.86
0.75 292.30
D1 5 100 63.6
0.09 63.83
1.0 36.43
D2 2 46.5 120.9
0.11 365.01
0.71 357.46
D2 5 100 132.7
67.0 56.98
0.80 83.53
the samples. However, in all cases, single-photon jitter is larger than that of bright pulses,
which demonstrate the detectors’ vulnerability to the blinding attack.
7.6 Summary and discussions
This chapter showed that the NFAD detectors, running under our custom made readout,
are controllable by Eve using bright illumination. However, Gaëtan et al explained two
countermeasures in [268] to detect this attack. One method is keeping track of the current
flow through the NFADs and the other one is high-bandwidth measurement. Since Eve’s
blinding control will cause the detectors to be always conductive even during the dead
time, it will increase the average current flow. Therefore in the earlier method, Bob
will be able to catch Eve’s attack by monitoring the photocurrent through the NFADs.
But Eve could apply a cleaver attack to reduce the mean photocurrent. She can attack
the NFADs when they are active and stop blinding at the time of detectors’ dead time.
This way of attack will reduce the detector’s mean photocurrent, which in turn keeps her
presence secret to Bob. However, Bob will be able to catch these shortened attacks by
utilizing high-bandwidth measurement. He needs to monitor the detector bias voltages
using a high-bandwidth device. This would enable him to see the tiny deviations in the
bias voltages caused by the detector voltage drop due to the blinding photocurrent. Thus




High-Speed Single-Photon Source for airborne
demonstration of QKD
This chapter is a partial contribution to the publication [102].
8.1 Introduction
In satellite QKD, especially in the uplink configuration, quantum signals experience addi-
tional loss caused by the atmospheric turbulence. That leads to low signal compared to the
background noise. The quantum sources are therefore required to generate quantum states
at a high rate. It will ensure a better signal to noise ratio. Sate-of-the-art quantum sources
feature pulse rate in the range of GHz [176, 291–293]. Most QKD implementations use
either weak laser pulse (WCP) sources [32, 102, 294–298] or entangled photon-pair sources
[31, 88, 299–303]. These quantum sources are expected to emit single photons within the
shortest possible time frame to perform QKD over high-lossy channels in the uplink satel-
lite communication schemes[100]. To meet that purpose, Yan et.al [100] built a 532 nm
WCP source utilizing sum-frequency generation (SFG) of a pulsed Ti:Sapphire (Ti:Sp)
810 nm laser and a continuous laser at 1550 nm. However, this source is not suitable for
satellite communications because of a few reasons. First, its repetition rate is low, limited
to 76 MHz. Second, 532 nm is not the optimal wavelength for free-space communication.
The other reason is, being a complicated and bulky laser, Ti: Sp is difficult to use in
outdoor experiments. We therefore build a new source to overcome these limitations. Like
Yan et al, our source also utilizes SFG of two laser frequencies, but it avoids the compli-
cated lasers to accomplish a compact and movable system. Our source generates photons’
123
polarization states at 785 nm, which was shown optimum for free-space communication
[36]. The sum of 1550 nm laser pulses and 1590 nm continuous laser pulses generates the
785 nm output pulses. This approach enabled us to achieve a higher repetition rate up
to 500 MHz using a pulsed laser with 300 ps pulse width. This source generates signal
and decoy states to implement decoy-state BB84 QKD [304] system. This source was also
successfully demonstrated in a QKD demonstration between a ground station and a flying
receiver in an aircraft.
Previous source implementations using polarization degree of freedom incorporated dif-
ferent approaches. That includes use of multiple laser diodes combined with a polarization
encoder [32, 104, 305–307], or a single laser combined with four semiconductor optical
amplifiers [297]. These multiple device approaches need to ensure identical frequency, in-
tensity, and bandwidth at the output quantum states. Otherwise, these will open loopholes,
which can be exploited by an eavesdropper. Another approach for source incorporated a
phase modulator with a Faraday mirror [308]. In which quantum states will suffer polar-
ization modal dispersion while propagating through polarization-maintaining (PM) fiber,
affecting the quality of produced states. A comparatively simple source demonstrated
recently that utilizes a polarization modulator inside a Sagnac interferometer provides
long-term temporal stability both at 800 nm and 1550 nm [309, 310]. However, this source
is reported very recently, and still needs to be verified that how it performs for long dis-
tance QKD. Moreover, our source is built long before this newly reported source. This
chapter explains our WCP source that ensures better thermal stability and is optimized
at uplink wavelength.
8.2 Weak coherent pulse source
A WCP source generates coherent states that are quantized electromagnetic field state.
These states are described as






A phase modulation of θ ∈ [0, 2π) on |α〉 implements |αiθ〉. Ideally, the phase of a
coherent state must be randomized to implement a mixed state of Fock states [311] that
follows a Poisson distribution with a mean photon number of |α|2. In practice, laser pulses
are heavily attenuated to generate coherent states in WCP sources. There is a nonzero
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probability of generating other than single photons. The probability of finding n photons
per pulse is found from the Poissson distribution as,




here, µ is the mean photon number. So, the probability of finding a single-photon per
pulse is:
P (1|µ) = µe−µ. (8.3)
When µ is close to 0.1–0.01, most of the pulses carry one photon. However, these sources
occasionally generate more than one photon per pulse. Eve exploits these occurrences to
enforce an attack, known as photon number splitting (PNS) attack [58, 58, 312]. In this
attack, Eve could split up the multi-photon pulses, and keep one portion for herself while
giving the other portion to Bob. This attack can be accomplished without being noticed
Eve’s presence by Alice and Bob. This will compromise the security of QKD. To overcome
this sophisticated PNS attack, in 2003 W. Y. Hwang first proposed a decoy-state protocol
[304].
8.2.1 Decoy state BB84 QKD
In the BB84 protocol using decoy states [304, 313, 314], Alice intentionally generates addi-
tional photon pulses (decoy pulses) apart from signal states. The µ is different in the decoy
pulses and the signal states. Then Alice sends randomly these states to Bob and keeps
a record of photon distribution of each pulse. This protocol use the signal states for key
generation and the decoy pulses for identifying the PNS attack. The polarization of the
decoy pulses are also randomized to make them indistinguishable from the signal states.
The yield and the quantum bit error rate (QBER) for both types of the pulses must be
similar. Generally, Eve is unaware about the photon number statistics of the two types
of states, she only knows the number of photons per pulse. Her interruption will affect
significantly the yield or QBER of signal or decoy states revealing Eve’s presence. Thus,
























APD TT1 Alice’s PC GPS
Figure 8.1: Schemetic of the high speed WCP polarized source. 785 nm pulses are generated
by the sum frequency generation (SFG) waveguide combining a 1590 nm continuous wave
(CW) laser and a pulsed 1550 nm laser. Acronyms are as follows: Arbitrary waveform
generator (AWG); fiber beam coupler (FBC); Sum-frequency generation (SFG); Band pass
filter (BPF); intensity modulator (IM); phase modulators (PM); fiber polarizing beam
splitter (FPBS); delay line (DL), fiber beam splitter (FBS); avalanche photo diode (APD);
TT1: time tagger unit; global positioning system (GPS).
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8.3 High-speed decoy state WCP source
Figure 8.1 depicts the block diagram of our WCP source that generates polarized photons
at 785 nm to implement decoy-state BB84 QKD. The source utilizes the sum-frequency
generation (SFG) scheme to generate the 785 nm wavelength. This scheme takes the
advantage of the high-speed pulsed lasers at telecom wavelengths, and thus avoids the
difficulty of finding a high-speed 785 nm laser. The source uses optical intensity and phase
modulators to generate decoy and signal states in a balanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer
configuration. The source setup is explained into two sections: The preparation of 785 nm
pulses and the modulation system.
Generation of 785 nm Pulses
First, a narrowband 1590 nm continuous (CW) laser was combined with a pulsed 1550 nm
laser (id-300, 500 MHz) using a fiber coupled beam combiner (FBC). Then the combined
optical beams travelled through a SFG waveguide that is a PPMgO:LN crystal (Periodi-
cally poled MgO doped lithium niobate) from HC Photonics [315]. PPMgO:LN is a highly
efficient non linear crystal at THz frequencies which produces 785 nm pulses at its out-
put. To ensure maximum optical power at the crystal’s output, we characterized crystal’s
performance at various temperatures, illustrated in Fig. 8.2. For input wavelengths of
1551.72 nm and 1590.52 nm, the maximum output power at 785 nm wavelength was found
to be 11.8 nW at 34.7 ◦C. Along with the desired 785 nm wavelength, the SFG crystal
also generates output at 775 nm and 795 nm which are doubles of the crystal’s input
wavelengths, respectively. Therefore, a band pass filter (BPF) was used to allow only the
desired wavelength to pass through discarding any undesired frequencies. In this setup,
the trigger signals to the pulsed laser were provided by a 1.25 GHz arbitrary waveform
generator (AWG) from Tabor Electronics [316].
Phase randomization
Our source utilizes passive phase randomization technique [317], where the pulsed laser was
turned on and off to produce the pulses. The laser current remains completely off between
the adjacent pulses and therefore these pulses do not have phase correlation among them.
For many quantum information processing protocols especially in QKD, it is crucial to
ensure continuous phase randomization between the consecutive pulses. Otherwise, one
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Figure 8.2: 785 nm optical power output of the SFG crystal with the changes of its tem-
peratures. The two input wavelengths were 1551.72 nm and 1590.52 nm.
assumption of security proof will be violated [296, 318]. In addition, QKD systems can be
hacked utilizing this phase correlations of the pulses [319, 320]
The Modulation system
To prepare polarized decoy and signal states, the modulator system includes an intensity
modulator (IM) and two phase modulators (PMs) in the Mach-Zehnder configuration.
The intensity and phase modulators are electro-optic LiNbOx (lithium niobate) 785 nm
crystal from EOSpace. Each of the modulators has a radio frequency (RF) co-axial port
to provide the driving voltages. The RF ports has external 50 Ω termination. These
modulators features low insertion loss < 3 dB, and requires only a few volts (around 2.2
V) to induce a π phase shift.
The IM works as a variable optical attenuator that controls the intensities of the input
signals. The amount of attenuation is determined by the provided driving voltages. In this
setup, IM generates vacuum, signal and decoy pulses with µ of 0, 0.5, and 0.1, respectively.
The voltages at the IM are chosen carefully to obtain the expected µ values. The pulses
then enter the MZI interferometer at diagonal polarization. The first polarizing beam







Figure 8.3: The modulator system. An aluminium housing contains the intensity modula-
tor (IM), two phase modulators (PMs), two free space delay lines (DLs)
arms. The diagonal polarization of the input pulses ensures equal beam intensities entering
into the two arms of the interferometer. Two free-space delay lines (DL) on the two arms
of the MZI are used to balance the path lengths of them. A femtosecond laser giving a
50 fs pulse width is utilised during the delay lines adjustments. Each arm of the MZI
also includes a PM that controls the relative phases of the horizontal (H) and vertical (V)
polarizations in the two arms. We applied four different voltage combinations to the PMs
to obtain four distinct phase differences between the states in the arms. When recombined,
the MZI produces diagonal (D), anti-diagonal (A), right-circular (R), and left-circular (L)
polarizations. The relative phase differences and the polarised states are explained as
follows:
∆ϕ = 0; |H〉 + |V 〉 = |D〉







(|H〉 + i|V 〉) = |R〉





(|H〉 − i|V 〉) = |L〉
A subsequent rotation of the polarised states results in the four BB84 polarizations: H,
V, D, and A. The states are generated randomly by driving the modulators with a random
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sequence of voltages to the IM and the PMs. The driving voltages are also provided by the
AWG. All the modulators and the pulsed laser were triggered simultaneously to eliminate
any loophole in the QKD. It was ensured by the AWG (model # WX1284C) we used,
because it has four synchronized channels. Each channel is capable of supporting maximum
1.2 G sample per second per channel and has 4M memory capacity. This can be readily
upgraded up to 8M per channel using already available highest memory capacity [316].
However, due to the limited AWG memory, we load a limited number of voltage sequences
in each channel. Fig. 8.4 represents a random voltage sequence for the modulators and
the 1550 pulsed laser. Each channels provide 4VP−P into 50 Ω termination.
Fig. 8.3 shows the modulator system that is housed in an aluminium frame. The
intensity modulator (IM), two phase modulators (PMs), two free space delay lines (DLs)
are contained in an aluminium housing. The housing provides a good isolation from the
environment and also acts as a good heat sink. The structure ensures long term thermal
stability.



















Figure 8.4: A sample of voltage sequences for the EO modulators and the pulsed laser.
Finally, when the polarization states are prepared, a fiber beam splitter (FBS) splits
them into 90:10 ratio. 90% of the modulated signals are then transmitted to Bob and the
remaining 10% are used for source characterization. Fig. 8.5 illustrates the sequence of
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polarized states measured by Alice.
To generate the random voltage sequences and then to load those on the AWG, two
pieces of MATLAB code were written. One code generates the four voltage sequences for
the modulators and the pulsed laser, and then saves those in four different files (see chap-
ter C. Another code, known as VISA (Virtual Instrument standard architecture) program,
interfaces the computer with the AWG. The VISA does the following tasks: i) opens up a
session, ii) sets the repetition rate of the AWG, ii) loads the pre defined files in respective
channels, iv) synchronously turns on the four output channels, and v) when requires closes
the session. In each new session, the VISA loads different sequences at the channels, while
in a particular session each channel repeats a single sequence. The length of each sequence
can be extended by upgrading the AWG memory capacity up to 32 M.
Overall, the major features of our high-rate decoy state WCP source are as follows: 1) It
prepares four non-orthogonal, BB84 states since the great advantage of polarization encod-
ing is that earth’s atmosphere preserves the polarization, 2) The pulsed laser synchronously
operates with the intensity and phase modulators, 3) The balanced MZI configuration with
two phase modulators in the two arms of MZI ensures higher visibility in the polarization
states, 4) Provides maximum repetition rate of 500 MHz, which is limited by the speed of
the pulsed laser. The rate can be scaled up to GHz by using a high repetition rate pulsed
telecom laser, and 5) An aluminium enclosure for the modulator system provides more
thermal stability,
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Figure 8.5: A portion of the generated states measured by Alice. Height indicates the inten-
sity, and color indicate types of pulses. Green represent signal states (0.5 photons/pulse),
blue are decoy states (0.1 photon per pulse), and grey is the background measured between
pulses (not used for QKD). The intensities for signal (mu), decoy (nu), and vacuum (Y0)
are shown in the boxes on the top left
8.4 Airborne QKD demonstration
In 2016, our WCP source was used in an airborne QKD demonstration, between a ground
station at Montague Airport, Smiths Falls and a Twin Otter research airplane from the
National Research Council of Canada (NRC) [102]. During the flight, when the receiver
on the aircraft came at the transmitter’s line of sight, both tracked each other onward and
established an optical link. The polarization states prepared at the ground station source
were navigated through a transmitter telescope and then sent up to the receiver. Both
the source and receiver kept records of the quantum states’ polarization and their arrival
times. Later this information was used for checking the correlation and post-processing to
extract the secret key.
The experiment consisted of in total 14 night-time passes. The aircraft passes were at
an altitude of around 1.6 km with distances of 3 km, 5 km, 7 km, 10 km from the ground
station in the straight line paths and arc paths. Fig. 8.6 demonstrates two– 7 km line and
arc paths.
During the test, our source generated signal, decoy and vacuum states, with probabil-
ities of 80%, 14%, and 6% respectively. The source rate was 400 MHz. The sequences
used for the intensity and phase modulators repeated in every 1000 pulses. Although this
is not ideal for QKD systems, it was sufficient for the demonstration. 90% of the weak
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7 km radius. For thisflightmission concept, a sequence ofGPS coordinates was calculated for eachflight, with
the start angle relative to the ground station and the distancewere used as input. These coordinates were
transferred to theflight software of the aircraft by the pilots.We developed a decision tree such that, based on the
observed performance of each pass, we could immediately select an appropriate course of action (e.g. to perform
troubleshooting or collect data under different conditions). That amission concept such as this is viable shows
that a similarmission concept, appropriate for an orbiting satellite receiver, can realistically be achieved.
2.2. Source and transmitter
OurQKD source is a significantly improved version of a previous-generation apparatus [28], implementing
BB84with decoy states [29] at 400MHz.Weak coherent pulses at 785 nmwavelength are generated by
combining a narrowband 1590 nmcontinuous-wave (CW) laser (L1)with 1550 nm triggered-pulsing laser (L2)
through sum frequency generation in a periodically poledmagnesiumoxide (PPMgO)waveguide (see figure 2).
For each pulse, one of three intensity levels is chosen: signal, decoy or vacuum,with probabilities of 80%, 14%
and 6%, respectively. Signal and decoy levels are generated using a fast electro-optical intensitymodulator (IM)
Figure 1. Flight paths for the 7 km arc and line, followed from left to right. The star indicates the location of the ground station at
Smith Falls–Montague Airport. The inner portions represent where the quantum linkwas active. Photo produced using
GPSVisualizer.com,map data© 2016Google, imagery© 2016Cnes/Spot Image, DigitalGlobe, Landsat, NewYorkGIS, USDAFarm
Service Agency.
Figure 2. Left, schematic diagramof the quantum source and transmitter apparatus. Acronyms are as follows: arbitrary waveform
generator (AWG), wavelength divisionmultiplexer (WDM), polarising beam splitter (PBS), optical attenuator (OA), band-pass filter
(F), polarisation tomography (PT) and time tagger (TT). Other acronyms and details given in the text. The red border indicates
components that aremounted on themotors. Right pane: ground station located at Smiths Falls–Montague airport, showing (right to
left) the trailer where the source is located,motormountwith transmitter telescope attached,Wi-Fi antenna and calibration telescope.
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Figure 8.6: Flight paths from left to right. These are 7 km arc and line paths. The ground
station located at the middle established a quantum link with the aircraft at the inner
portion of each path. Reprinted from [102].
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Figure 2. Left, schematic diagramof the quantum source and transmitter apparatus. Acronyms are as follows: arbitrary waveform
generator (AWG), wavelength divisionmultiplexer (WDM), polarising beam splitter (PBS), optical attenuator (OA), band-pass filter
(F), polarisation tomography (PT) and time tagger (TT). Other acronyms and details given in the text. The red border indicates
components that aremounted on themotors. Right pane: ground station located at Smiths Falls–Montague airport, showing (right to
left) the trailer where the source is located,motormountwith transmitter telescope attached,Wi-Fi antenna and calibration telescope.
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Figure 8.7: Apparatus used in the ground station. Left, the schematic diagram of the
source and ransmitter. Right, round station at Smiths F lls–Montague irpo t. The
source is located in the trailer, and the motor mount with attached transmitter telescope,
a d Wi-Fi antenna are ou side. Reprinted from [102].
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pulses are then guided to the transmitter and sent to the receiver on the aircraft by a 12
cm diameter refractive telescope. On the ground station, the source optics and electronics
were kept inside a trailer to preserve the thermal and humid stability. The big telescope,
and the Wi-Fi antenna were located outside just beside the trailer, as shown in Fig.8.7.
On the receiver side, a telescope with a 10 cm aperture facing out from the cabin door
collected the incoming signals. An integrated optical assembly (IOA) containing a passive-
basis-choice polarization analyser measured the signal into corresponding four BB84 states
(H, V, D, and A). Four output fibers of the IOA were fiber coupled to the receiver’s detector
module that contains four Excelitas SLiK silicon single-photon avalanche diodes. Then, a
control and data processing unit (CDPU) accumulated the detector events.
calibrations allowed link acquisition to begin immediately upon the arrival of the airplane in the vicinity of the
ground station.
3. Results
In total, seven of the 14 airplane passes over the ground station successfully established a quantum signal link.
Issues, includingminor equipment failures (e.g., a loose beacon camera lens) and accidental controller
misconfigurations, particularly hampered link establishment during the first night: two of the seven attempts
were successful. These issues were addressed during the intervening day, and the second night had considerably
better link establishment rate: five of seven attempts. (Weattribute the two failures on the second night—both
attempted straight-line paths—to thefixed orientation of theWi-Fi transceiver at the aircraft being poor for this
geometry, particularly at the beginning of a pass.)
Secret keywas extracted out of six of the seven successful passes. Fromdata collected during these passes, we
observe the performance of the system at various distances andwith angular speeds. Circular-arc passes allowed
us to demonstrate longer duration of key exchange, comparedwith straight-line passes, as the receiver telescope
held a relatively constant position during the pass,making link establishment and pointing easier. Straight line
passes, however, aremuchmore representative of a satellite passing over a ground station, as they simulate the
change in angular speed that would be experienced during such a pass. Themaximumangular rate is reached
when the airplane is closest to the ground station for that pass: the greatestmaximumangular rate wemeasured
for our passes was 1.28°/s at a distance of 3 km (arc). This angular rate is consistent with overflying LEO
spacecraft such as 0.72°/s for a 600 kmorbit, as baselined forQEYSSat, or 1.2°/s for the International Space
Station (ISS).
Table 1 summarises the seven passes where quantum signal was successfully transmitted to the receiver
aboard the aircraft. Passes typically lasted a fewminutes, with the aircraft travelling at 198–259 km/h. To
quantify pointing performance, we define the typical pointing error as themeasured distance of the beacon spot
from the calibrated reference point on the camera image, discarding timeswhen themotors had just begun
tracking. Themean typical pointing error at the transmitter varied from0.00133° to 0.0220° over the passes; at
the receiver, it was 0.0630° to 0.126°. The receiver’s fine-pointing unitmeasured pointing errors similar to the
pointing error of the transmitter, between 0.00239° to 0.0127°, where the deviationwasmeasured from the
centre of the quad cell sensor. (These values are used in the link analysismodel, below.)
Figure 4 shows observed results for two representative passes, including themotor speed of the transmitter
in the horizontal axis and link acquisition stages, the coarse- andfine-pointing errors at the receiver, the
calculated time offlight of the quantum signal from the transmitter to the receiver, the rate of detections of all
Table 1. Summary of data frompasses where a quantum linkwas established. All times areUTC. Except where indicated (*), secure key
lengths incorporate finite-size effects.
Pass 5 km 7 km 5 km 3 km 3 km 7 km 10 km
arc 1 line arc 2 line arc arc arc
2016-09-21 2016-09-21 2016-09-22 2016-09-22 2016-09-22 2016-09-22 2016-09-22
Parameter 2:57:45 3:30:45 1:15:23 2:19:33 2:24:45 2:42:16 2:57:42
Classical link duration [s] 288 172 352 34 170 210 289
Quantum link duration [s] 235 158 250 33 158 206 269
Mean speed [km h−1] 208 200 198 236 216 259 212
Maximumangular speed [°] 0.76 0.45 0.75 1.0 1.28 0.60 0.37
Transmitter pointing error
(10−3)[°]
22.0 4.85 1.33 3.42 2.91 1.58 2.82
Receiver pointing error
(10−3)[°]
125 126 63.0 86.5 89.8 78.6 87.2
Receiver fine-pointing error
(10−3)[°]
2.73 9.98 Nodata 2.62 2.39 3.01 12.7
SourceQBER [%] 5.08 3.58 3.32 2.66 4.37 2.80 3.39
SignalQBER [%] 13.13 5.24 3.42 2.96 5.20 2.96 3.30
DecoyQBER [%] 19.54 11.1 6.13 6.35 7.93 5.97 8.46
Theoretical loss [dB] 52.1 41.6–44.8 28.1 33.3–35.1 30.9 32.1 39.9
Meanmeasured loss [dB] 48.0 51.1 34.5 39.5 34.4 39.4 42.6
Error correction efficiency 1.4 1.16 1.33 1.4 1.18 1.46 1.27
Signal-to-noise threshold 0 1500 2000 1000 1000 2000 2500
Sifted key length [bits] 152508 95710 5212446 853066 5102122 2348086 1175317
Secure key length [bits] None 9566* 867771 71648 44244 200297 70947
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Figure 8.8: Summary of the successful passes during trials. Reprinted from [102].
8.5 Results
Of the 14 aircraft passes, seven could establish quantum links successfully. The results
of these passes are summarized in Fig. 8.8. The pass distances and the angular velocity
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were different. Circular-arc passes could maintain the quantum links for longer duration
compared to the line paths, as because the receiver telescope managed to keep a constant
position during the flight, which made it easier for the pointing system to establish and
maintain the link. Nonetheless, the straight line paths are more similar to the satellite
passes as the angular speed changed during the pass over the ground station. The angular
speed was maximum when the aircraft was closest to the ground station: the maximum
angular speed was measured 1.28◦s−1 at the 3 km arc distance. Such speed is consistent
with a LEO spacecraft, for instance, angular speed of the QEYSSat would be 0.72◦s−1 at
600 km altitude, or for the International Space station it is 1.2◦s−1. The total quantum link
loss varied between 34.4–51.5 dB. The source QBER varied between 2.66%–5.08% for each
pass. Of the successful passes, six could extract the secret key. Through this experiment





This thesis presented the results of my four research projects. In chapter 5, I discussed
the design and development of a highly compact and miniaturized single-photon detector
module (DM) that facilitates thermal and laser annealing, as well as detector characteriza-
tion. This DM works together with a control board developed by our collaborating team
at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) and forms the complete annealing
payload. The control board contains high power lasers required for the laser annealing, a
light source and a photodiode required for detector characterization, and a microcontroller.
Our DM consists of four silicon single-photon avalanche photodiodes (SPADs): two Ex-
celitas C30902SH and two Excelitas SLiK. The SPADs mounted on an aluminium plate is
attached with the DM PCB, which contains SPAD bias and readout electronics, and an
active temperature controller. Module operation is controlled by a Cypress programmable
embedded system-on-chip (PSoC). Throughout the development process, we implemented
three detector modules. The first module (DM1) was built to test the proof-of-principal
operation of the detector PCB, which has a dimension of 95 mm × 95 mm × 40 mm
(L×W× H). The second PCB (DM2) is the actual flight version with a proper CubeSat
dimension ( 90 mm× 90 mm× 52 mm), that fits into the CubeSat bus. DM2 implementa-
tion considered the launching vibration, as well as the low-Earth orbit (LEO) thermal and
vacuum environment. This completed module is now sent to the UIUC team for further
test and under preparation for its launch. As of this writing, the UIUC team is continuing
functional tests of the annealing payload, which has so far passed the second phase of
the international space station safety panel and next will go over other safety tests and
certifications. When ready for the actual launch, a 3U CubeSat bus will carry the payload
to an LEO orbit in the CAPSat mission. The tentative time of the flight is sometime in
2020.
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After the launch of the payload to an LEO, we will be able to conduct the annealing
experiments in space. The time of operation of the DM will be controlled from a ground
station. This test will provide us an insight about the radiation damage that occurs to
in-space detector devices and the annealing methods. We will know the effectiveness of the
annealing methods in mitigating the in-orbit damages. The success of this experiment will
lead us to assess a few other issues before incorporating the system in the future satellite
quantum receivers. One issue is analyzing the statistical fluctuations between the samples.
For that, we need to test more samples in the real space environment. The second concern
is, the high power laser used for the annealing also degrades over time due to the space
radiation and temperature fluctuations. Their lifetime could also affect the mission lifetime.
Therefore, a comprehensive study is required to analyze high power lasers’ behaviour and
their lifespan in space. The other problem is, we still need to find out an effective way for
coupling the incoming single-photons from a ground station source and the annealing high
power laser with the detectors.
However, in the meantime, prior the actual launch of the annealing payload, we built
another detector module (DM3) in a similar manner as maintained during DM2 implemen-
tation. As of this writing, we are processing an experiment to perform annealing on the
DM3 detectors in a thermal vacuum chamber. This experiment will allow us to analyze
the performance of the overall module in vacuum that it will face in the lower Earth orbit.
In chapter 6, I explained a new simple design of an NFAD photon detection module
that includes an active afterpulse suppression circuit. We used this module to characterize
two NFAD samples. We found the maximum photon detection efficiencies of 8.5% and
6% for NFAD1 and NFAD2, respectively. These efficiencies are acceptable in the long-
distance quantum communications where the channel loss is usually high. The study of
the hold-off times on the DCR and afterpulsing probability showed that 20 µs of hold-off
time is sufficient to achieve DCR below 100 Hz and highly reduced afterpulsing probability
PAP. At the 5 V of excess bias, where PAP is generally high, a 20 µs hold-off time reduced
the afterpulses significantly. At this hold-off time, the afterpulsing probabilities are 0.02
and 0.004 times of the probabilities at a 5 µs hold-off time for NFAD1 and NFAD2,
respectively. This outcome demonstrates a noticeable afterpulse reduction capability of
our readout module. Additionally, the maximum possible detection rate imposed by the
20 µs hold-off will not affect the long-distance quantum communications because of the low
photon receiving rate at the receiver. Our new readout system also has an excellent timing
resolution, which is around 75 ps and 62 ps FWHM for NFAD1 and NFAD2, respectively.
The overall resultant characteristic parameters of the NFADs under our new readout system
prove the system’s as well as the detectors’ suitability in the quantum optics applications
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at telecommunication wavelengths.
Chapter 7 discussed the blinding attack of the NFADs mentioned above using bright
illumination. Our experiment demonstrated the detectors’ vulnerability to the attack that
is utilized by an Eavesdropper to leak quantum information. This attack on the detec-
tors can be prevented by incorporating countermeasures, such as by monitoring detector
current, or through measurement using high bandwidth devices [268].
Finally, in chapter 8, I presented the development of a high-speed weak coherent pulsed
(WCP) source. Our WCP source modulator uses phase and intensity modulators to gen-
erate polarization quantum states at different intensities to implement decoy-state BB84
protocol. Its maximum repetition rate is 500 MHz, which can be upgraded in the range of
GHz by replacing the pulsed laser with a GHz speed laser. However, this source running
at 400 MHz was used in a ground station to transmit polarized qubits to a receiver located
on a flying aircraft. This QKD demonstration established a secure key of length 70947 bits
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Figure A.1: PCB schematic of the CAPSat detector module.
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Figure A.3: An engineering drawing of the payload detector board, with
high voltage modules attached.
25
Figure A.2: Engineering drawing of the DM2 and DM3 PCB with the high voltage supply
loaded. Courtesy to University of Illinois.
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Figure A.4: An engineering drawing of the mounting plate on which the
SPADs are mounted.
26
Figure A.3: Engineering drawing of the DM2 and DM3 detector mounting plate.
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Appendix B
Supporting details for characterization of
negative feedback avalanche diode
B.1 Formula for detection efficiency
Photons from a weak coherent pulsed (WCP) source, usually a highly attenuated laser
pulses, follows Poisson distribution [321]. When these photons are detected by a single-
photon detector having a quantum efficiency of ηD, the probability of detection can be
written as




Here, P(n) is the probability of detecting n photons, µ is the mean photon number, and
ηD is the detector’s efficiency. Detectors should not click for the laser pulses containing no
photon. The probability of no photon is
P (0) = e−µηD (B.2)
and if the laser pulses contain one or more photons, detectors will click. The probability
of detection due to photon is therefore
P (≥ 1) = 1− e−µηD (B.3)
However, practical single-photon detectors have some dark count probability dc, which
are generally thermally generated carriers. Due to these dark counts, the detectors produce
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extra click events even at the absence of photons. So, the total click probability of the
detectors within a time window τo will be
P (D) = Click probability due to photon + Click probability due to dark counts
⇒ P (D) = (1− e−µηD) + e−µηDdcτo
⇒ e−µηD(1− dcτo) = 1− P (D)
⇒ e−µηD = 1− P (D)
1− dcτo
⇒ µηD = −ln
1− P (D)
1− dcτo







If the laser triggers at a rate of ftrig and the detector clicks at a rate of Rdet, then the









Equation B.5 gives the detection efficiency of a single photon detector when a WCP
source is used.
B.2 Photon number calibration
To do the photon number calibration, we used a high power laser (OPO Ti:Sp) at 1310.44
nm to determine the loss factor of the attenuator. In our setup, the attenuator consisted of a
90:10 beam splitter (BS) followed by a digital variable optical attenuator (VOA: OZ optics:
DA-100-3U-1300/1550-9/125-S-50). The optical input was first attenuated by feeding it
into the 10% arm of the BS, which was further weakened by the VOA. By measuring the
optical power at the input (P I) and output (P O), we calculated the total loss (Eq. B.6)
of the attenuator combination. We also considered the losses through the fibers that were
contained in the optical path. The cleanliness of the fibers and the FC/PC connectors
have a significant contribution to the total loss.





Once the loss of the attenuator was carefully determined for different loss settings in
the VOA (which were used later with the low power pulsed laser), we switched the OPO
TI:Sp with the low power pulsed laser id-300. From the measured input power of id-300
and the known attenuation factor, the output optical power PO that was illuminated on






Where ftr is the laser trigger frequency, and hν is the photon energy at wavelength of
laser. Thus, this procedure gave us the photon flux for various attenuations.












Figure B.1: Timing jitter measurement setup using oscilloscope. The acronym are PL:
pulsed laser, FG: function generator, VOA: variable optical attenuator, O/E: optical to
electrical converter. The start channel on the oscilloscope refers that the trigger was set
on this channel.
We used a 6 GHz Lecroy wavepro 760Zi oscilloscope (OSC) to measure the timing jitter
of the NFADs. The scheme is illustrated in B.1. Photons from a pulsed laser (id-300), with
a pulse width of 147.2 ps FWHM and triggered at a rate of 40 kHz, were sent to an NFAD
(at the 10% arm of BS). Its detection signals were the trigger signals in the OSC. On
the other hand, 90% of the pulsed optical output (PL), following an optical to electrical
conversion (O/E: LeCroy OE455, DC-3.5 GHz), were also fed to the OSC as stop signals.
The time differences between the two signals were calculated as a function P1 within the
OSC. The threshold voltages for the two OSC input signals were kept fixed: half of the
147
amplitude for detection signals and one-quarter of full amplitude for the optical signals.
A histogram of P1 for ∼100 K counts were generated in OSC to measure the timing jitter
of the counting module. Fig. B.2 illustrates a histogram of the time differences between
the signals. Then a Gaussian plot was produced from the histogram in Matlab, and the
standard deviation (σ) and the full width at half maximum (FWHM) were calculated using
equations B.8 and B.9, respectively.






JT (FWHM) = 2σ
√
2log2 (B.9)
here C is a coefficient found from the Gaussian distribution that defines the width of the
distribution.
The timing jitter found following this process includes the jitter contribution from all
the devices involved in the setup. We measured the overall jitter by gradually increasing
the photon flux. The jitter decreases with the increase of photon flux, as illustrated in Fig.
B.3. For sufficiently high photon flux, the jitter asymptotically reaches a minimum value,
which was considered as the overall jitter contribution from all connected devices. It was
only ∼ 40 ps, and we therefore neglected the jitter contribution from the OSC and the
O/E. Hence, the timing jitter of the counting module was found using the formula (B.10).
∆tjitter =
√
J2T − J2L (B.10)
148
here, JT is the measured jitter and JL is the laser pulse width, which was ∼ 147 ps
FWHM.
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Lines from Trim Pot 3 and 2 are connected together
and then only one is connected to PR2
Lines from Trim Pot 3 and 2 are connected together
and then only one is connected to PR4
Digikey P/N:
WM2702-ND = BOARD CONNECTOR 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Modifications R1 to R2:
R12 100 ohm trim pot  -> Vias for soldering cables to large trim pot
TP1 added to U1 pin4






































































Number of photons/ pulse
Figure B.3: Measured timing jitter with respect to various number of photons per pulse.
Jitter is smaller for larger number of photon flux.
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Figure B.4: Top view of the PPM PCB
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MATLAB code to generate the modulation
sequence
1
2 warn=0; %will turn to 1 if voltages are not appropriate
3
4 DAQ Q1 max=voltmax; %max voltage of the DAQ for the ...
corresponding channel
5 DAQ Q2 max=voltmax; %max voltage of the DAQ for the ...
corresponding channel
6 DAQ Q3 max=voltmax; %max voltage of the DAQ for the ...
corresponding channel
7 DAQ Lp max=voltmax; %max voltage of the DAQ for the ...
corresponding channel
8
9 V H=Vpi/8+offset H;
10 V V=3*Vpi/8+offset V;
11 V D=Vpi/8+offset D;









21 for j=1:seq no
22
155
23 %The IDquantique laser needs pulses to trigger, so we have to make ...
the signal
24 %alternate from max to 0. To accomodate this we assign each modulator ...
points
25 %two identical values. Therefore, each pulse periods create 2 ...
identical points
26 %for each modulators and 1 on and 1 off point for the laser, ...
resulting in
27 %2*seq no number of points for the DAQ. This also means the QKD ...
system will
28 %run at half the DAQ frequency (i.e. 1GHz will give 0.5GHz laser and ...
modulator frequency).
29
30 if (int vect(j)==0) %Vacuum pulses, laser does not trigger





36 Q3(1+mod(Q1 d+2*j−1,2*seq no))=Vac;
37 Q3(1+mod(Q1 d+2*j−2,2*seq no))=Vac;
38 else
39 Lp(1+mod(Lp d+2*j−1,2*seq no))=2;
40 end
41 Lp(1+mod(Lp d+2*j−2,2*seq no))=0;
42
43 if (int vect(j)==1)
44 Q3(1+mod(Q1 d+2*j−1,2*seq no))= Sig;
45 Q3(1+mod(Q1 d+2*j−2,2*seq no))= Sig;
46 elseif (int vect(j)==2)
47 Q3(1+mod(Q1 d+2*j−1,2*seq no))=Decoy;
48 Q3(1+mod(Q1 d+2*j−2,2*seq no))=Decoy;
49 end
50

























75 if max(abs(Q1)) > DAQ Q1 max
76 warning('Q1 goes outside bounds!')
77 warn=1;
78 end
79 if max(abs(Q2)) > DAQ Q2 max
80 warning('Q2 goes outside bounds!')
81 warn=1;
82 end
83 if max(abs(Q3)) > DAQ Q3 max
84 warning('Q3 goes outside bounds!')
85 warn=1;
86 end
87 if max(abs(Lp)) > DAQ Lp max




92 %converting data into 14 bit format
93 Q1=int16((2ˆ13−1)*Q1/DAQ Q1 max);
94 Q2=int16((2ˆ13−1)*Q2/DAQ Q2 max);
95 Q3=int16((2ˆ13−1)*Q3/DAQ Q3 max);
96 Lp=int16((2ˆ13−1)*Lp/DAQ Lp max);
97
98 %writing to the binary file
99 fid1= fopen('Q1.wav', 'w');
100 fid2= fopen('Q2.wav', 'w');
101 fid3= fopen('Q3.wav', 'w');















116 %End of the program%
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